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The Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court continued hearing the Bhojshala dispute as Senior Advocate Shobha Menon advanced detailed constitutional and statutory arguments, contending that the controversy cannot be resolved within the framework of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Appearing before a Division Bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi, Sr Adv. Menon argued that the petitions seek to cloak private and sectarian claims in the language of public interest, while in substance raising issues of title, ownership, and competing religious assertions that require adjudication by a civil court.

Opening her submissions today, Sr Adv. Menon placed reliance on constitutional provisions including Article 13 of the Constitution of India, Article 21 of the Constitution of India and Article 25 of the Constitution of India, arguing that the petitioners’ invocation of fundamental rights was misconceived.

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She submitted that while Article 21 has been expansively interpreted to include cultural and heritage concerns, relief under it must be grounded in a direct and tangible threat to life or liberty. The present case, she argued, fails to meet that threshold and instead advances claims confined to a particular community.

On Article 25, Sr Adv. Menon emphasized that the guarantee of religious freedom is available to “all persons” and is subject to public order, morality, and health. She cautioned against construing the provision to grant exclusive rights to one group over a disputed site, arguing that such an interpretation would distort the constitutional balance. According to her, the petitions effectively seek exclusionary control, which cannot be justified under the scheme of fundamental rights.

A significant portion of her arguments focused on evidentiary standards, with Sr Adv. Menon relying on principles emerging from the Ayodhya Ram Janmabhoomi verdict. She underscored that questions of title cannot be determined on the basis of faith, belief, or historical narratives alone, but must rest on evidence tested through trial. Referring to the extensive evidentiary exercise undertaken in that case, she argued that reliance on gazetteers, travelogues, and archaeological opinions in the present petitions cannot substitute for proof. Such materials, she submitted, may have corroborative value but cannot conclusively establish ownership.

Sr. Adv. Menon also addressed the role of official records and reports, cautioning that even authoritative documents cannot be treated as determinative without judicial scrutiny. She argued that opinions contained in reports, however eminent their authors, must yield to evidence tested in accordance with law. The court, she submitted, must remain circumspect in drawing conclusions from historical or literary sources in the absence of cross-examined material.

Turning to statutory provisions, Sr Adv. Menon traced the legal framework governing ancient monuments, including the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904 and subsequent legislation. She argued that there is no concept of automatic vesting of property in the Archaeological Survey of India, emphasizing that statutory procedures require specific notifications, declarations, and acquisition processes. In the absence of such steps, she submitted, claims of automatic control or ownership are unsustainable.

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She further relied on a 1935 gazette notification issued under the then prevailing legal regime to contend that such notifications qualify as “law” within the meaning of Article 13. According to her, the notification explicitly recognized the religious character of the site and permitted continued usage, and has not been displaced through any valid legal process. She argued that the authority of the ruler to issue such a notification was traceable to the statutory framework in force at the time, including the Government of India Act, 1935.

Sr Adv. Menon also challenged the validity of an Archaeological Survey of India order dated July 7, 2003, particularly the provision permitting weekly access on Tuesdays. She argued that the order was issued under statutory rules that only empower the authority to restrict or prohibit entry, not to create new rights of access. The impugned clause, she submitted, was therefore without jurisdiction and liable to be declared void.

Reiterating her central submission, Sr Adv. Menon argued that the dispute involves contested questions of title, religious character, and historical fact, all of which require adjudication through evidence before a competent civil forum under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. She concluded by cautioning against expanding writ jurisdiction to decide such issues, stating that the case is ultimately about legality under the Constitution rather than a contest of faith.

The Court will continue to hear the matter Tomorrow (April 29, 2026).

Case Title: Hindu Front for Justice (Regd. Trust No. 976) Through its President Ms. Ranjana Agnihotri v. Union of India Ministry of Culture and other connected matters

Date of Hearing: April 28, 2026

Bench: Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Alok Awasthi