Allahabad High Court Upholds Husband's Conviction In Dowry Death Case, Acquits Estranged In-Laws Living In Separate Household

The Allahabad High Court recently upheld the life imprisonment of a man convicted of dowry death of his wife, while acquitting her brother-in-law and sister-in-law on the ground that they lived in a separate household and had no involvement in the couple's domestic affairs.

A bench of Justice J. J. Munir and Justice Saurabh Srivastava ruled that the statutory presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted against extended family members without persuasive evidence that they inflicted cruelty upon the deceased.

The case pertained to the 2013 death of one Tajrun Khatoon, who died of asphyxia as a result of strangulation in her matrimonial home within four months of her marriage to Abrar Ahmad/Appellant.

The trial court had sentenced (Abrar), his brother (Lal Babu), and sister-in-law (Shabana Khatoon) to life imprisonment. They were all convicted under Sections 304-B/ 34, 498-A/ 34 IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act.

'Strangers To His Household'

The prosecution's case against the brother-in-law and his wife rested heavily on telephonic conversations reported by the deceased's father and siblings.

However, the High Court scrutinized this testimony and noted that the deceased's family had ‘scanty’ interaction with her matrimonial home. The father had visited only once, and the siblings had never visited, rendering them effectively unaware of the internal domestic dynamics.

On the other hand, multiple defence witnesses, including independent neighbours, deposed that Abrar (Husband) and Lal Babu were not on speaking terms. Following Lal Babu's marriage, their father had partitioned the house and the brothers lived in separate living quarters with no shared hearth.

Noting that the trial court had wholly ignored this fact, the High Court stated: "It is not fair to condemn defence evidence or look upon it with suspicion as second-grade evidence, inferior to that of the prosecution."

Statutory presumption cannot be applied mechanically

Relying on the Supreme Court's mandate in Baijnath v. State of M.P. (16), the Bench said that proving cruelty or harassment shortly before death is the sine qua non (essential condition) for invoking the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

The Court noted the apex court's ruling that if the prosecution fails to demonstrate this fact by persuasive evidence, it cannot take refuge in the statutory presumption to cover up a shortfall in proof.

Applying this to the present case, the High Court emphasized that the evidence of cruelty against the brother-in-law and sister-in-law was based entirely on ‘scanty’ telephonic information, which could not be mechanically accepted for all the appellants.

The Bench ruled that while the husband would naturally take the blame for dowry-related cruelty, it was "rather illogical" to infer that his estranged brother and sister-in-law would join cause with him.

Noting that the fundamental requirement to attract the presumption was absent, the Court concluded: “Once the presumption is not raised, conviction as ordered by the Trial Court on its basis under Section 304-B IPC cannot be sustained. No case under Section 4 of the DP Act and under Section 498-A IPC, for the selfsame reason, is also made out against these two appellants.”.

Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions of Lal Babu and Shabana Khatoon for all charges.

Murder (Section 302 IPC) ought to be the main charge

While upholding the husband's life term, the High Court took objection to the trial court's framing of charges.

Given the definitive medical evidence of strangulation and a fractured hyoid bone, the Bench noted that a charge under Section 302 IPC (Murder) should have been framed and tested as the main charge, rather than proceeding straight to Section 304-B IPC (Dowry Death).

However, the Court held it could not convert the husband's conviction to Section 302 IPC or enhance the sentence.

Referring to Section 386 of the CrPC and the legal maxim no reformatio in peius (prohibition of a change for the worse), the Court explained that an appellate court cannot suo motu enhance a sentence in an appeal filed by the convict without any specific appeal for enhancement by the State or the complainant.

Ultimately, the husband’s appeal was dismissed and his life term was upheld. On the other hand, the appeal moved by the brother-in-law and sister-in-law was allowed, and their conviction was set aside.

Case Title: Abrar Ahmad v. State of U.P.

Judgment Date: July 1, 2026

Bench: Justice J. J. Munir and Justice Saurabh Srivastava