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Synopsis

The Supreme Court recently quashed criminal proceedings against a couple accused of cheating by a woman who claimed she engaged in physical relations with their son under the assurance of marriage.

A bench comprising Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and K V Viswanathan, while ruling in favor of the couple, also criticized the Madras High Court for its "disturbing" observations, including its assertion that allowing the couple's petition would enable their son to "spoil women of marriageable age in the same manner."

Setting aside the high court's order, the bench said, "We do not find that there is any act or conduct on the part of the appellants which can be termed to be illegal per se, much less criminal in nature. No ingredients of any offence under the IPC appear to be forthcoming. As such, we are unable to hold that any offence under the ambit of Section 415 of the IPC is made out against the instant appellants".

Appellant Marippan and his wife moved the Supreme Court challenging a Madras High Court order that had refused to quash the charge sheet against them. Their plea, filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, sought to set aside the proceedings, but the high court declined their request.

The complainant woman had alleged that she was in a relationship with the appellants’ son and engaged in physical relations with him based on his promise of marriage. She claimed that during their relationship, he introduced her to his parents, who assured her that they would accept her as their daughter-in-law. However, she later learned that his parents had arranged his marriage with someone else.

The appellants' counsel submitted that nowhere in the entire complaint there was any allegation that the parents had instigated or had misrepresented to the complainant that they would get her married to their son and that was the basis for the complainant to have developed physical relations with the appellants’ son. Further, there was also no allegation that the appellants forced the son to marry another girl and that they had any knowledge of the intimate relationship of their son with the complainant.

A counsel for the complainant, per contra, submitted that the role of the appellants was crucial since they were the parents and only upon their assurance, she had agreed to a physical relationship. Suddenly, she was left in the lurch, as the son of the appellants had duped her and married another girl.

The state counsel, however, submitted that on the facts of the present case and the pleadings, it appeared that the appellants could not be held liable, much less, held criminally liable under Sections 417 and Section 109 of the IPC.

Finding substance in the submissions of the counsel for the appellants, the bench said, "From the entire reading of the complaint itself, it is clear that the only reference by/reason of the complainant against the appellants was that they were the parents of the boy who was in a relationship with her, and on one occasion, she had also met the appellants with their son."

In the complaint itself, the court pointed out, it was stated that the son of the appellants did not want the appellants to stay there for some time, and immediately they were sent away.

"To our minds, this is also indicative of the fact that the appellants themselves were totally ignorant of what, if anything, was happening between their son and the complainant," the bench said.

Further, the court pointed out that at the time of filing the complaint, the complainant was 29 years old, while the appellants’ son was 32. It also highlighted that the complainant was a postgraduate who had previously worked at the appellants’ textile showroom before establishing her own cosmetics business.

"Arguendo, the appellants’ statement/conduct led the complainant to develop intimate relations with the son, looking to the complainant’s age and educational qualification, we are not inclined to accept the same," the bench said.

In any event, the court said, from a bare perusal of the complaint, it was evincible that the main allegations were against the appellants’ son.

The son had also filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code, which was later withdrawn.

"Grant of relief, therefore, to the appellants would not adversely impact the case against the appellants’ son, inasmuch as the appellants’ son can independently be proceeded against in the case," the bench said.

The bench held that trial against the appellants would be an abuse of the process of the court and the same needs to be nipped in the bud.

The court thus allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. It, however, clarified, the observations would not in any manner, prejudice the State or the complainant in proceedings against the appellants’ son.

In its parting note, the court expressed "disapproval" with regard to observations by the high court on the appellant's son.

"The parties before the High Court were: (i) the appellants (original petitioners); (ii) the State, and; (iii) the complainant. This being the position, it was plainly unnecessary for the observation infra to be made by the High Court in the impugned judgment, towards which we express our disapproval," the bench said.

The court said that the high court should have been cognisant that the appellants’ son was not before it. The bench ordered deletion of the observations from the high court’s records.

Case Title: Marippan & Anr Vs State Represented By The Inspector Of Police & Anr