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Synopsis

 

In a significant ruling, the High Court of Meghalaya rejected a bail plea in a criminal miscellaneous case, emphasising the principle that when a special law sets a definitive time limit, the judiciary cannot extend this timeframe as it would essentially equate to legislative action, beyond the court's authority.

Additionally, the court invoked the maxim "Ut res magis valeat quam pereat," underscoring the necessity of interpreting statutes in a manner that ensures their efficacy and constructiveness, rather than rendering them ineffective or destructive.

The petition, filed by Wallam Jingsuk Barim (accused), challenged his incarceration related to charges of criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Explosive Substance Act 1908. The accused in a Special NIA Case for alleged offences, sought bail after multiple rejections by the Special Judge (NIA).

The petitioner argued a lack of material evidence implicating him in the case, alleging his association with the banned Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), and highlighted his prolonged judicial custody. It was further argued that under Section 120B of the IPC, which pertains to criminal conspiracy, the maximum punishment can be either death or life imprisonment.

However, he contends there is no concrete evidence to prove that he conspired with others to commit an offence under Section 6 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908, thus challenging the accusations of abetting the offence of bomb blasting.

The petitioner also claimed that the Special Judge failed to consider his assertion that he has no affiliation with the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), suggesting a gap in the judicial assessment of his involvement with the banned organisation.

Barim's bail applications were rejected by the Special Judge (NIA) on three separate occasions: September 22, 2022, March 9, 2023, and August 21, 2023.

Following these rejections, Barim filed another bail application with the High Court, which he subsequently withdrew on September 28, 2023, with the liberty to file a new application. The present bail application was filed with a delay of 114 days, and a condonation of delay was sought for entertaining the bail plea.

Basing the argument on the principle of “bail is the rule and jail is the exception,” the counsel representing the petitioner argued that despite the prescribed 30 days limitation period under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the court is empowered to condone the delay with a further 90 days in preferring the appeal.

The counsel for the government (respondent) opposed the plea, arguing that the petitioner has “no statutory right to seek for condonation of delay” and has not demonstrated sufficient cause to justify the delay of 114 days.

According to Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, applications cannot be entertained beyond the 30-day limit. Additionally, the counsel contended that the Limitation Act of 1963, particularly Section 29(2), does not apply in this case since the 2008 Act is a special law that governs proceedings related to offences under this specific act, the government counsel contended.

Referring to the case of Nasir Ahammed vs. National Investigation Agency, the respondents highlighted that the NIA Act's specific provisions regarding time limits for appeals are definitive. The judgment from this case clarified that while the High Court can condone delays up to sixty days beyond the initial thirty-day period, no appeal can be entertained after ninety days, thereby excluding the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

A bench of Chief Justice S. Vaidyanathan and Justice W. Diengdoh acknowledged the petitioner's situation and his repeated bail rejections while remarking, “Of course, it is true that there is no restriction to file a number of bail applications before the Trial Court, but as per the condition stipulated under the Act, it should be well within time.” The court noted that the petitioner had the opportunity to file a new bail application immediately after withdrawing the earlier one but failed to do so within the acceptable time frame.

The court concluded that the petitioner “having obtained adverse orders thrice and having withdrawn the last one, had missed the bus in filing yet another bail application in time and there was no whisper as to the cause for the delay, thereby sufficient cause to the best satisfaction of this Court is apparently absent, which is a mandatory requirement under the Act, 2008.”

“Special Law prescribes an outer time limit, this Court cannot extend the time on the reasoning that it would amount to legislation by the Court itself, which is not permissible,” the court stated, dismissing the petitioner's application and allowing him the liberty to approach the Special Court again with a new bail application if he is so advised.

Notably, the court initially considered condoning the delay and expressed its decision in favour of the petitioner in open court but ultimately decided against it after reserving the case for orders. This change of opinion, aligns with the Supreme Court's ruling in Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit vs. State of Gujarat, which states that a court can change its mind before the order is signed. “Once the order is signed, it attains finality and Section 362 Cr.P.C. is a bar and the Court cannot recall the order”.

Cause Title: Wallam Jingsuk Barim vs The Union of India & ors (Crl.M.C. No. 108/2023)