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Synopsis

The Supreme Court has said that a senior’s admonition cannot be reasonably attributed to mean an ‘intentional insult with the intent to provoke’ within the meaning of Section 504, IPC, provided that it relates to matters incidental to the workplace, covering discipline and the discharge of duties therein.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta allowed an appeal by B.V. Ram Kumar, then officiating director of the National Institute for Empowerment of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, Secunderabad, and quashed an FIR lodged against him at Bowenpally Police Station, Hyderabad, for offences punishable under Sections 269, 270, and 504 of the IPC. The FIR was registered on February 5, 2022, by a woman assistant professor.

It was alleged that he spoke to her in a high-pitched voice in his chamber and reprimanded her for having filed complaints against him to the higher authority regarding the alleged unavailability of PPE kits, masks, and sanitizer.

The court felt that pressing criminal charges against an individual who was the head of the Institute (workplace) for trying to maintain discipline may lead to disastrous consequences, crippling the entire disciplinary atmosphere required in the workplace.

The Telangana High Court had dismissed his petition, holding that the allegations against him were serious in nature; therefore, the true facts of the case needed to be elicited and proved during the trial.

In the case at hand, the bench noted that all the charge sheet disclosed was that the appellant and the complainant had a verbal altercation, which became unbearable for the complainant owing to her medical condition, as she claimed to have recovered from Covid-19.

At the time of the incident, the appellant was discharging his functions as the Director of the Institute (workplace). He was entrusted with the administration and management of the entire Institute (workplace) and, in addition, was required to fulfill his professional obligations as a medical professional to both the Institute (workplace) and society at large.

"It is, therefore, a reasonable expectation on the part of a person who caters to the affairs at the helm that his juniors should attend to the professional affairs of the Institute (workplace) with utmost sincerity and dedication. We are equally cognisant of the circumstances that existed during the times of the Covid-19 pandemic and the pressure on medical professionals was multiplied manifold. Therefore, in our view, it was reasonable for the appellant to contemplate similar expectations from his juniors/associates," the bench said.

The court also noted that complaints regarding indiscipline in the Institute (workplace) were already pending with the office of the Director. Additionally, while discharging his duties as Director, the appellant had received numerous complaints from the parents of students against the complainant for negligence in the discharge of her duties.

In this backdrop, there was nothing out of the ordinary for the person in charge of the Institute (workplace) to call such subordinates to the chamber and reprimand them in order to restore discipline in the Institute (workplace), the court said.

"The intention was simply to control the perceived indiscipline of subordinates who were alleged to be shirking their duties and displaying a lethargic, lackadaisical, and laid-back approach towards the profession. If such behavior is not checked by superior officers entrusted with administrative tasks, it could lead to a situation where other employees follow suit," the bench said.

In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the bench felt that the appellant’s act of reprimanding the complainant could not, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an ‘intentional insult’ meted out to provoke her to commit a breach of peace or any other offence.

"If the interpretation advanced by the prosecution and the complainant is accepted, it may lead to gross misuse of liberty in workplaces. Therefore, in our opinion, a senior’s admonition cannot be reasonably attributed to mean an ‘intentional insult with the intent to provoke’ within the meaning of Section 504, IPC, provided that the admonition relates to matters incidental to the workplace, covering discipline and the discharge of duties therein," the bench said.

Going by the charge sheet and the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer during the investigation, the court noted that it was discernible the appellant had been implicated in the present criminal proceedings due to his strict demeanor and his tendency to maintain discipline, which is reasonably expected of individuals serving the noble vocation of the medical profession while also heading an institution during the challenging period of the Covid-19 pandemic.

"Therefore, we are of the firm view that allowing criminal charges to be pressed against an individual who was the Director of the Institute (workplace) for trying to maintain discipline may lead to disastrous consequences, crippling the entire disciplinary atmosphere required in the workplace. We do not find the necessary ingredients constituting the offences applied in the charge sheet so as to allow further prosecution of the appellant. Hence, it is a fit case to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant," the bench said.

Examining the appeal, the court said that the position of law is well settled by a catena of judgments of this court. In order to entertain a challenge to an FIR, charge sheet, or an order taking cognisance, all that needs to be seen is whether, from a bare reading of the charge sheet, the ingredients of the sections charged therein are prima facie made out or not.

Relying upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), the bench said it is trite that constitutional courts are wholly competent to exercise their extraordinary power to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice if the allegations in the FIR or complaint neither disclose the commission of any offence nor make out a prima facie case against the accused.

On a thorough reading of the charge sheet, the bench found that the highest allegation against the appellant was that he had been scolding the complainant in the Institute (workplace), thereby causing mental harassment to her since October 2021. On February 2, 2022, at 11 o’clock at night, while the complainant was attending to her clients, the appellant called her to his chamber. When she entered, he raised his voice and asked her whether she was aware of the conduct rules before submitting her grievance against him to the higher authorities.

The charge sheet also narrated that the complainant had been affected by Covid-19 due to the inadequate supply of PPE kits and gloves, which were allegedly maintained by the appellant as the Director of the Institute (workplace).

From a bare perusal of the charge sheet and the documents relied upon therein, apart from the fact that the allegations were purely conjectural, they could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered sufficient to constitute the ingredients of offences under Sections 269 and 270, IPC, the bench said.

The court opined that the Investigating Officer seemed to have been unduly influenced by the sensitive situation prevailing during Covid-19 and relied upon the bald allegations of the complainant, who alleged that the appellant had not provided and maintained an adequate supply of PPE kits and gloves for the working staff at the Institute (workplace).

The allegation regarding the failure to maintain an adequate supply of PPE kits and gloves had already been refuted by witness statements, it noted.

"We thus fail to see how the Investigating Officer was able to reach a conclusion that a simple verbal spat which took place between the appellant and complainant in the chamber of the appellant would make the former liable under Section 504, IPC. At best, what can be inferred from the allegations is that the appellant spoke to the complainant in a loud voice and a belligerent tenor," the bench said.

Referring to Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra (2013), the bench said that upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate concludes prima facie that there has been an intentional insult by the accused towards the complainant to provoke a breach of peace or any other offence, only then would the act complained of fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC.

The court thus set aside the High Court's judgment of March 3, 2024, and quashed the charge sheet for offences punishable under Sections 269, 270, and 504, IPC, filed before the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad, along with all proceedings arising therefrom.

Case Title: B V Ram Kumar Vs State of Telangana And Another