Bhojshala Dispute: Intervener Says Writ Petition Not Maintainable, Urges Civil Trial

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore continued hearing today in the long-standing Bhojshala dispute.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the intervener urged the court to decline entertaining the writ petition and instead relegate the parties to a civil trial, stressing that the controversy turns on contested facts, title, and documentary evidence that cannot be adjudicated within the limited scope of Article 226 jurisdiction.

Appearing for the intervener, Advocate Syed Ashhar Ali Warsi submitted before the division bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi that the property in question, identified through specific Khasra numbers, has consistently been recorded as a mosque in historical land records, including entries dating back to 1925–26, which carry a statutory presumption of correctness under Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 unless disproved through evidence.

The counsel emphasized that such presumptions cannot be displaced without a full-fledged trial. “All entries made in land records shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved,” he argued, adding that no contrary evidence has been established in accordance with law. He further contended that several documents relied upon by the petitioners were not formally proved and remained uncorroborated, describing them as “mere lectures” rather than admissible exhibits.

A central plank of the intervener’s case rested on the statutory scheme of the Waqf Act, 1995. Referring to Sections 4, 5, and 6, Warsi argued that once a Waqf property is notified and published, any dispute regarding its character must be raised within the prescribed limitation period and before the appropriate forum. “No such suit shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication,” he submitted, asserting that the present challenge is ex facie barred by limitation. He further contended that the petitioners have bypassed the statutory mechanism by directly invoking writ jurisdiction.

The submissions also relied on historical gazette notifications, particularly those from 1935, alongside the regulatory framework under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904. It was argued that while the State may act as a custodian of protected monuments, such protection does not confer ownership. “The State does not become the owner of the property; it is only a custodian for preservation,” counsel submitted, adding that any pre-existing title remains unaffected unless lawfully extinguished.

Addressing claims that the structure bore characteristics of a Hindu temple, the intervener pointed to findings from Archaeological Survey reports, asserting the absence of essential temple features such as garbhagriha, shikhara, and mandapa. In contrast, he highlighted the presence of mosque-specific architectural elements, including mihrab, qibla alignment, courtyard, and minbar. “The ASI itself confirms the existence of essential mosque features,” he argued, while also questioning the evidentiary basis of contrary interpretations advanced by the petitioners.

The intervener further alleged discrepancies in documentary reliance, including what was described as a “forged” interpretation of a British Museum record concerning an idol. Such conduct, it was argued, reflects an attempt to “abuse the process of law” and underscores the need for strict evidentiary scrutiny in a civil forum.

On the constitutional plane, reliance was placed on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, which mandates maintenance of the religious character of places of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947. Counsel submitted that any attempt to alter this character is statutorily barred and constitutionally impermissible. “The law creates a clear embargo on changing the religious nature of such sites,” he argued.

Concluding his submissions, Warsi maintained that the dispute involves “profound factual controversies” requiring examination of oral and documentary evidence, which can only be undertaken in a civil suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. He urged the court to dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable, observing that “Article 226 is not the appropriate forum where evidence can be led and tested.”

The court, after hearing the submissions, indicated that the maintainability of the petition and the appropriate forum for adjudication would be considered at the next stage of proceedings.

Case Title: Hindu Front for Justice (Regd. Trust No. 976) Through its President Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri v. Union of India Ministry of Culture and other connected matters

Date of Hearing: April 20, 2026

Bench: Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi