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Synopsis

The Supreme Court has on April 9, 2024 said that it is not necessary that a candidate in an election must declare every item of movable property that he or his dependent family members own, such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture, etc, unless the item is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be disclosed. 

"We are not inclined to accept the blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate. His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character," a bench of Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar said.

The apex court allowed an appeal filed by Karikho Kri against the July 17, 2023 judgment of Itanagar bench of High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. 

Acting on a petition by Congress candidate Nuney Tayang, the high court had declared Kri's election in 2019 as independent candidate from the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency, as void for not disclosing material particulars in his affidavit filed in Form No 26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. 

The high court had held against Kri for not disclosing vehicles, viz, the Kinetic Zing Scooty, Maruti Omni Van, the TVS Star City Motorcycle.

It had also held against him for non submission of no dues certificate with regard to occupation of government bungalow and liability in the form of municipality and property taxes.

The apex court said, "Though it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained registered in the names of the wife and son of Kri, the question that arises is as to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified the attributing of a corrupt practice to him and the negating of his election on that ground".

The court, however, pointed out once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by Kri, the said vehicles could not be considered to be still owned by his wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. 

"Such non-disclosure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as an attempt on his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section 123(2) of the Representation of People Act of 1951. We may note that Kri had declared the value of the movable assets of his dependent family members and himself as Rs 8,41,87,815. The value of the three vehicles in question, by comparison, would be a mere miniscule of this figure. In any event, suppression of the value of these three vehicles would have no impact on the declaration of wealth by Kri and such non-disclosure could not be said to amount to ‘undue influence’," the bench said.

With regard to contention on improper acceptance of nomination papers, the bench said that the very fact that Section 36(4) of the Representation of People Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in mind and there is no absolute mandate that every non-disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact, would automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a corrupt practice.

The court did not accept a contention that the voter's right to know is absolute.

The court said that every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character. 

Giving an example, the bench said, a candidate and his family who own several high-priced watches, which would aggregate to a huge figure in terms of monetary value, would obviously have to disclose the same as they constitute an asset of high value and also reflect upon his lavish lifestyle. Suppression of the same would constitute ‘undue influence’ upon the voter as that relevant information about the candidate is being kept away from the voter. However, if a candidate and his family members each own a simple watch, which is not highly priced, suppression of the value of such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would, therefore, have to be judged on its own facts, the bench said.

The court pointed out that it was not in dispute that there were no actual outstanding dues payable by Kri in relation to the government accommodation occupied by him earlier.

His failure in disclosing the fact that he had occupied such accommodation and in filing the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import, the bench held.

Case Title: Karikho Kri Vs Nuney Tayang and another