Muslim Personal Law Allows Marriage Upon Puberty, Not Live-In Relationships: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that even if some schools of Muslim personal law recognise marriage upon puberty, such recognition cannot extend to a live-in relationship outside marriage, while refusing protection to an interfaith couple where the male partner was below 21 years of age.

Justice Garima Prashad observed that the petitioners had not claimed to have solemnised a nikah and were admittedly in a live-in relationship outside marriage. Court said that Muslim personal law therefore did not come to their assistance.

Moreover, court clarified that even if a more permissive rule existed under any personal law, the secular statutory framework governing marriage, including the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954, prescribed a higher threshold which the court was bound to enforce.

Referring to the legislative scheme that treats a male below 21 years as lacking legal capacity to marry, court held that what cannot be achieved either through a valid secular marriage or a lawful marriage under the applicable personal-law framework cannot be “judicially reconstituted as a sanctioned live-in arrangement".

Court was dealing with a writ petition filed by a 20-year-old Muslim woman and her 19-year-old Hindu partner, who sought protection of their life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, claiming they were residing together in a live-in relationship. The couple alleged that the woman’s father was threatening them and pressuring them to separate.

Before court, the petitioners stated that they could not solemnise marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 because the male petitioner had not yet attained 21 years of age, the statutory minimum age for a groom under the law. They argued that despite this, they had a right to live together as consenting adults and sought directions restraining family members from interfering in their relationship.

Opposing the plea, the State argued that granting protection to such a relationship would effectively undermine the statutory framework under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. It contended that Parliament had consciously treated a male below 21 years as lacking legal capacity to marry and courts could not indirectly permit a marriage-like arrangement through a live-in relationship.

Court framed the central issue as whether it could, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, grant protection to a live-in relationship where the male partner was below 21 years of age and statutorily classified as a “child” for marriage purposes.

Examining the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, court observed that the statute creates a “marriage-specific incapacity” by treating males below 21 years as children for the purposes of marriage, even though they may otherwise be majors under general law. It noted that the legislation was intended not merely to classify child marriages but to prevent and discourage them through penal and preventive mechanisms.

On the issue of Muslim personal law, court held that the petitioners were not claiming the existence of a valid Muslim marriage. Justice Prashad observed that even if some schools of Muslim law recognise marriage on attaining puberty, such principles concern marriage and not live-in arrangements outside marriage.

Justice Prashad also observed that the petitioners themselves admitted they had entered into a live-in relationship because the law did not currently allow them to marry. In such circumstances, the court said, the live-in arrangement functioned as a substitute for marriage and granting protection to it would amount to indirectly sanctioning a presently impermissible marriage-like relationship.

Court clarified that while parents or guardians could not resort to threats, violence, coercion or illegal confinement, they equally could not be restrained from taking lawful steps under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, including approaching police or Child Marriage Prohibition Officers.

Referring to Supreme Court precedents on live-in relationships and personal liberty, including Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006), Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018) and Nandakumar v. State of Kerala (2018), the high court held that those rulings concerned legally competent adults and did not authorise courts to override statutory age restrictions governing marriage.

Finding that the petition contained only vague allegations without details of any specific unlawful acts or threats, the high court ultimately dismissed the writ petition and refused to grant the protection sought by the couple.

Case Title: Shajiya Parveen And Another Vs. State Of U.P. And 3 Others

Order Date: May 4, 2026

Bench: Justice Garima Prashad