Muslim Women’s Body Urges Supreme Court to Reject PIL Seeking Uniform Divorce Rules

The PIL also seeks gender-neutral, religion-neutral universal grounds and procedures for divorce.

In its intervention application filed through AoR Ejaz Maqbool the group argued that it is a necessary party because its work centres on studying Muslim Personal Law and conducting grassroots awareness programmes for Muslim women on their rights under the Shariat Act. It submitted that the petition, if allowed, would deprive Muslim women of their constitutionally protected rights to seek dissolution of marriage through Khula, Mubaraat and the statutory grounds under Section 2 of the 1939 Act.

The Applicants contended that Muslim Personal Law is a sacred framework rooted in the Qur’an, Ahadith, Ijma and Qiyas, and has been judicially recognised in Shayara Bano v. Union of India as protected under Articles 14, 19(1), 25, 26 and 29. They asserted that divorce in Islam is a matter of conscience and an integral religious practice, and any interference would violate the fundamental right to freedom of conscience and religion.

The application emphasised that Talaq-e-Hasan provides a reconciliation period during iddat and that Khula and Mubaraat empower women to seek separation without prolonged litigation. The Applicants argued that these mechanisms prevent “limping marriages” where a civil divorce exists but religious divorce does not, leaving Muslim women unable to remarry within their community.

They submitted that the petitioner’s challenge reflects a misunderstanding of Muslim women’s agency and undermines systems that enable swift, inexpensive resolution of marital disputes without burdening courts. The group further asserted that Muslim women’s rights to religiously recognised divorce cannot be negated under the guise of uniformity, especially when Muslim Personal Law has been held outside the scope of Article 13 and thus cannot be tested on Articles 14, 15 or 21.

Maintaining that the petitioner has already exercised multiple legal remedies and is attempting to use personal grievances to attack the entire framework of Islamic matrimonial law, the Applicants urged the Supreme Court to reject the PIL.

Notably, on November 19, the Apex Court was told by a counsel appearing for a petitioner highlighted the case of a woman who allegedly received an 11-page talaq notice signed not by her husband but by his Advocate.

Justice Kant had strongly questioned the practice, remarking that such a procedure raised serious concerns about dignity and women’s rights. “What prevents the husband from directly writing to her? Does he have such ego that even for divorce he cannot speak to her? Should a civilized society allow this kind of practice?” Justice Kant observed, noting that while the present petitioner was fighting her case, many women would lack the resources to do so and could later face accusations of polyandry if remarried in the absence of a proper divorce record.

The Supreme Court had, while last hearing the matter, observed that the practice of using Talaq-e-Hasan for divorce by Muslims was not prima facie improper. Talaq-e-Hasan is the practice wherein a Muslim man can divorce his wife by saying the word "talaq" once a month, for three months.