Procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights: SC

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Synopsis

"This court cannot help but be reminded of the famous saying that procedure is the handmaiden of justice," court noted

The Supreme Court has said procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights or cannot subvert substantive justice, as it set aside Punjab and Haryana High Court's order which by dismissing a revision application allowed the procedure to compromise substantive right of the objector.

A bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and Sanjay Karol pointed out that the ground taken by the High Court to dismiss the revision application was that the appellant misapplied the provisions in filing his objections before the executing court, inasmuch as the objection petition mentioned both Section 47 as also Order XXI Rule 58 and 97 of the CPC. The High Court found that both these sets of provisions could not be applied together given that the method of assailing the orders passed therein were different and could not co-exist. 

"Whilst looking at it purely from a procedural point of view, this may have some merit; however, as has been long established, procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights or cannot subvert substantive justice. Since the objector or his father already had a decree in their favour, fruits thereof cannot be denied to them by virtue of the fact that while attempting to protect their rights in a subsequent suit which would have affected their enjoyment of such property, the Sections or Orders under which they sought such protection, were incorrect," the bench said.

The top court was dealing with a question whether the objections filed by the present appellant, Joginder Singh (Dead) now represented through LRs, were maintainable and warrant interference with the decree of the learned civil court.

The objections filed were under Order XXI Rules 58 and 97 read with Section 47 of the CPC.

The bench pointed out it is all too well-settled that a court cannot ‘go behind’ a decree. 

The court also noted that in Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs Gobind Ram Bohra (1990), it has been held that if a decree is passed by a competent court after due adjudication of merits, it operates as re judicata. If the same is nullity, its validity can be questioned at any stage. 

The executing court is to determine all questions inter se the parties to the decree, as flows from the statutory text, has been reiterated in Jugalkishore Saraf Vs Raw Cotton Co Ltd (1955), court noted.

An executing court is to execute the decree as it stands and cannot modify its terms, the bench said, referring to C F Angadi Vs Y S Hirannayya (1972).

Similarly, a decree passed by a court not having the jurisdiction to do so, does not ipso facto, render it illegal. The recourse is for the aggrieved to have it set aside as per law. If they fail to do so, they shall be bound thereby, the bench said, citing Rafique Bibi Vs Syed Waliuddin (2004), the Supreme Court noted.

After underscoring the principle, the bench said the High Court in the present matter had correctly held that the objector-appellant was not a third party to the dispute. 

The matter before the court pertained to the execution of decree of the second partition suit. The share sought to be divided was a result of the first partition suit. The civil court had on September 22, 1979 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs wherein it was mentioned that Mukand Singh, father of the objector/appellant was the plaintiff in the said suit. 

An appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge, Faridkot, which was dismissed as meritless on October 18, 1982. Handing over of possession was recorded by Additional Senior Sub-Judge, Moga, on September 21, 1985 to the LRs of Mukand Singh and Chanan Singh.

"With the appeal before the Additional District Judge, Faridkot, being dismissed, the decree of 1979 in the first partition suit has attained finality. Therefore, the remit of the second partition suit necessarily has to exclude the portions which already stand decreed per the first partition suit. By virtue of the first partition decree, the legal representatives of Mukand Singh and Chanan Singh have been in possession of the decreed lands since September 21, 1985", the bench noted.

In the case, the bench opined that the High Court dismissing the revision application had to be interfered with.

"This court cannot help but be reminded of the famous saying that procedure is the handmaiden of justice," the bench said.

The court also did not agree to the High Court, which with respect to the first partition suit, observed that it could not have been decreed by virtue of the Punjab Pre-Emption (Repeal) Act, 1973, but then noted that this was not an aspect which required delineation given that the entitlement of share was admitted by the parties. 

"Be that as it may. We find the said observation to be in error for the reason that the discussion of pre-emption in the judgment rendered in the first partition suit appears to correspond to an earlier transaction having taken place somewhere in the 1930s and 1940s by one Lal Singh, father of the plaintiffs in the first partition suit," the bench said.

The court remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court to take a decision on the objections of the appellant afresh, on merits. 

"It stands clarified that this court has not expressed any view on the facts of the case. Considering the fact that this matter has been doing the rounds of various court halls for more than two decades, we request the concerned court to take all steps necessary for expeditious disposal," the bench said.

The court also pointed out after all it was as far back as 1872 that the Privy Council in General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga Vs Coomar Ramaput Sing lamented that the problems of the litigant in India, begin once he has obtained the decree. 

In Messer Griesheim GmbH Vs Goyal MG Gases Pvt Ltd (2022), a hundred and fifty years later this court observed that ‘there has been no improvement and still the decree holder faces the same problem what was being faced in the past', the bench said.

"When a litigant approaches the court, what he is interested in getting is not the imprimatur of the court on his right over a certain amount of money or in this case property, what he actually wants is the actual money and/or property, and the rights that flow from possessing it, i.e., enjoyment of the same in whatever manner he sees fit," the bench said.

The court allowed the appeal and directed its Registry to forward a copy of its judgment to the Registrar General of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana who has been asked to then ensure its passage to the concerned court, expeditiously.

Case Title: Joginder Singh (Dead) Thr LRs Vs Dr Virinderjit Singh Gill (Dead) Thr LRs & Ors