Bhojshala-Kamal Maula Mosque | Sr Adv Salman Khurshid Argues Disputed Title Cannot Be Decided In Writ
Sr Adv Salman Khurshid argues Bhojshala dispute cannot proceed in writ jurisdiction, citing Places of Worship Act, Supreme Court judgments, and res judicata.
Sr Adv Salman Khurshid Invokes Res Judicata, Challenges Maintainability of Bhojshala Plea
Senior Advocate Salman Khurshid, appearing for respondent Maulana Kamaluddin Welfare Society, on Tuesday advanced a layered challenge before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the ongoing Bhojshala-Kamal Maula Mosque dispute, placing the spotlight on the interplay between statutory bars, maintainability principles, and the evidentiary limits of writ jurisdiction.
At the outset, Sr. Adv. Khurshid anchored his submissions in the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, as interpreted in the M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v Mahant Suresh Das. He argued that the central question before the High Court is whether the dispute pertains to a “remote past” or must be assessed with reference to the statutory cut-off date of August 15, 1947. Emphasising that the Ayodhya ruling rejected faith-based adjudication in favour of legal principles, he submitted that the present controversy must similarly be tested within a constitutional framework rather than competing historical narratives.
Addressing the statutory scheme, Sr. Adv. Khurshid acknowledged the argument that properties protected by the Archaeological Survey of India fall outside the Act’s ambit under Section 4. However, he suggested that this exclusion stems from the existence of a parallel regulatory regime under ASI, rather than an invitation to reopen religious character disputes.
He further drew attention to proceedings pending before the Supreme Court of India in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, highlighting the December 2024 order restraining courts from proceeding with fresh suits or granting effective interim or final reliefs concerning such disputes.
Sr. Adv. Khurshid argued that while the survey in the present case may have been permitted through specific orders, the High Court would be constrained from passing consequential directions in light of the Supreme Court’s broader embargo. He framed this as a threshold issue, urging either judicial restraint or clarification from the Supreme Court before further adjudication.
On facts, he raised concerns regarding the ASI survey process, particularly the absence of complete videographic access to the respondent. He contended that meaningful objections to the survey report could only be formulated after examining the full video and photographic record, invoking principles of natural justice.
The Court, noting the Supreme Court’s direction that objections arising from videography must be considered, indicated that the footage would be supplied to the parties, while allowing arguments on other issues to proceed.
Sr. Adv. Khurshid’s principal attack, however, was on maintainability. Citing a line of precedents including DLF Housing Construction v Delhi Municipal Corporation and subsequent rulings, he submitted that disputed questions of title and religious character requiring detailed evidence and possibly cross-examination cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings. He pointed out that an earlier petition concerning the same site had already been dismissed on similar grounds, directing parties to seek remedies through a civil suit.
Building on this, he invoked the doctrine of res judicata, arguing that the present petition is effectively a “mirror image” of the earlier litigation, merely reversing the communities claiming exclusive rights. Allowing such proceedings, he cautioned, would undermine finality in litigation and amount to an abuse of process.
He also questioned the maintainability of the plea as a public interest litigation, citing non-compliance with procedural requirements under the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, including disclosure of credentials, source of information, and prior representations. Without directly imputing mala fides, he suggested that constitutional standards governing PIL jurisdiction must be strictly enforced.
Touching briefly on the waqf issue, Sr. Adv. Khurshid clarified that statutory changes affecting waqf notifications do not extinguish the concept of waqf itself, which can arise through dedication or long-standing religious use.
Concluding his submissions for the day, Sr. Adv. Khurshid indicated that he would address the implications of the Ayodhya judgment in greater detail in the next hearing.
In the previous hearings, the ASI defended its survey process as compliant with due procedure, while petitioners relied on architectural findings to assert temple origins. Intervenors, however, consistently questioned maintainability and pressed for a full civil trial, even as calls for a practical, non-confrontational resolution were also placed before the Court by one of the petitioners.
The matter is now scheduled for further hearing tomorrow (April 22, 2026).
Case Title: Hindu Front for Justice (Regd. Trust No. 976) Through its President Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri v. Union of India Ministry of Culture and other connected matters
Date of Hearing: April 21, 2026
Bench: Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi