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The Single Bench of Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai while recently dismissing the application for condonation of delay filed under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“MV Act”) has observed that to entertain an appeal after the expiry of limitation period, the Appellant is required to prove sufficient cause for the delay. 

“It is clear from the second proviso supra that the High Court may entertain the Appeal after expiry of the period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from preferring the Appeal in time. Thus, the Appellant is required to prove “sufficient cause” for the delay.”, the Bench remarked.

The instant application is filed by the Petitioner/ Appellant under Section 173(1) M.V. Act seeking condonation of 261 days delay in filing the Appeal.

The Applicant’s Counsel while explaining the delay submitted to the court that,

“the impugned Judgment was pronounced on 31.10.2019, copy of the Judgment was sought on 05.11.2019 vide application which was ready on 26.11.2019. The Appeal came to be filed on 05.11.2020 however after curing the defects was re-submitted on 11.12.2020. The limitation period of 90 (ninety) days admittedly, was over on 19.02.2020, as per Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant. Reliance was placed by Learned Counsel on the Circulars issued by the Registry of this High Court from 24.03.2020 after the lockdown owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. That, in view of the facts submitted hereinabove, the delay be condoned.”

On the other hand the Respondent’s Counsel contended that,

“the Appeal ought to have been filed on 19.02.2020 and reliance by the Petitioner/Appellant on the Circulars issued by the High Court is erroneous as the first Circular, dated 24.03.2020, was issued almost a month after the period of limitation was over and was concerned with the lockdown after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. The other Circulars dated 14.04.2020 and 18.04.2020 also have no relevance to the instant matter. That, as no other grounds have been specified for the delay, in such circumstances, the Petition merits no consideration.”

Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 states that,

Appeals: 

1. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: 

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty five thousand rupees or fifty percent of amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: 

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

2. No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.”

The Bench placed reliance on the SC judgements in Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81) in which it was observed that, “It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

Reference was also made to Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others ((2013) 12 SCC 649). 

Therefore, the Court while rejecting the application for condonation of delay, observed that, 

“it is indeed incongruous for the Petitioner/Appellant to have placed reliance on Circulars dated 24.03.2020, 14.04.2020 and 18.04.2020 which were issued much after the period of limitation had expired for filing the Appeal. No grounds have been put forth as to why the delay of 261 (two hundred and sixty one) days occurred prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the issuance of the consequent Circulars. Although it was also urged by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant that substantial justice ought to be meted out to the Appellant, however, in the same vein, Learned Counsel may be reminded that the compensation sought for is under benevolent legislation to mitigate the sufferings of persons who lose an earning member of the family in a motor accident besides suffering other non pecuniary losses. The Circulars issued by the High Court, as already pointed out by Learned Counsel for the Respondents, have no relevance to the instant matter and are, therefore, outside the ambit of consideration.”

Case Title: The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited V. Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha and Others

Law Point/Statute Involved: Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act,1988