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<title><![CDATA[LawBeat | Indian Legal News | Legal Updates | Supreme Court Judgements | Latest Legal Breakings | Court Ruling Updates]]></title>
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<title>LawBeat | Indian Legal News | Legal Updates | Supreme Court Judgements | Latest Legal Breakings | Court Ruling Updates</title>
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<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 14:38:25 GMT</pubDate>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 14:38:25 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[Trilegal Advised ASK Investment Managers On Proposed Acquisition of SageOne Investment Managers]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The acquisition is a strategic move to strengthen ASK's equity investment capabilities.]]></description>
<tags>Trilegal,Mergers And Acquisitions</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-ask-investment-managers-on-proposed-acquisition-of-sageone-investment-managers-1641921</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-ask-investment-managers-on-proposed-acquisition-of-sageone-investment-managers-1641921</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Deal Beat]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[aishwarya iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 14:04:30 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Trilegal advised Blackstone-backed ASK Investment Managers on its proposed acquisition of SageOne Investment Managers.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289990-trilegal-dealbeatjpg.webp' /><p>Trilegal advised Blackstone-backed ASK Investment Managers on its proposed acquisition of SageOne Investment Managers.</p><p>The acquisition is a strategic move to strengthen ASK's equity investment capabilities and provide SageOne access to ASK's global distribution network. </p><p>The deal, estimated at ₹1,500–2,000 crore, will bring together ASK's institutional scale and distribution network with SageOne's investment team and track record. Blackstone will remain the majority shareholder of the combined platform.&nbsp;</p><p>The Trilegal Corporate Team advising on this matter was led by Partners: Nishant Parikh, Arjun Ghose and Rahil Pereira; and supported by Counsel: Ishika Goon; and Associates: Krithika R Bhandari, M Yogish, Muhammed Ijaz, Harsh Mittal and Saif Ali</p><p>The Trilegal Financial Regulatory Team advising on this matter was led by Partner: Shruti Rajan; and supported by Counsel: Jitesh Maheshwari; and Associates: Prashasti Mishra and Dishaa Dand</p><p>The Trilegal Funds Regulatory Team advising on this matter was led by Partner: Ganesh Rao, Aditya Jha and Yash Bansal; and supported by Senior Associate: Riddhi Joshi; and Associates: Priyanka Chauhan, Ashmit Sharma and Saloni Khaitan</p><p>The Trilegal Competition Team advising on this matter was led by Partner: Gauri Chhabra; and supported by Counsel: Gargi Yadav; Senior Associate: Ujwala Adikey; and Associates: Bhabya Mahapatra and Shobhit Shukla</p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Quashes Ghaziabad Police Notice Seeking Abhishek Upadhyaya's Digital Records]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Upadhyay had told court that his digital information may enable the Police to identify persons who communicated with him in connection with his journalistic work.]]></description>
<tags>Abhishek Upadhyaya,Road Rage,Ghaziabad,UP police,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-quashes-ghaziabad-police-notice-seeking-abhishek-upadhyayas-digital-records-1641893</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-quashes-ghaziabad-police-notice-seeking-abhishek-upadhyayas-digital-records-1641893</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[aishwarya iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:42:32 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Journalist Abhishek Upadhyay approached the Supreme Court challenging the Ghaziabad FIR and seeking protection from arrest]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/08/24/2250506-supreme-court-of-india-journalist-abhishek-upadhyaya-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court today quashed the notice issued by Ghaziabad Police to X (formerly Twitter) to hand over data on journalist Abhishek Upadhyay while investigation against him in the road rage case is underway.</p><p>Justice Bagchi expressed concern over the UP Police's request seeking details of Upadhyay's X account and said, "seizing data of 3 months prior to date of alleged road rage incident seems to be an overkill."</p><p><i>"Notice to X issued by local police is hereby quashed. Any information taken pursuant thereto or otherwise shall not be utilized against petitioner.   This court, while issuing notice, has already directed no coercive action. And that he will cooperate with ongoing investigation. That being so, the order is made absolute.."</i> the bench ordered today.</p><p>Upadhyay had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/abhishek-upadhyaya-moves-supreme-court-against-ghaziabad-police-seeking-digital-information-of-x-account-1627361" target="_blank">moved </a>Supreme Court of India to restrain the Ghaziabad Police from seeking, obtaining, accessing, processing or disclosing any information, including the digital/account information of his X account @upadhyayabhii.
</p><p>He is accused in a road rage case which he alleged to be a fabricated one in retaliation for his investigative reporting on alleged irregularities concerning the Ram Mandir.
</p><p>Last month, a mentioning was made before a CJI Surya Kant led bench wherein Advocate Anoop Prakash Awasthi stated, "The Ghaziabad Police has sought my digital footprint from June 1, 2026 in connection to the road rage case..that is when I broke the Ram Mandir donations theft story..all of the sources would be revealed and they would be harassed by the police..I have received information from the Meta office from California that they have sought my digital footprint..I have filed an application..".</p><p>Upadhyay's application sought ad-interim stay and quashing of a notice u/s <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144691869/">94</a> of BNSS dated 22 August, 2026 issued by crime branch unit, Police Commissionerate, Ghaziabad, UP. Upadhyay received an email from X from its legal department at San Francisco, California, informing him that X had received a request from the Crime Branch Investigation Unit, Ghaziabad, seeking production of information relating to the Petitioner’s X account @upadhyayabhii.
</p><p>On August 25, the Supreme Court <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-stays-abhishek-upadhyays-arrest-in-ghaziabad-road-rage-case-1625469" target="_blank">stayed</a> the arrest of Upadhyay who had approached Court under Article <a href="https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-32-remedies-for-enforcement-of-rights-conferred-by-this-part/">32</a> seeking quashing of an FIR registered against him in Ghaziabad and protection from arrest, alleging that the case was fabricated in retaliation for his investigative reporting on alleged irregularities in Uttar Pradesh. Court further directed the police to supply the copy of the registered FIR to Upadhyay adding that he can then approach the Allahabad High Court for seeking suitable reliefs. The Ghaziabad Police Commissioner has been asked to file a compliance report regarding the supply of the FIR by the next date of hearing.
</p><p>A bench of CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana had earlier agreed to hear a writ petition filed by Upadhyay challenging the FIR. The petition challenges FIR No. 678/2026, registered at Indirapuram Police Station, Ghaziabad, on August 18 in connection with an alleged road-rage incident near Shipra Mall. The FIR invokes provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf">Sanhita</a>, 2023, the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) <a href="https://tribal.nic.in/actRules/preventionofAtricities.pdf">Act</a>, 1989 and the Information Technology <a href="https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/03/IT-Act-Rules_2000_0.pdf">Act</a>. The petition itself notes discrepancies between the sections reflected in different portions of the FIR record. Upadhyay, who runs the independent news portal “Top Secret”, has alleged that the FIR was lodged after he published investigative reports concerning alleged corruption and irregularities in Uttar Pradesh, including matters relating to the Ram Janmabhoomi premises and senior government officials. </p><p><b><i>Case Title: Abhishek Upadhyaya v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: CJI Kant, Justice Bagchi</i></b></p><p><b><i>Hearing Date: October 14, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA["Tell Me What's Wrong With It": Delhi High Court To CBI on Discharge Of Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia In Liquor Policy Case]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Justice Sachin Datta directed the CBI to file a tabular chart identifying each paragraph of the trial court's order it challenged, the legal test allegedly misapplied, and the evidence allegedly ignored or misread, after Additional Solicitor General SV Raju argued that the trial court had undertaken a full evidentiary exercise at the stage of charge]]></description>
<tags>Arvind Kejriwal,Manish Sisodia,Delhi Excise Policy case,CBI v. Kuldeep Singh &amp; Ors.,Delhi High Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/tell-me-whats-wrong-with-it-delhi-high-court-to-cbi-on-discharge-of-arvind-kejriwal-manish-sisodia-in-liquor-policy-case-1641883</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/tell-me-whats-wrong-with-it-delhi-high-court-to-cbi-on-discharge-of-arvind-kejriwal-manish-sisodia-in-liquor-policy-case-1641883</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:29:13 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Delhi High Court asked the CBI to identify precisely what was wrong with the trial court's order discharging Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia and all other accused in the excise policy case, and listed the matter on November 5]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289581-delhi-high-court-arvind-kejriwal-sisodia-2026jpg.webp' /><p>While hearing the Central Bureau of Investigation's challenge to the discharge of former Delhi Chief Minister <b>Arvind Kejriwal,</b> former Deputy Chief Minister <b>Manish Sisodia </b>and all other accused in the excise policy case, the Delhi High Court on Wednesday pressed the agency to point out specific errors in the trial court's order rather than restate its allegations.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p dir="ltr"><i>"The judge has painstakingly gone through everything. Tell me what's wrong with it,"</i> Justice Sachin Datta told <b>Additional Solicitor General (ASG) SV Raju</b>.</p>

<p dir="ltr">At the close of the hearing, the Court directed the CBI to file fresh written submissions in a tabular format, setting out each paragraph of the impugned order under challenge, the findings disputed, and whether the complaint was that the wrong legal test had been applied or that material on record had been ignored or misread. The matter will next be heard on November 5 at 2:30 PM.</p>

<p dir="ltr">At the outset, the Court asked the ASG for an overview of the case. <i>"Give me an overview of the case, what is the case against them,</i>" Justice Datta said.</p>

<p dir="ltr">When Raju sought to begin with the issue of maintainability, the Court declined. <i>"No, on maintainability I'll hear them first. You give me a broad overview of the case,</i>" Justice Datta said.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Noting that the record was now before it and that preliminary objections had been raised, the Court emphasised that, in revisional jurisdiction, it had to examine whether there was anything palpably wrong with the order under challenge. It questioned the challenge to an order running into over 500 pages and asked counsel to identify the specific deficiencies that warranted interference, pointing to the relevant portions of the order and explaining how the challenge fell within the limited scope of revision.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju began by referring to the CBI's allegation that the policy was changed to facilitate the exchange of money before tenders and licences were awarded, allegedly enabling the accused and their associates to use the money for illegal purposes. The Court, however, asked him to move beyond the allegations and identify precisely what was wrong with the impugned order, given that the judge appeared to have examined the record in considerable detail.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju argued that the trial court, despite passing an order running into over 500 pages, had ignored crucial evidence and misinterpreted witness statements. Taking the Court to page 41 of his written submissions, he referred to allegations concerning suggestions attributed to the Lieutenant Governor, witness testimonies and file notings relating to the changes in the policy.</p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the CBI, the Lieutenant Governor had suggested only that the power to make changes in the policy should remain with the Council of Ministers, rather than being delegated to the Additional Advocate General. Raju argued that no other changes were suggested by the Lieutenant Governor, yet subsequent file notings recorded seven changes attributed to discussions with him, including a reduction in the turnover criteria.</p>

<p dir="ltr">He alleged that the policy was approved by the Council of Ministers through circulation on May 21, 2021, with unusual haste, while members of the alleged South Group were present in Delhi during the COVID wave. The reduction of the turnover criterion to ₹150 crore, he argued, benefited M/s Indospirit in obtaining an L-1 licence.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The ASG submitted that the trial court ignored a crucial statement of PW87, Ashita Mishra, who allegedly stated that only the broad policy framework was discussed and no figures were discussed in the relevant section. This omission was significant, Raju argued, because the changes recorded in the file concerned figures such as the turnover criteria and shop size.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju then raised the alleged disappearance of an earlier draft Cabinet note dated January 28, 2021, which, according to the CBI, contained legal opinions recommending that the status quo in the excise policy be maintained. He alleged that when these opinions did not suit the accused's plan, a fresh file was initiated without incorporating them.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Referring to witness statements, emails, file notings and mobile phone chats, the ASG argued that the earlier draft Cabinet note and the accompanying legal opinions were handed over to the concerned authorities but subsequently disappeared from the record. A fresh Cabinet note was then prepared, he submitted, incorporating only a summary of comments and omitting any reference to the earlier file and the legal opinions.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju contended that the trial court selectively read the witness statements and misinterpreted the evidence on this aspect, and that the CBI's case was that the opinions favouring the status quo were excluded because they did not support the alleged plan to change the policy.</p>

<p dir="ltr">At this point, the Court sought to distil the ASG's grievance. <i>"So, in a single sentence, your difficulty with this order is that this entire evidentiary exercise is done at the stage of charge?</i>" Justice Datta asked.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju agreed, arguing that the trial court had gone beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny at that stage. The Court asked him to show the law on what a court is required to do at the stage of charge, observing that it could not simply substitute one opinion for another, and asked counsel to establish why the impugned order warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju clarified that his argument was not that the trial court must act as a "rubber stamp", but that it could not ignore relevant evidence or misinterpret it. <i>"If the court has considered it and then given a finding, which is a reasonable finding, then it's a different matter,"</i> he submitted. He maintained that the trial court had completely ignored relevant material and said the points raised were only the beginning of his challenge, adding that he would demonstrate further instances of evidence allegedly overlooked.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Taking the Court through the impugned order in FIR 405, Raju asked it to compare the undertaking extracted by the trial court with the original undertaking submitted by Indo Spirit Marketing Pvt Ltd. Pointing to the last two lines, he alleged that the order added the name of Indo Spirit Distribution Ltd, which did not appear in the original document.</p>

<p dir="ltr"><i>"How could the learned judge tweak a document and extract something which was not there, part of the document?"</i> Raju asked. He also argued that the alleged addition was significant because it was relied upon to conclude that the South Group did not benefit from the excise policy.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju further urged the Court to examine the relevant judgments rather than rely on selective readings of isolated paragraphs of the impugned order.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in <em>L. Khajan Singh Kumar v. CBI</em> (as cited by counsel), he read out the principle that, at the stage of framing charges or considering discharge, the court is not expected to analyse the acceptability of evidence as it would at trial. The credibility of witnesses and the veracity of documents, he submitted, were matters to be assessed during trial, and the trial court had exceeded the permissible scope by undertaking an extensive evidentiary evaluation at the stage of charge.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Taking the Court through his chart, Raju alleged that the trial court overlooked evidence pointing to the role of the South Group in drafting the excise policy, including a 36-page printout, a meeting with accused Vijay Nair and digital records tracing the movement of the persons involved.</p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the ASG, the evidence showed that 36 pages were printed at the Oberoi hotel, after which a taxi was hired to travel to Oberoi Meadows, where members of the South Group allegedly met Vijay Nair and handed over the material. The final policy, he argued, subsequently contained the same 36 pages. He pointed to GPS records of the hired taxi and call detail records which, he said, placed the relevant person at the locations after the printout was taken.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Raju also relied on WhatsApp chats recovered from the phone of Guchhi Babu, submitting that certain paragraphs in the chats predated the policy but were identical to provisions that later appeared in the final excise policy. Referring to one paragraph of the final policy, he argued that the corresponding provision appeared in the recovered chats despite allegedly not being part of the earlier draft, and that the trial court failed to properly account for this digital evidence.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The ASG alleged that the policy increased the profit margin for private wholesalers from 5% to 12%, despite the Dawan Committee recommending a 5% margin and wholesale operations through government-owned entities. The shift from government entities to private wholesalers, coupled with the increased margin, he argued, conferred an undue financial benefit on private operators and formed a crucial part of the prosecution's case. He took the Court to a paragraph of the first supplementary chargesheet which, he said, specifically recorded the change and the departure from the committee's recommendations.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court, however, asked counsel to identify the precise provision in the final excise policy that fixed the margin at 12%, seeking to examine the policy itself rather than rely solely on the allegations in the chargesheet. Raju maintained that the margin was arbitrarily increased without any discussion in the relevant file notings. When the Court asked him to show the exact page and provision of the policy supporting the claim, the ASG continued to rely on the alleged departure from the Dawan Committee's recommendations.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court directed the ASG to file fresh written submissions in a tabular format before the next hearing, setting out the specific challenges to the impugned order. The submissions are to identify.</p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">1. The paragraphs of the impugned order under challenge, along with the corresponding grounds in the original revision petition.</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">2. The findings challenged.</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">3. Whether the challenge is that the wrong legal test was applied, or that material on record was ignored or misread, identifying such material by its page in the trial court record.</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">4. The respondents to whom each challenge relates.</span></p>

<p dir="ltr">Where no specific paragraph in the original revision petition covers a particular challenge, the same is also to be indicated. The submissions are to be filed at least two days before the next hearing, with an advance copy to counsel for all respondents.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court declined, for the present, to call for written submissions from the respondents. <i>"I don't want multiple written submissions at this stage. Once you conclude, then it'll be better for them (respondents) to file it in one shot at that point of time,"</i> Justice Datta said.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The matter is listed for further consideration on <b>November 5 at 2:30 PM</b>.</p></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p><b>What has happened so far in the Delhi Excise policy case</b></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>In July, the High Court had granted a <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/excise-policy-case-delhi-hc-gives-arvind-kejriwal-manish-sisodia-final-chance-to-reply-in-cbis-discharge-plea-challenge-1612918">last and final opportunity </a>to Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia and Durgesh Pathak to file their replies in the CBI's revision petition.</p><p>Notably, on May 19, the Court had<a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/excise-policy-case-delhi-high-court-orders-fresh-notice-to-kejriwal-sisodia-pathak-1593082"> issued </a>fresh notices to the three respondents. Earlier, Justice Sharma had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-rejects-kejriwals-recusal-plea-says-judicial-integrity-cannot-be-put-on-trial-1582900">rejected </a>recusal pleas filed by Kejriwal and others, who had expressed apprehension of bias. She later decided to continue hearing the matter, prompting the accused to indicate that they would boycott proceedings before her.</p></div></div></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>The CBI’s revision petition challenges the trial court’s<a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/delhi-excise-policy-court-discharges-arvind-kejriwal-sisodia-and-others-in-cbi-case-1568463"> order </a>dated February 27, which discharged all 23 accused in the case, including senior political leaders. The trial court had also made strong observations questioning aspects of the CBI’s investigation. In a detailed order, the court criticised the investigation conducted by the CBI, observing that the agency had implicated the accused without sufficient material.</p><p>The judge had noted that the voluminous chargesheet contained several lacunae and was not supported by witness statements or substantive evidence. The High Court had earlier observed that certain findings of the trial court appeared prima facie erroneous, leading to the CBI’s challenge in revision.</p></div></div></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>It is to be noted that Senior AAP leader Manish Sisodia had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/after-arvind-kejriwal-manish-sisodia-refuses-delhi-high-court-hearing-before-justice-swarana-kanta-sharma-1585297">written</a> to Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma of the Delhi High Court, stating that he will not participate in further hearings in the matter, citing concerns over the “appearance of impartial justice” and invoking principles of conscience and Satyagraha. Sisodia’s letter follows a similar<a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/arvind-kejriwal-refuses-to-appear-before-justice-swarana-kanta-sharma-cites-bias-and-conflict-of-interest-1584865"> communication</a> by Arvind Kejriwal a day earlier. Referring to it, Sisodia stated, <em data-start="685" data-end="896">“I have carefully considered the substance of that letter… I find myself in respectful agreement with the stand taken by him, which is based on Mahatma Gandhi's teachings on Satyagraha.”</em></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><section class="text-token-text-primary w-full focus:outline-none [--shadow-height:45px] has-data-writing-block:pointer-events-none has-data-writing-block:-mt-(--shadow-height) has-data-writing-block:pt-(--shadow-height) [&amp;:has([data-writing-block])&gt;*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] R6Vx5W_threadScrollVars scroll-mb-[calc(var(--scroll-root-safe-area-inset-bottom,0px)+var(--thread-response-height))] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" data-turn-id="request-69ba45dc-6f38-8323-bff6-5afb222bb62c-121" data-testid="conversation-turn-456" data-scroll-anchor="false" data-turn="assistant"><div class="text-base my-auto mx-auto pb-10 [--thread-content-margin:var(--thread-content-margin-xs,calc(var(--spacing)*4))] @w-sm/main:[--thread-content-margin:var(--thread-content-margin-sm,calc(var(--spacing)*6))] @w-lg/main:[--thread-content-margin:var(--thread-content-margin-lg,calc(var(--spacing)*16))] px-(--thread-content-margin)"><div class="[--thread-content-max-width:40rem] @w-lg/main:[--thread-content-max-width:48rem] mx-auto max-w-(--thread-content-max-width) flex-1 group/turn-messages focus-visible:outline-hidden relative flex w-full min-w-0 flex-col agent-turn"><div class="flex max-w-full flex-col gap-4 grow"><div data-message-author-role="assistant" data-message-id="caa8c45b-bb05-44a2-9cce-752dad0769a9" dir="auto" data-message-model-slug="gpt-5-3" class="min-h-8 text-message relative flex w-full flex-col items-end gap-2 text-start break-words whitespace-normal outline-none keyboard-focused:focus-ring [.text-message+&amp;]:mt-1" data-turn-start-message="true" tabindex="0"><div class="flex w-full flex-col gap-1 empty:hidden"><div class="markdown prose dark:prose-invert w-full wrap-break-word light markdown-new-styling"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>Manish Sisodia's recusal case involves a pending criminal revision petition before the Delhi High Court, where he had sought the recusal of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma citing apprehensions of bias. In the same case, Arvind Kejriwal was permitted to argue the recusal plea <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/arvind-kejriwal-argues-own-case-in-delhi-hc-seeks-recusal-of-judge-in-excise-policy-matter-1581189">in person</a> and he had made <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/kejriwal-in-fresh-affidavit-before-delhi-high-court-seeking-judges-recusal-cites-alleged-bias-institutional-conflict-concerns-1581627">detailed</a> <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-recusal-plea-court-accepts-arvind-kejriwals-fresh-written-submissions-verdict-at-430-pm-1582618">submissions </a>before the Court.</p></div><p data-start="547" data-end="896">The High Court, however, rejected the recusal plea, holding that the grounds raised did not justify withdrawal of the judge and cautioning against allegations that could undermine the institution’s integrity if not substantiated.<em data-start="685" data-end="896"></em></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p data-start="682" data-end="908">Following the hearing, videos of Kejriwal’s courtroom arguments surfaced and were widely circulated on social media, triggering a separate controversy over alleged <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/plea-filed-over-illegal-recording-of-delhi-high-court-proceedings-in-kejriwal-recusal-hearing-names-aap-leaders-1583085">unauthorised</a> recording and dissemination of court proceedings. The same is under <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-orders-takedown-of-unauthorised-court-proceeding-videos-in-arvind-kejriwal-case-1583731">consideration</a> before the High Court. It is in this backdrop that after Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia and Durgesh Pathak have written to the Court expressing their decision to abstain from further participation in the matter.</p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></section></div></div></div><p><b>Case Title: CBI v. Kuldeep Singh &amp; Ors.</b></p><p><i><b>Bench: Justice Sachin Datta</b></i></p><p><i><b>Hearing Date: October 14, 2026</b></i></p></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA['Blue Drum' Murder Case: Meerut Court Sentences Convicts Muskan Rastogi, Lover Sahil To Death]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[UP Court awarded the death penalty to Muskan Rastogi and Sahil Shukla after convicting them of murdering Merchant Navy officer Saurabh Rajput, whose dismembered body was found concealed in a cement-filled blue drum in Meerut in March 2025]]></description>
<tags>Blue Drum murder case,Sahil Shukla,Muskan Rastogi,Death Penalty</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/blue-drum-murder-case-meerut-court-sentences-convicts-muskan-rastogi-lover-sahil-to-death-1641866</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/blue-drum-murder-case-meerut-court-sentences-convicts-muskan-rastogi-lover-sahil-to-death-1641866</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:14:10 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Meerut district court has sentenced Muskan Rastogi and Sahil Shukla to death for killing merchant navy officer Saurabh Rajput and hiding his dismembered remains in a concrete-filled blue drum in March 2025.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289823-meerut-district-court-muskaan-rastogi-sahil-shukla-jpg.webp' /><p><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">A Meerut court today imposed death penalty on convicts Muskan Rastogi and Sahil Shukla for the murder of Rastogi's husband, Merchant Navy Officer Saurabh Rajput, in the case in which Rajput's dismembered body was recovered in 2025 from a ‘blue drum’ sealed with cement.</span></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div>District Judge Arvind Kumar Mishra had earlier convicted Muskal and Sahil on September 30 for the offence of Murder.  The trial continued for around 13 months and involved 126 hearings.</div><div>The prosecution has sought the maximum punishment, citing the nature of the offence and the evidence led during the trial.</div><div>While holding the two guilty, the Court had referred to a Supreme Court decision concerning punishment in serious crimes and emphasised the importance of the rule of law.</div><div>The prosecution case was that Rajput was killed in March 2025 and that his body was subsequently cut into pieces and concealed inside a blue plastic drum, which was filled with cement. Muskan and Sahil were subsequently arrested in connection with the crime.</div><div>During the trial, the prosecution examined 22 witnesses to establish its case, including persons connected with the alleged purchase of materials subsequently linked to the crime.</div><div>These included a medicine seller, the person from whom the blue drum was allegedly purchased, a cement seller and a person connected with the purchase of the knife and other utensils.</div><div>The prosecution also relied on hotel records and the evidence of hotel managers to establish the movements and stays of the accused at different locations. Cab drivers were also examined regarding their alleged movements.</div><div>The prosecution maintained that the evidence, taken together, established the circumstances surrounding Rajput's killing and the subsequent concealment of his body.</div><div>The defence, however, had disputed the prosecution case, including pointing to the absence of an eyewitness to the alleged murder and questioning the circumstances in which the accused were implicated.</div><div>Alleged murder and concealment of body</div><div>Rajput, who had previously worked in the Merchant Navy and was later working in London, had returned to Meerut in February 2025 to spend time with his family.</div><div>According to the prosecution case, Rajput was killed at the couple's rented residence in Brahmpuri, Meerut, on the night of March 3, 2025.</div><div>The prosecution alleged that Muskan first rendered Rajput unconscious and that Sahil subsequently joined her. Rajput was allegedly stabbed to death and his body was thereafter dismembered. The remains were allegedly placed inside a blue drum and concealed using cement.</div><div>The prosecution further alleged that the materials required for disposing of the body had been procured before the killing, forming part of the circumstances relied upon to contend that the crime was planned.</div><div>After the alleged murder, Muskan and Sahil are stated to have left for Himachal Pradesh. Muskan subsequently returned to Meerut, following which suspicion arose over Rajput's continued absence. A search of the residence eventually led investigators to the drum containing the remains.</div><div>Rajput's elder brother Rahul Kumar had lodged the FIR in the case, following which Muskan and Sahil were arrested on March 19, 2025.</div><div><div>Trial continued for 13 months</div><div>The case was transferred to the Meerut District Judge's court in July 2025. The prosecution and defence thereafter completed the examination of witnesses and their respective arguments.</div><div>Final arguments concluded on September 17, following which the court fixed September 30 for <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/blue-drum-murder-case-meerut-court-convicts-muskan-rastogi-lover-sahil-for-murder-of-saurabh-rajput-1637437">pronouncement </a>of judgment. The prosecution had argued that the scientific, forensic and circumstantial evidence established the guilt of both accused.</div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/author-info/1073/lawbeat-news-desk"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[BREAKING| Saket Court Issues Fresh Dasti Summons To Dhruv Rathee In 2018 Defamation Case]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[In the criminal defamation complaint filed by Vikas Sankrityayan in 2018 over Dhruv Rathee’s “BJP IT Cell Part 2” video, a Delhi court recorded that Rathee had been summoned as early as July 2019, but the summons had still not been served.]]></description>
<tags>Dhruv Rathee,Defamation Case,Saket Court,Delhi Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/breaking-saket-court-issues-fresh-dasti-summons-to-dhruv-rathee-in-2018-defamation-case-1641839</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/breaking-saket-court-issues-fresh-dasti-summons-to-dhruv-rathee-in-2018-defamation-case-1641839</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 12:39:57 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[YouTuber Dhruv Rathee, against whom a Saket court issued fresh and dasti summons on October 12, 2026 in a criminal defamation complaint filed by Vikas Sankrityayan over the "BJP IT Cell Part 2" video]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289725-delhi-saket-district-court-dhruv-rathee-2026jpg.webp' /><p>A Delhi Court on Wednesday issued fresh summons to YouTuber <b>Dhruv Rathee</b>, along with dasti summons, in a criminal defamation complaint pending at Saket since 2018, after recording that the complainant had been trying to serve him ever since he was first summoned in July 2019.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The order was passed by<b> Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) Rahul Jain </b>of Saket Courts, in the complaint filed by Vikas Sankrityayan, also known as Vikas Pandey. The complaint concerns Rathee's video titled "BJP IT Cell Part 2".</p></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">The case was initiated by Vikas Sankrityan, also known as Vikas Pandey, a purported supporter of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and founder of the social media page 'I Support Narendra Modi'. The video by Rathee accused Pandey of being the second-in-command of the BJP IT cell and offering Rs. 50 lakh to someone named Mahavir Prasad to retract allegations of spreading lies and fake news against the ruling party's IT cell.<br></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p dir="ltr">The matter will next be taken up on<b> October 17</b>.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The application was moved by <b>Advocate Samaksh Sharma</b>, appearing for the complainant. As recorded in the order, he sought preponement of the matter "on the ground that the accused no. 1 (Dhruv Rathee) ordinary resides in Austria and is presently in India with respect to CJP Protest."</p>

<p dir="ltr">He also sought fresh summons <i>"so that prompt steps for service can be taken as he submits that the service of summons upon the accused has remained delayed for last several years due to the fact the accused resides in Austria."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">After hearing the submissions and perused the record, the Court observed, <i>"From the available record, it is clear that the complainant has been trying to served the accused no. 1 since last several years as the accused was initially summoned vide order dated 23.07.2019."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">Counsel informed the Court that he had "information that accused no.1 is residing at the address" in Sector 56, Gurugram, Haryana. Acting on that submission, the Court directed, <i>"In view of the submissions of the counsel for the complainant, let fresh summons be issued to accused no. 1 at the address mentioned above. PF be filed within two days from today."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court also directed that "Ahlmad is directed to issue the process on daily basis."</p><p dir="ltr">During the same hearing, the complainant's counsel requested dasti summons, that is, summons handed over to the party for service rather than left solely to the court's ordinary process. </p><p dir="ltr">The Court recorded, <i>"At this stage, Ld. counsel for the complainant has requested for dasti summons. Heard. Allowed.
Issue dasti summons as per law.
The complainant is at liberty to accompany the process server.
Be put up for 17.10.2026."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The summons issued the same day, addressed to "Dhruv Rathee" at the Gurugram address, requires him to appear before the Court on October 17, 2026. </p><p dir="ltr">It reads as :<em>"You are to appear before this Court on 17.10.2026 … in person (or through counsel, as the case may be). Let there be no default in complying with this order."</em></p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the complainant's side, the summons has since been served on Rathee at his residence. </p><p dir="ltr">The October 12 order itself records only that fresh and dasti summons were issued. Whether service has been effected will be a matter for the Court to note from the process server's report when the case is taken up on October 17.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Kejriwal's apology for retweet did not end proceedings against Rathee</b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The complaint is the same one in which former Delhi Chief Minister <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/amp/delhi-high-court-upholds-defamation-case-against-arvind-kejriwal-retweeting-youtuber-dhruv-rathee-video-bjp-it-cell">Arvind Kejriwal</a>, who had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/government-is-against-any-procession-madras-high-court-pulls-up-state-over-rss-march-refusals-1641736">retweeted</a> the "BJP IT Cell Part 2" video, tendered an apology before the Supreme Court in February 2024, for doing so. The proceedings against Rathee, as the original creator of the video, continued thereafter at the magistrate's court, where the question of service on him has now come to the fore.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The case is listed for further hearing on October 17.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Case Title: Vikas Sankrityayan @ Vikas Pandey v. Dhruv Rathee &amp; Ors</b></p><p dir="ltr"><b><i>Bench: Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) Rahul Jain</i></b></p><p dir="ltr"><b><i>Order Date: October 12, 2026</i></b></p></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[No Cancellation Of Metro Services On October 10, Zero Reduction Of Train Trips: DMRC Submits Before Supreme Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation has filed a compliance affidavit in the Supreme Court in response to its October 9 order on the closure of 57 stations, saying no train trips were cut during the CJP protest.]]></description>
<tags>Supreme Court of India,Metro Station shutdown,Cockroach Janta Party</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/no-cancellation-of-metro-services-on-october-10-zero-reduction-of-train-trips-dmrc-submits-before-supreme-court-1641829</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/no-cancellation-of-metro-services-on-october-10-zero-reduction-of-train-trips-dmrc-submits-before-supreme-court-1641829</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 12:21:50 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[DMRC has filed a compliance affidavit before Supreme Court on its directions concerning metro closures.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289512-supreme-court-metro-station-closurejpg.webp' /><p>The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation has filed a compliance affidavit before the Supreme Court in response to its October 9 order, that had asked the government to take a <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/sc-questions-proposed-closure-of-57-delhi-metro-stations-out-of-a-total-289-centre-cites-security-risks-1640128" target="_blank">decision </a>on the operation of Metro trains and other rail services in a suitable and regulated manner, ahead of CJP protests.</p><p>Filed through Group Captain Sanjay Vinayakrao Kute, General Manager (Legal), DMRC, supreme court has been told there was no curtailment or cancellation of Metro Train Services.</p><p><i>"There was zero reduction in the total volume of metro operation i.e. there was no reduction in number of train trips. Trains were inducted strictly as per the standard Saturday Schedule, with 271 trains inducted into service on 10 Oct, 2026. A full complement of 4157 train trips were run on 10 Oct 2026 as per the schedule across the network,"</i> the affidavit adds.</p><p>It is further submitted that the number of affected stations was scaled down from 57 to 45 stations and upon receiving directions from the Delhi Police to open the above 45 stations from 10:00 PM on 10.10.2026, the station controllers were directed to open the entry and exit gates across all these 45 stations and thereafter the stations were opened and services continued normally.</p><p>Court has further been informed that entry and exit regulations were restricted to only 45 out of 303 stations across the Metro network, accounting for only 15% of the entire network.</p><p><i>"Crucially, out of the 45 stations where entry/exit gates were regulated, 14 key interchange stations (including major transit hubs such as Rajiv Chowk, Kashmere Gate, Central Secretariat, Mandi House, Hauz Khas, Dilli Haat-INA, and Netaji Subhash Place) continued to provide full and uninterrupted line-interchange facilities for commuters. Commuters entering into the city as well as inside the city were able to change transit corridors seamlessly without disruption," </i>the affidavit adds.</p><p>The affidavit adds the total number of commuters who travelled on the Metro network during its operational hours, was approximately 32 lakh. It is submitted that this figure was slightly lower than the ridership on a normal second Saturday. </p><p>"This reduction may be attributed to the protest, which appears to have prompted a large number of commuters to refrain from travelling and, consequently, from undertaking their usual daily activities or attending to their business or private employment," the DMRC reply submits.</p><p>On October 9, in the plea before Supreme Court alleging indiscriminate closure of 57 metro stations and cancellation of trains, the Centre had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/sc-questions-proposed-closure-of-57-delhi-metro-stations-out-of-a-total-289-centre-cites-security-risks-1640128" target="_blank">defended its decision</a>, saying the citizens lives cannot be put to risk and its decision is essential to maintaining law and order in the national capital.</p><p>SG Mehta had assured the bench that he would take up the issue with the government, but at the same time some leeway has to be granted to the enforcement agencies. Court has asked the Centre to reconsider and take a call.
</p><p>The government's order was issued ahead of the Cockroach Janta Party protests scheduled for tomorrow October 10 against the Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over the SIR row. Notably, the protests have not been granted the requisite permissions.
</p><p>Petitions before Supreme Court were filed by CPI(M) General Secretary MA Baby and other petitioners challenging the curbs imposed by the authorities ahead of the protests.
</p><p>Later, a <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/contempt-plea-before-supreme-court-over-57-delhi-metro-station-shutdown-1640268" target="_blank">contempt petition</a> was also filed in the Supreme Court alleging that the Central government has violated the court’s order to lift restrictions on metro and train services.</p><p><b>Case Title: MA Baby vs Union of India</b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Hears Challenge to Madras High Court Order That Quashed FIR Against Venu Srinivasan in Kapaleeswarar Idol Case]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court is hearing temple activist Rangarajan Narasimhan’s challenge to the Madras High Court’s 2024 order quashing the FIR against Venu Srinivasan and others over alleged antique peacock idol theft and replacement at Chennai’s Sri Kapaleeswarar Temple.]]></description>
<tags>Supreme Court of India,Tamil Nadu,Sri Kapaleeswarar Temple,Peacock idol theft</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-updates/idol-theft-case-tn-govt-defends-ancient-idols-existence-before-sc-in-challenge-to-fir-quashing-against-tata-sons-venu-srinivasan-1641805</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-updates/idol-theft-case-tn-govt-defends-ancient-idols-existence-before-sc-in-challenge-to-fir-quashing-against-tata-sons-venu-srinivasan-1641805</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salil]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 11:53:45 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court hears challenge over Chennai temple idol theft case.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289485-supreme-court-venu-srinivasan-temple-idol-fir-casejpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court today heard a batch of petitions challenging the Madras High Court's February 2024 decision to quash the First Information Report (FIR) <a href="https://www.timesnownews.com/business-economy/companies/no-clean-chit-for-tata-sons-venu-srinivasan-in-idol-theft-case-article-156303080" target="_blank">against </a>Venu Srinivasan, Chairman Emeritus of TVS Motor Company and a board member of Tata Sons, in a case concerning allegations of <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/kapaleeswarar-temple-idol-theft-madras-hc-summons-hrce-commissioner-explain-undue-delay" target="_blank">theft </a>and unauthorised replacement of an antique idol at Chennai's Sri Kapaleeswarar Temple in 2004.</p><p>One of the pleas has been filed by temple activist Rangarajan Narasimhan, who has sought to set aside the high court's decision.</p><p>During today's hearing before the bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi, Additional Advocate General for Tamil Nadu Prashanto Chandra advanced submissions on behalf of the State. His arguments centred on a resolution allegedly passed ahead of the temple's Kumbhabhishekam (consecration ceremony) on August 30, 2004, which, according to the State, indicated that the idol had been replaced before the ceremony.</p><p>The State's submissions addressed the dispute over the original idol, which allegedly depicted a peacock holding a flower in its beak. The State contended that an idol had been present before the alleged theft, in response to the contention that no idol depicting a peacock holding a flower was present at the temple.</p><p>The Court has posted the matter for further hearing on October 29, 2026, at 2 PM.</p><p><b>The Peacock Idol</b></p><p>The case concerns allegations that an antique peacock idol at the Punnaivananathar Sannidhi of Sri Kapaleeswarar Temple was removed during renovation work in 2004 and replaced with an apparently identical idol depicting the bird holding a snake in its beak instead of a flower.</p><p>In August 2018, temple activist Narasimhan initiated legal proceedings alleging irregularities in connection with the idol and the conduct of temple officials appointed under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&amp;CE) Department of the Tamil Nadu government.</p><p>Following the complaint, the Idol Wing of the Tamil Nadu Police initiated an investigation and questioned officials associated with the HR&amp;CE Department. Srinivasan, who was part of a government-constituted committee overseeing the temple's renovation at the time, was also named in the criminal case.</p><p>The police registered an FIR in 2018. In 2022, the Idol Wing filed a final report naming Srinivasan and others in the case. Srinivasan subsequently approached the Madras High Court, seeking to quash the criminal proceedings against him.</p><p>On February 16, 2024, the high court allowed his plea and quashed the FIR against him. Narasimhan challenged the decision before the Supreme Court, seeking its reversal.</p><p>As per reports, Srinivasan has denied involvement in the alleged theft and maintained that he was not responsible for the temple's day-to-day administration. He has also stated that he contributed Rs 70 lakh from his personal funds towards the temple's restoration.</p><p><b><i>Case Title: M. Muthiah Sthapathy v. State of Tamil Nadu &amp; Anr. and Connected Matters</i></b></p><p><b><i>Hearing Date: October 14, 2026</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justices Aravind Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/salil"><![CDATA[Salil]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[“Government Is Against Any Procession”: Madras High Court Pulls Up State Over RSS March Refusals]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Madras High Court questioned why Tamil Nadu keeps refusing RSS route marches every year, and asked both sides to work out a peaceful way to hold the procession.]]></description>
<tags>Madras HC,RSS,Tamil Nadu police,Freedom of ass,freedom of assembly</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/government-is-against-any-procession-madras-high-court-pulls-up-state-over-rss-march-refusals-1641736</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/government-is-against-any-procession-madras-high-court-pulls-up-state-over-rss-march-refusals-1641736</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 10:16:49 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Blanket Refusals Force Litigation: Madras High Court on Tamil Nadu’s Stand on RSS Processions]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289489-madras-hc-rssjpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;">The Madras High Court on Wednesday pressed the Tamil Nadu government to explain why the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is made to seek court intervention every year just to hold a route march, as it took up a plea ahead of the organisation’s founding day celebrations.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Justice V Lakshminarayanan</b> was hearing a petition by RSS member VG Jagadeesan, who wants the police directed to consider his representation and allow marches on October 18, October 25, November 1 or any other suitable date. The petitioner proposes to walk in uniform, led by a musical band, and to follow the march with a public meeting.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Bench did not hide its unease with the State’s stand. Observing that the RSS had been allowed to march even in a terrorism-affected region like Jammu and Kashmir, the judge asked why Tamil Nadu police refused it year after year.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court went further, saying the present government appeared opposed to processions as a category, whether organised by the RSS or the Dravidar Kazhagam. Such blanket refusals, it said, push organisations into avoidable litigation.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b><i>“This government is against any procession,”</i></b> the judge remarked orally, adding that citizens were being treated like enemies when they sought to protest.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also made it clear that the problem was not limited to one political party. <b><i>“Whichever government is coming up, they’re rejecting,” </i></b>the Court observed, suggesting that the reluctance to permit marches cuts across administrations.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate NL Rajah told the Court that the organisation was forced to approach the judiciary every single year. He said the RSS only wished to mark its founding day, which falls on Vijayadashami, with a route march. According to him, police kept rejecting the request on the ground that it could lead to law and order problems.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Sr Adv Rajah also raised a wider concern. Well-organised groups like the RSS can afford to approach the Court, he said, but smaller parties without such resources are left with no real remedy when permission is refused.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Defending the State, Advocate General Vijay Narayan said permission was refused because the RSS had sought to hold the march and public meeting at a location that has not been notified for such gatherings. He also pointed to the burden on the police, who are already stretched during the festive season, and said processions could inconvenience people out shopping.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court was not persuaded. It noted that the RSS approaches the High Court every year and receives relief every year, and wondered what had changed in 2026 to justify a different approach. When the State referred to earlier criminal cases, the judge asked it to point to actual incidents of violence linked to RSS marches.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In a pointed remark, the judge suggested that if the State was determined to refuse permission for protests, it should simply bring a law banning marches altogether. <b><i>“Why are you doing this? Unnecessary litigation,”</i></b> he said, asking whether the government wanted adverse publicity.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The issue is not new. The Court had earlier laid down detailed guidelines for RSS route marches. Even so, permission was denied in 2024, and the organisation had to return to court. While allowing the march then, the Court had said the police were duty-bound to protect both the public and the organisers, and could not cite law and order as a routine excuse. It had also expected the police to follow judicial orders in future without inventing <b><i>“new and fanciful reasons”</i></b> for rejection.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">For now, the Court has asked counsel for the petitioner to meet State Public Prosecutor John Sathyan and work out a way for the march and meeting to be held peacefully. The State has also been asked to place on record a report on permitting a peaceful procession.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The matter will be heard again on Thursday, October 15.&nbsp;</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Case Title: V.G. Jagadeesan v. The State Rep. By, The Chief Secretary and Others
</b></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Date of Hearing: October 14, 2026
</b></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Bench: Justice V Lakshminarayanan</b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA['Dhruv Rathee On A Mission To Defame My Religious Feelings': Advocate Files Defamation Suit In Delhi Court Over Hindu Deities Video]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Plaintiff’s counsel submitted that if someone defames a deity, Lord Rama will not approach the court. Somebody will have to approach the court]]></description>
<tags>Dhruv Rathee,Advocate Amita Sachdeva,Defamation Case,Saket Court,Delhi Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/dhruv-rathee-on-a-mission-to-defame-my-religious-feelings-advocate-files-defamation-suit-in-delhi-court-over-hindu-deities-video-1641720</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/dhruv-rathee-on-a-mission-to-defame-my-religious-feelings-advocate-files-defamation-suit-in-delhi-court-over-hindu-deities-video-1641720</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 09:54:22 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[A Delhi court has heard a civil defamation suit filed by advocate Amita Sachdeva against YouTuber Dhruv Rathee over a video on Hindu deities. The matter is listed for November 5.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289352-dhruv-rathee-defamation-suit-hindu-deities-video-delhi-courtjpg.webp' /><p><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">A Delhi court today briefly heard submissions in a civil defamation suit filed by advocate Amita Sachdeva against YouTuber Dhruv Rathee over a video concerning Hindu deities, in which the plaintiff has sought a declaration, damages and other reliefs.</span></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div>During the hearing, counsel for Sachdeva submitted that Rathee was allegedly "on a mission" to defame the plaintiffs' religious feelings and argued that the complained-of conduct could give rise to civil liability, apart from criminal consequences.</div><div>The hearing before District Judge Mohinder Virat also saw arguments on whether a person's religious identity could be protected as part of their legal character under Section <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1028815/">34</a> of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.</div><div><b>'My Religious Identity Is My Legal Character'</b></div><div>Counsel for Sachdeva argued that religious identity forms part of a person's legal character and that a civil court should examine the alleged defamation of religious sentiments.</div><div>" My religious identity is my legal character. This has to be tested " counsel submitted.</div><div>Drawing a comparison with professional reputation, counsel questioned why alleged defamation of religious identity should not also give rise to a civil claim.</div><div>" If my professional defamation is a part of my personality, my religious defamation, is it not a part of my personality? " counsel asked.</div><div>Counsel also submitted that the defendants had allegedly made it a mission to defame the religious feelings of the plaintiffs.</div><div>The court questioned whether the suit was effectively being pursued on behalf of society at large. Counsel responded that the plaintiffs were seeking to protect their own rights and religious identity.</div><div>During the hearing, counsel referred to Section <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf">299</a> of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which criminalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens by insulting their religion or religious beliefs.</div><div>Counsel argued that conduct alleged to constitute an offence under criminal law could also be examined as a civil wrong.</div><div>" If the conduct of the defendants is covered by Section 299, if the criminal law treats it as a wrong, I say that it is a civil wrong also " counsel submitted.</div><div>Acknowledging that the argument raised a new jurisprudential question, the counsel said the issue deserved judicial consideration even though no directly applicable precedent could be found.</div><div>"This is a new jurisprudential concept. I am quite conscious of that. But let it be tested" counsel said.</div><div>The plaintiff's counsel also referred to earlier proceedings before the Delhi High Court concerning the<a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/dhruv-rathees-video-on-hindu-gods-eating-meat-withheld-in-india-on-centres-order-google-informs-delhi-hc-1621376"> same video</a> and submitted that the High Court had granted liberty to pursue appropriate legal remedies.</div><div>The court also referred to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, which allows a person claiming entitlement to a legal character or a right concerning property to seek a declaration against someone denying, or interested in denying, that entitlement.</div><div>The provision also restricts the grant of a mere declaration where the plaintiff is able to seek further relief but omits to do so.</div><div>The court sought clarity on the precise declaration sought by the plaintiff and the legal basis for the damages claimed. It also questioned the scope of the relief that could be granted in the suit.</div><div>Counsel urged the court to issue summons to the defendants, contending that they should be given an opportunity to respond to the allegations.</div><div>" There was a doubt as to whether a deity could own an asset. The Supreme Court has settled that issue. Likewise, if somebody defames a deity, it is not Lord Ramchandra who will approach the court. Somebody will have to approach the court " Sachdeva’s counsel argued.</div><div><b>Background: Delhi High Court Proceedings Over The Video</b></div><div>Sachdeva had earlier approached the <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/dhruv-rathees-video-on-hindu-gods-eating-meat-withheld-in-india-on-centres-order-google-informs-delhi-hc-1621376 ">Delhi High Court</a> seeking action concerning Rathee's video on Hindu deities.</div><div>On July 3, 2026, the High Court directed the Center's Grievance Appellate Committee (GAC) to decide her appeal seeking removal of the video, preferably within 15 days. The court left the rights and contentions of the parties open.</div><div>In an order dated August 11, 2026, the High Court noted that YouTube had restricted access to the video in India. The court also permitted Sachdeva to send links of re-uploaded versions to the platform, which was directed to examine them in light of the GAC's order and take appropriate action in accordance with law. </div><div>The present civil defamation suit raises a separate question concerning the plaintiff's claim to declaratory and monetary relief for the alleged defamation of religious sentiments.</div><div>The matter is now listed for November 5</div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/author-info/1073/lawbeat-news-desk"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[POCSO Act | Kissing Minor On Lips Can Constitute 'Sexual Assault' If Sexual Intent Is Established: Delhi High Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Justice Madhu Jain holds that minor variations in a child victim’s testimony regarding the precise body part touched do not, by themselves, discredit her evidence]]></description>
<tags>Delhi High Court,POCSO Act</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/pocso-act-kissing-minor-on-lips-can-constitute-sexual-assault-if-sexual-intent-is-established-delhi-hc-1641668</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/pocso-act-kissing-minor-on-lips-can-constitute-sexual-assault-if-sexual-intent-is-established-delhi-hc-1641668</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 08:14:58 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[The Delhi High Court has held that kissing a minor on the lips can amount to sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act if sexual intent is proved, upholding a man’s conviction.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289335-delhi-high-court-pocso-kissing-minor-lips-sexual-assaultjpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;">The Delhi High Court has held that kissing a minor child on the lips can fall within the definition of sexual assault under Section <a href="https://delhipolice.gov.in/doc/acts/sexual_offences_act.pdf" target="_blank">7</a> of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, provided the requisite sexual intent is established from the facts and circumstances of the case.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Justice Madhu Jain</b> made the observation while dismissing an appeal filed by an accused against his conviction under Section <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/203036/">354 </a>of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (Section 74 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) and Section <a href="https://delhipolice.gov.in/doc/acts/sexual_offences_act.pdf " target="_blank">10 </a>of the POCSO Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The trial court had sentenced him to five years of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of ₹5,000 under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The High Court clarified that even if the allegation of touching the child’s private parts were excluded from consideration, the allegation that the accused kissed the minor on her lips would still require examination under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">This provision, apart from the specific acts enumerated therein, also covers <b><i>"any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration"</i></b>.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court observed: <b><i>"The absence of penetration or the exclusion of the allegation regarding touching of the private part would not, by itself, take the alleged act outside the ambit of Section 7, provided the requisite sexual intent is established from the facts and circumstances of the case."</i><br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>What was the case all about?</b><br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The prosecution case was that the incident took place on April 12, 2020, when the victim was around six years old. According to the prosecution, the accused, who was her neighbour, kissed her on the lips and touched her inappropriately.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The victim’s mother told the police that her daughter had disclosed the incident to her after returning home. The mother then informed her husband, who contacted the police.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">During the trial, the child testified that the accused had kissed her on the lips and squeezed the area of her stomach below the breast. She also stated that, apart from these acts, he had not subjected her to any other <b><i>“bad touch”</i></b> on that day.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the child’s testimony contained material inconsistencies and that there was no independent eyewitness or medical or forensic evidence corroborating the alleged acts. The defence also questioned the reliability of the child’s testimony and alleged that she had been tutored.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>What did the High Court find?<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Rejecting these submissions, the High Court compared the child’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC with her testimony before the trial court.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court found that she had remained consistent on the material particulars of the incident, including the allegation that the accused kissed her on the lips. It also noted that her immediate disclosure of the incident to her mother was consistent with the mother’s testimony.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b><i>"There may be some minor variation in the testimony regarding the precise part of the body touched by the appellant. However, considering the tender age of the victim at the time of the incident, such variation with regard to the precise description of the body part cannot, by itself, be treated as a material contradiction so as to discredit the core of her testimony"</i></b> the Court held.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court added that the material fact remained that the appellant had subjected the minor to inappropriate physical contact and kissed her on the lips.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The High Court reiterated that a conviction can be based solely on a victim’s testimony if the evidence is consistent and inspires confidence.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Relying on the Supreme Court’s <a href="https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/cant-reject-child-witness-testimony-outrightly-supreme-court-reverses-mans-acquittal" target="_blank">decision</a> in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh (2025), the Court discussed the principles governing the assessment of evidence given by child witnesses.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">It noted that a child witness is competent to testify if the child understands the questions put to her and can provide coherent and rational answers. There is no general requirement that a child witness’s testimony must be corroborated before it can form the basis of a conviction.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">However, the Court noted that a child’s evidence must be carefully scrutinised, and corroboration may be sought as a matter of caution where the testimony appears tutored or contains material discrepancies or contradictions.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the present case, the High Court noted that the trial court had assessed the child’s ability to understand and answer questions. Although the defence had suggested that she was tutored, the Court found that the allegation had not been established and that no material contradiction had been shown to render her testimony untrustworthy.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b><i>"In view of the foregoing, the testimony of the victim is consistent and inspires confidence. The minor variations do not constitute material contradictions, and the allegation of tutoring has not been established"</i></b> the Court concluded.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Finding no ground to interfere with the trial court’s judgment dated April 13, 2026, or its order on sentence dated April 20, 2026, the High Court dismissed the appeal and directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the trial court for information and compliance.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Case title : SURAJ SINGH @ LAALA v STATE NCT OF DELHI</b><br></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA["Chilli Mango Vodka": Supreme Court Seeks Union's Reply On Plea Against Fruit-Themed Alcohol Packaging]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, R. Mahadevan and Aparesh Kumar Singh granted the Union of India four weeks to file its counter-affidavit and directed that notice be served on the non-appearing States through their Standing Counsels]]></description>
<tags>Chilli Mango Vodka,Alcohol Tetra Packs,Alcohol ban,Community Against Drunken Driving,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/chilli-mango-vodka-supreme-court-seeks-unions-reply-on-plea-against-fruit-themed-alcohol-packaging-1641666</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/chilli-mango-vodka-supreme-court-seeks-unions-reply-on-plea-against-fruit-themed-alcohol-packaging-1641666</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 08:13:40 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court granted the Union of India four weeks to respond to a plea by Community Against Drunken Driving alleging that alcohol is being marketed in fruit-themed packaging that appeals to minors]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289298-supreme-court-of-india-tetra-pack-alcohol-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court on Wednesday granted the Union of India four weeks to file its counter-affidavit in a plea by Community Against Drunken Driving (CADD) that alleges alcoholic beverages are being sold in packaging dominated by fruit imagery, with the alcoholic content barely disclosed, in a manner that makes them attractive to young people and minors.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The Bench of<b> Justices Vikram Nath, R. Mahadevan </b>and<b> Aparesh Kumar Singh</b> also directed the other respondents to file their counter-affidavits within four weeks, and allowed the petitioner two weeks thereafter to file a rejoinder. </p><p dir="ltr">Noting that several States had not yet appeared, the Bench directed that they be served through their Standing Counsels.</p>

<p dir="ltr"><b>Advocate Vipin Nair</b> appeared for the petitioner.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Taking the Bench through product packaging bearing the description "chilli mango vodka", counsel for the petitioner argued that the fruit imagery was displayed prominently while the word 'vodka' was printed inconspicuously.</p>

<p dir="ltr"><em>"This is how it is being sold all over the place,"</em> Nair submitted, flagging concerns over the manner in which such products are presented to consumers.</p>

<p dir="ltr">He contended that packaging of this kind can disguise the alcoholic nature of the product, particularly for young consumers, and urged the Court to examine how such beverages are being marketed and to address the need to protect minors from exposure to them. Nair also highlighted the absence of statutory warnings on alcoholic beverages comparable to those mandated for tobacco products.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Stressing that age verification is an issue requiring attention at the national level, counsel requested the Court to ask an Additional Solicitor General (ASG) to appear on behalf of the Union, given the importance of the issue and the need for a standardised approach.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Bench discussed the role of the Union alongside that of the States, noting that alcohol is a State subject.</p>

<p dir="ltr">In response, Nair argued that the Union is a key respondent in the matter and that a coordinated approach between the Union and the States is necessary. He also flagged that several States had not yet appeared in the proceedings, as the Court examined the status of service and of counter-affidavits on record.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Expressing concern over the delay in service, Justice Nath remarked, <i>"States ko kaise serve nai horra h, notice. Serve them through the Standing Counsels."("How is the notice not getting served on the States? Serve them through the Standing Counsels.")</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court granted the Union of India four weeks to file its counter-affidavit. The other respondents were likewise directed to file their counter-affidavits within four weeks, with the petitioner granted two weeks thereafter to file a rejoinder.</p></div><p><b>Background&nbsp;</b></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>In May, the Court had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/pil-against-sale-of-alcohol-in-tetra-packs-supreme-court-issues-notice-calls-it-very-deceptive-1593551">issued notice</a> in a petition seeking a ban on sale of alcohol in "inconspicuous packages" such as tetra packs and sachets. <i>"This is very deceptive. Notice issued,"</i> CJI Kant had remarked. It issued notice to the Union as well the excise departments of various State governments on the petition moved by an Community against Drunken Driving.</p><p><b>Advocate Vipin Nair</b>, appearing for the petitioners had told the bench today, <i>"Unlike tobacco, there is no warning. These packs are fruit juices but has vodka with pictures of apples. Chilli mango vodka etc,".</i></p></div><p>In April 2025, CJI Surya Kant led bench of the Supreme Court had<a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/approach-authorities-supreme-court-rejects-pil-against-wine-tetra-packs-sold-in-uttar-pradesh-1581564" target="_blank"> rejected a PIL</a> challenging the availability of Wine in tetra packs in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The bench also comprising Justices Bagchi and Pancholi noted that thestate's policy did not have any express permission of selling liquor in tetra pack in the excise policy. However, some administration decision was taken by state government in February 2025 permitting such small packages of liquor, it further noted.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p><i>"The said policy decision is on record. It is not expedient for the court to express any opinion. Since petitioner alleged availability of liquor in tetra packs and is likely to have impact on educational institutions and on the students, we dispose of the plea with liberty to submit the copy of this plea as representation to authorities who may in turn consider the request"</i>, the bench had ordered. </p><p>In 2025, the Supreme Court ha<a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-criticizes-sale-of-alcohol-in-tetra-packs-says-it-is-so-easy-to-carry-in-schools-1540782" target="_blank">d expressed concern </a>over sale of alcohol in tetra packs, noting that their deceptive packaging could give school-going children easy access. Tetra packs containing whiskey for sale were presented before a bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi during the hearing of a trademark dispute.</p><p><i>"Should this even be permitted...it is so easy to carry in schools</i>", Justice Kant had said. Court was hearing a long-standing trademark battle between two liquor giants – M/s. Allied Blenders and Distillers Pvt. Ltd., marketing its whiskey under the name ‘OFFICER’S CHOICE’ and M/s. John Distillers Ltd., marketing its whiskey under the name ‘ORIGINAL CHOICE’. To give the Court a comparative sense of the competing branding, the original bottles of both products, followed by their tetra pack versions were placed before court respectively.</p><p>Both companies have registered their respective trademarks. Challenging the grant of a trademark to the other, both approached the erstwhile Intellectual Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”) seeking rectification of the mark used by the other. The IPAB, however, vide common order dated March 8, 2013, dismissed both the petitions observing that the two marks were not deceptively similar to each other and were not likely to confuse the public. The Madras High Court, by way of the Impugned order dated November 7, 2025, held that the mark ‘Original Choice’ was in continuous disturbance, and directed rectification thereof.</p><p><b>Case Title: Community against Drunken Driving v. Union of India and Ors. </b></p><p><i><b>Bench: Justices Vikram Nath, R. Mahadevan and Aparesh Kumar Singh </b></i></p><p><i><b>Hearing Date: October 14, 2026</b></i></p></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Asaram Bapu: Supreme Court To Hear Appeal Against Conviction On November 6 After Parole Ends]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[A Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran directed the Registry to call for the trial court records in physical and digital form, and deferred the hearing until after Asaram's parole ends on October 27]]></description>
<tags>Asaram,Rajasthan,Parole,sexual offences against minor,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaram-bapu-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-against-conviction-on-november-6-after-parole-ends-1641641</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaram-bapu-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-against-conviction-on-november-6-after-parole-ends-1641641</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:26:54 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[The Supreme Court summoned the trial court records in Asaram Bapu's appeal against conviction and listed the matter for further hearing on November 6]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289218-supreme-court-of-india-asaram-bapu-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has directed its Registry to summon the trial court records, in both physical and digital form, in the appeal filed by self-styled godman Asaram Bapu against his conviction for sexually assaulting a minor devotee in Jodhpur in 2013. The Court listed the matter for further hearing on <b>November 6 </b>at 2 PM.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The bench of<b> Justices JB Pardiwala </b>and <b>K Vinod Chandran</b> was hearing Asaram's challenge to the Gujarat High Court's refusal to grant him 20 days' temporary bail to meet his ailing wife, along with his application for bail on medical grounds. Both pleas form part of his pending appeal against conviction.<section contenteditable="false" data-width="100%" style="width:100%" class="image-and-caption-wrapper clearfix hocalwire-draggable cmp-img float-none"><img src="https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/05/2281671-supreme-court-of-india-justice-jb-pardiwala-justice-k-vinod-chandran-2026jpg.webp" draggable="true" class="hocalwire-draggable cmp-img float-none" data-uid="380751JPKAe0EvEdRcPq321M1Dhn4W85CmAGZ0257068" data-float-none="true" data-watermark="false" style="width: 100%;" info-selector="#info_item_1791961900971"><div class="inside_editor_caption image_caption hocalwire-draggable cmp-img float-none" id="info_item_1791961900971"><br></div></section></p></div><p><b>Senior Advocate Siddharth Dave</b> appeared for Asaram, and <b>Solicitor General Tushar Mehta</b> appeared for the respondent State.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">At the outset, Dave told the Bench, <em>"After notice, this is coming up for the first time."</em></p>

<p dir="ltr">The Bench then examined the procedural history of Asaram's parole pleas in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The Solicitor General submitted that the Gujarat High Court had rejected Asaram's parole plea on medical grounds, and that a subsequent plea citing his wife's ill health was also rejected.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court was informed that Asaram is presently out on 20 days' parole. He was released by the Rajasthan jail authorities following contempt proceedings over the non-implementation of a Rajasthan High Court order granting him parole. His parole period ends on October 27.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Dave raised questions going to the conviction itself. He argued that the issue of whether the prosecutrix's testimony satisfies the definition of rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code also arises in the appeal. He further submitted that the High Court had convicted Asaram under Section 376 IPC despite the nature of the charges framed at trial.</p>

<p dir="ltr">For the State, the Solicitor General pointed to the murder of three prime witnesses during the course of the trial and raised issues concerning the conviction.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Justice Pardiwala indicated that the Bench had examined the oral evidence on record. He said the appeal would require the appellant to demonstrate how the alleged lapse vitiates the conviction.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Court directed the Registry to summon the trial court records and proceedings in both physical and digital formats. Its order records, <i>"Once received, digital paperbooks are to be furnished to the counsel for Asaram, the State and Respondent No. 2 (the victim)."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The Bench said it would hear the appeal further after examining the record, and listed the matter on November 6 at 2 PM, after the expiry of Asaram's current parole on October 27.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Previous Hearings</b></p></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>Last month, the Court had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaram-bail-plea-supreme-court-orders-aiims-medical-board-to-assess-health-condition-1614395">directed</a> the Director of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) to constitute a medical board to examine the health condition of Asaram. During the hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta opposed the plea, questioning the genuineness of Asaram's medical claims. <i>"He got the bail on the ground that he was in a vegetative state. But now he is roaming around,</i>" Mehta submitted, referring to Asaram's alleged <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaram-bapu-recently-visited-ayodhya-kashi-vishwanath-he-is-fit-state-tells-supreme-court-1613185">recent visits</a> to Kashi Vishwanath and Ayodhya.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>In June, Asaram had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaram-bapu-cites-social-media-conviction-in-supreme-court-plea-against-rape-conviction-1607428" target="_blank">approached</a> the Supreme Court against the Rajasthan High Court's May 2026 <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/rajasthan-hc-upholds-asarams-life-sentence-for-rape-sets-aside-gang-rape-conviction-co-accused-acquitted-1596270" target="_blank">decision</a> whereby partly allowed the appeals filed by the self-styled spiritual leader and his co-accused in the 2013 sexual assault case involving a minor girl, setting aside the conviction under <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15289/1/ipc_act.pdf" target="_blank">Section 376D</a> of the Indian Penal Code (gang rape) and certain provisions of the<a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2079/1/AA2012-32.pdf" target="_blank"> Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) </a>but upheld Asaram’s conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC.</p><p>A bench of Justices MM Sundresh and Sheel Nagu had issued notice in Asaram's SLP saying that it will consider it. Senior Advocate DS Naidu had appeared for Asaram.<i> "He is 90 now..many medical issues..he was taken to an ayurvedic hospital..This court is our only hope...there is social media conviction now..,"</i> Naidu had told the bench. <i>"Let the treatment being given to him continue...list after re-opening..,"</i> the bench went on to order.</p><p><b>What happened in the High Court?</b></p><p>In May, a Rajasthan High Court division bench of Justice Arun Monga and Justice Yogendra Kumar Purohit delivered the judgment while deciding criminal appeals challenging the 2018 conviction recorded by the Special POCSO Court at Jodhpur. While acquitting co-accused Sharad and Shilpi of all charges, the Bench held that the evidence on record was sufficient to sustain Asaram’s conviction for rape and therefore declined to interfere with the punishment imposed by the trial court.</p><p>The Court also directed Asaram to surrender before the authorities at Jodhpur Central Jail. The judgment comes nearly eight years after the Special POCSO Court convicted Asaram for sexually assaulting a minor girl and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The case attracted significant public attention owing to the stature of the accused and the serious nature of the allegations made by the prosecutrix.</p><p>The prosecution case arose from allegations made by a minor girl who accused Asaram of sexually assaulting her at his ashram. According to the prosecution, the assault occurred under the guise of spiritual healing and religious guidance. Following registration of the First Information Report, investigating authorities conducted an inquiry based on medical evidence, witness statements and other circumstantial material before filing a chargesheet against the accused persons.</p><p>After a full-fledged trial, the Special POCSO Court at Jodhpur, on April 25, 2018, found Asaram guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. The trial court had also convicted the co-accused and imposed substantial terms of imprisonment. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the accused persons approached the High Court through separate criminal appeals.</p><p>The Division Bench had reserved judgment on April 20 after the completion of final arguments. Upon examining the evidence and findings of the trial court, the High Court undertook a charge-wise assessment of the prosecution case. While partly allowing the appeals, the Bench reiterated a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every charge levelled against an accused must be independently established beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>Applying this standard, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to conclusively prove the ingredients necessary to sustain the charge of gang rape under Section 376D IPC and certain aggravated offences alleged under the POCSO Act. As a result, the accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt in relation to those charges. The Court observed that the evidence available on record did not sufficiently establish the allegation of gang rape. Consequently, the conviction under Section 376D IPC was set aside. The Court also found deficiencies in the evidence supporting certain POCSO charges and accordingly interfered with those findings as well.</p><p>At the same time, the Bench was clear that the failure of the prosecution to establish every charge did not necessarily undermine the core allegation of rape against Asaram. The Court noted that the testimony and allegations of the prosecutrix, when evaluated alongside the material available on record, remained credible and reliable for the purpose of sustaining a conviction under Section 376 IPC.</p><p>Asaram’s conviction under Section 376 IPC and the punishment of imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life therefore continue to remain in force despite the partial relief granted in appeal.</p></div></div></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p dir="ltr"><b>Case Title: Asaram v. State of Rajasthan&nbsp;</b></p>

<p dir="ltr"><i><strong>Bench:</strong><b> Justices JB Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran</b></i></p>

<p dir="ltr"><strong><i>Hearing Date: October 14, 2026</i></strong></p></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Delhi SIR: Voters Directed To Re-enroll Through Form 6 Move Supreme Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Court was told the persons whose names were missing from the draft electoral roll have been asked to submit Form 6, which contains a declaration that they are applying for the first time.]]></description>
<tags>Delhi SIR,Supreme Court,Special Intensive Revision (SIR),Election Commission of India (ECI),Form 6</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/delhi-sir-voters-directed-to-re-enroll-through-form-6-move-supreme-court-1641635</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/delhi-sir-voters-directed-to-re-enroll-through-form-6-move-supreme-court-1641635</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[aishwarya iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:16:13 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Delhi SIR has generated significant attention after the draft electoral roll published on August 31, 2026 removed around 47.7 lakh names from the existing list of approximately 1.45 crore electors.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/09/17/2267566-delhi-sir-supreme-courtjpg.webp' /><p>Before the Supreme Court, an issue has been flagged by a few voters who have been asked by the Election Commission to re-enroll under the Form-6 as the Special intensive Revision of Electoral Rolls in underway.</p><p>Advocate Prashant Bhushan informed a CJI Surya Kant led bench today that an urgent application has been moved in the Delhi SIR petition pending before court. "They are asking persons to fill out a declaration in Form 6 that they have not voted before. Last date is October 30th. Your lordship may have this next week. The EC may allow them to fill Form 8. This court issued notice in the petition returnable for October 30th," Bhushan stated.</p><p>"We are thinking of passing an order that may resolve your concerns," CJI Kant told Bhushan.</p><p>Form 6 is the application prescribed for individuals seeking inclusion of their names in electoral rolls as new voters. The present controversy concerns an additional declaration attached to the online version of Form 6 during the SIR exercise in certain states. The declaration requires applicants to provide information regarding whether they or specified family members appeared in electoral rolls prepared during an earlier SIR exercise.
</p><p>Two days back, Supreme Court <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-clarifies-no-adjudication-on-modified-form-6-justice-bagchi-says-sc-neither-approved-nor-disapproved-it-1640826" target="_blank">clarified </a>that it has neither approved nor disapproved the modified Form 6 (used for inclusion of their names in electoral rolls) used by the Election Commission of India (ECI) during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, stating that the Court had not adjudicated upon the modified form. </p><p>A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana made the clarification after a petitioner pointed out that the Supreme Court had earlier stated that the modified Form 6 had not been approved by it, while the Election Commission had claimed that the declaration attached to the form had been upheld by the Court.</p><p>In the Delhi SIR petition, Supreme Court on September 22 had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/delhi-sir-supreme-court-questions-eci-over-mechanical-issuance-of-notices-to-voters-1634205" target="_blank">questioned</a> the Election Commission of India over the manner in which notices were being issued to voters during the ongoing Special Intensive Revision of Delhi’s electoral rolls.</p><p>Court heard a plea concerning notices issued to more than 33 lakh voters whose names have been flagged for either “no mapping” with the 2002 electoral roll or “logical discrepancies.”</p><p>The Court observed that the notices appeared to have been issued “almost mechanically” and sought clarification from the ECI on the basis for identifying voters under the “logical discrepancy” category. The Bench also sought details regarding the manpower deployed for the verification exercise. </p><p>The <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/delhi-sir-supreme-court-to-hear-plea-against-notices-issued-to-33-lakh-persons-1632366" target="_blank">petition</a> has been filed by activists Anjali Bhardwaj and Amrita Johri and argued by advocate Prashant Bhushan. It challenges the failure to disclose the names of voters who have been issued notices and the specific reasons for such notices.
</p><p>The petitioners have sought a searchable, consolidated list identifying all electors who received notices, along with the precise reason for each notice. They have also sought disclosure of the criteria, algorithmic parameters and operational guidelines used to identify “logical discrepancies.”
</p><p>The Delhi SIR has generated significant attention after the draft electoral roll published on August 31, 2026 removed around 47.7 lakh names from the existing list of approximately 1.45 crore electors. The Election Commission said the enumeration phase resulted in forms being collected and uploaded for about 97.51 lakh electors. </p><p>Those whose names are missing from the draft roll can file claims for inclusion between August 31 and September 30, along with the prescribed forms and supporting documents. The process also provides for verification and hearings where required. The Delhi SIR schedule has been revised three times. Under the latest timeline, the final electoral roll is scheduled to be published on November 4, 2026.
</p><p><b><i>Mentioning Date: October 14, 2026</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: CJI Kant, Justice Bagchi</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Asaduddin Owaisi Moves Supreme Court Challenging SIR Of Electoral Rolls]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Court has been told Owaisi's plea challenged the manner in which the SIR exercise was being conducted.]]></description>
<tags>Special Intensive Revision (SIR),Asaduddin Owaisi,AIMIM,Supreme Court,Election Commission of India (ECI),Rahul Gandhi,Gyanesh Kumar</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaduddin-owaisi-moves-supreme-court-challenging-sir-of-electoral-rolls-1641612</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/asaduddin-owaisi-moves-supreme-court-challenging-sir-of-electoral-rolls-1641612</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 06:36:41 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Owaisi's SIR petition was mentioned today before a CJI Surya Kant led bench seeking listing along with similar matters pending before Supreme Court.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289163-asaduddin-owaisi-supreme-court-sirjpg.webp' /><p>AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi has moved the Supreme Court challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls.
</p><p>Advocate Nizam Pasha mentioned the petition before Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, seeking its listing alongside similar petitions scheduled to be heard on Thursday.</p><p><i>"The petition challenges the manner in which SIR is conducted..similar matters are coming up tomorrow..this may be listed as well,"</i> Pasha told the bench also comprising Justice Joymalya Bagchi.</p><p>CJI Surya Kant said he would check and list the petition with the connected cases.</p><p>Notably, Opposition leaders led by <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhi-india-bloc-seek-ecis-internal-sir-files-retired-judge-audit-of-voter-deletions-in-sc-what-the-petition-says-1641296" target="_blank">Rahul Gandhi</a> have also <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhis-sir-plea-supreme-court-registry-flags-14-defects-rs-200-fee-shortfall-1641181" target="_blank">moved a petition</a> before Supreme Court alleging that the Chief Election Commissioner exercised the "collective powers" of the Election Commission of India on his own during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, and have asked the Court to call for the Commission's files, minutes and notings to test whether its decisions were lawfully taken.</p><p>The writ petition, filed under <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf" target="_blank">Article 32 </a>of the Constitution by Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and Mallikarjun Kharge, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, along with other party leaders and Members of Parliament, also questions the modification of the statutory Form 6, the design and operation of the ECINET and ERONET electoral-roll databases, and the "large-scale exclusion of electors without adequate notice, hearing or an effective mechanism for restoration."</p><p>In a related development, the Supreme Court on Monday<a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-clarifies-no-adjudication-on-modified-form-6-justice-bagchi-says-sc-neither-approved-nor-disapproved-it-1640826" target="_blank"> clarified</a> that it has neither approved nor disapproved the modified Form 6 (used for inclusion of their names in electoral rolls) used by the Election Commission of India (ECI) during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, stating that the Court had not adjudicated upon the modified form.</p><p>Court made the clarification after a petitioner pointed out that the Supreme Court had earlier stated that the modified Form 6 had not been approved by it, while the Election Commission had claimed that the declaration attached to the form had been upheld by the Court.
</p><p>In May this year, Supreme Court <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/legitimate-and-constitutionally-grounded-supreme-court-upholds-ecis-decision-to-conduct-bihar-sir-1596132" target="_blank">upheld</a> the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar. A CJI Surya Kant led bench, in its verdict said SIR is not in conflict with the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Rules framed thereunder. "The impugned SIR does not supplant the Representation of the People Act and the Rules. Rather, it breathes life into the constitutional mandate under Article 324 within the precise statutory contours provided by Section 21(3). Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commission has acted in excess of its statutory powers," the CJI read out in court.</p><p><b><i>Bench: CJI Kant, Justice Bagchi</i></b></p><p><b><i>Mentioning Date: October 14, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Police Officers Who Misbehave With Lawyers Relaying Court Orders Will Face Contempt: Allahabad High Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Allahabad High Court warned police officers that misbehaviour with a law officer conveying court orders may amount to contempt, while stressing strict compliance with high court directions.]]></description>
<tags>Allahabad High Court,Contempt,Contempt of court,Uttar Pradesh Police</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/police-officers-who-misbehave-with-lawyers-relaying-court-orders-will-face-contempt-allahabad-high-court-1641607</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/police-officers-who-misbehave-with-lawyers-relaying-court-orders-will-face-contempt-allahabad-high-court-1641607</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salil]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 06:31:52 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Allahabad High Court warns police against misbehaviour with law officers.&nbsp;]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289157-allahabad-high-court-police-law-officer-contempt-warningjpg.webp' /><p>The Allahabad High Court has directed the Uttar Pradesh Director General of Police (DGP) to issue a circular warning police officers that misbehaviour with a high court state law officer while the officer is communicating a court order for compliance will be treated as <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/contempt-of-court" target="_blank">contempt</a>.</p><p><i>"Any misbehaviour on the part of any officer will be treated as a contempt of this court and shall be dealt with strictly in accordance with law,"</i> ordered the bench of Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal.</p><p>Court was dealing with a bail application in a case registered under Section <a href="https://devgan.in/bns/index.php?q=64&amp;a=10" target="_blank">64(1)</a> of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)[earlier Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)] and Sections 66E and <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/section-67-it-act" target="_blank">67A </a>of the Information Technology <a href="https://eprocure.gov.in/cppp/rulesandprocs/kbadqkdlcswfjdelrquehwuxcfmijmuixngudufgbuubgubfugbububjxcgfvsbdihbgfGhdfgFHytyhRtMjk4NzY=" target="_blank">Act</a>.</p><p>During the proceedings, court took note of the misbehaviour by Rajesh Kumar Singh, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Azamgarh, towards Additional Government Advocate (AGA) Anurag Pandey.</p><p>The incident occurred when Pandey was attempting to inform Singh over the phone about court's one order dated September 16, 2026. Court noted that the PRO had misbehaved with the AGA while he was conveying the order.</p><p>Observing that AGAs are officers of the court and communicate judicial orders to officials as part of their duty, the bench said that misbehaviour with them by any officer, irrespective of rank, may amount to contempt.</p><p><i>"Whenever they inform to any officer about the compliance of the order of this court, they are discharging their duty in compliance of the order of the court,"</i> court observed.</p><p>Court, however, noted that the SSP had issued a show-cause notice to the PRO and removed him from the post after learning of the incident.</p><p>Appreciating the prompt action, Justice Deshwal directed that the PRO be taken into custody and remain in the court's custody until 5 pm, after which he was to be released.</p><p>Another issue of failure to comply with court's directions concerning a non-bailable warrant (NBW) issued against investigating officer Vinay Kumar Mishra came to light.&nbsp;</p><p>Pursuant to court's order, the SSP, Azamgarh, Dr Anil Kumar-II, appeared before the court and filed an affidavit explaining the sequence of events. He informed that a communication regarding compliance had been forwarded to the relevant police units, but Sub-Inspector Subash Singh had kept the letter with himself instead of acting on it. A preliminary inquiry also found the Station House Officer (SHO) of Maharajganj police station negligent in complying with the court's order. SSP stated that show-cause notices had been issued to both officers and appropriate action will be taken against them.</p><p>The SSP apologised for not personally executing the NBW against the investigating officer, as he was under the impression that ensuring the officer's presence was sufficient for compliance.</p><p>"Though this is not the correct legal position," Justice Deshwal said, clarifying that whenever any police officer receives an NBW issued by the high court to be executed by him, then he should personally ensure the arrest of that person and produce him/her before the high court.</p><p>Court, however, closed the matter against the SSP without passing any further order, taking into account his unblemished record and expressing the expectation that he would be more careful in future.</p><p>Separately, court appreciated the SSP's prompt action against the PRO and his humanitarian gesture of adopting the two minor daughters of a criminal who had killed his wife and another child, who later died in a police encounter.</p><p>In the bail application, court noted that the allegations against the accused were that after his marriage was fixed with a woman, he developed a relationship with her and prepared obscene video and photographs of her. Thereafter, he started blackmailing her. When the woman refused to pay him Rs. 2 lacs, he uploaded those videos and photographs on a fake Facebook ID.&nbsp;</p><p>The counsel for the accused submitted that the concerned Facebook ID did not belong to him and he had been falsely implicated in the matter.&nbsp;He also submitted that the accused had no criminal history, had been in custody since March 1, 2025, and would cooperate with the trial if released on bail.</p><p>However, opposing the plea, the AGA submitted that the pendrive and the Cyber Cell report indicated that the accused had created the fake Facebook account on September 8, 2024, and subsequently uploaded the obscene material of the victim through it.</p><p>Considering the submissions of counsel for the parties and taking into account the report of the Cyber Cell, court held that it was clear that the accused had created the Facebook ID and uploaded the obscene video and photograph. Therefore, court declined to grant him any relief and rejected the bail application.&nbsp;</p><p><b><i>Case Title: Sachin Yadav v. State of U.P.</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal</i></b></p><p><b><i>Order Date: October 12, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/salil"><![CDATA[Salil]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[CJP Leaders Saurav Das, Ashutosh Ranka Sent To 5-Day Judicial Custody In Jantar Mantar 'Trespass' Case]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Two were remanded to judicial custody a day after Delhi Police put them under preventive detention over alleged trespass at Jantar Mantar yesterday; another party member was released on a personal bond.]]></description>
<tags>CJP,Jantar Mantar,Saurav Das,Ashutosh Ranka,Judicial Custody</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/cjp-leaders-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-sent-to-5-day-judicial-custody-in-jantar-mantar-trespass-case-1641582</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/cjp-leaders-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-sent-to-5-day-judicial-custody-in-jantar-mantar-trespass-case-1641582</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salil]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 05:22:15 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[CJP leaders sent to judicial custody over Jantar Mantar incident.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/14/2289139-cjp-leaders-jantar-mantar-judicial-custody-delhijpg.webp' /><p>Delhi's Special Executive Magistrate on Wednesday remanded Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) leaders Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka to five days of judicial custody for allegedly trespassing at Jantar Mantar yesterday by crossing police barricades and entering the area after it was no denotifies as a protest site.</p><p>The two, along with party member <b>Ajinkya Shinde</b>, were put under preventive detention yesterday. 
</p><p>They were produced before a Special Executive magistrate (SEM) at Mandir Marg in Delhi on Wednesday morning. While Das and Ranka were remanded to judicial custody, Shinde was released on a personal bond, according to the party's legal team.
</p><p>The case arises from an incident in which the party members allegedly crossed barricades and entered the Jantar Mantar area, raising slogans and holding the national flag. The police action followed the removal of Jantar Mantar from the list of designated protest venues.
</p><p>Yesterday, ANI reported that the Delhi Police has registered a case against the three and various others on allegations of trespassing, forming an unlawful assembly, and disobeying an order promulgated by a public servant.
</p><p><b>Police Allege Violation Of Peace Bond
</b></p><p>According to Delhi Police, Das and Ranka had previously executed bonds undertaking to maintain peace and good behaviour for one year after being detained during an earlier protest.
</p><p>The police alleged that the two had again violated the restrictions applicable in the area and breached the conditions of their bonds. They were consequently treated as repeat offenders and produced before the magistrate.
</p><p>The earlier bonds were furnished after the two were detained on October 10. They were reportedly released after furnishing surety bonds of ₹50,000 each and undertaking to maintain peace and good behaviour for one year.
</p><p>A peace bond is an undertaking to maintain peace and good behaviour for a specified period. Alleged breach of such conditions may lead to further proceedings before the competent authority or court.
</p><p>Advocate Abhisht Hela, appearing for Das, Ranka and Shinde, however, questioned the grounds on which the two leaders had been sent to judicial custody.
</p><p>He alleged that the police had relied on an apprehension that the activists might commit an offence and disputed the claim that they had violated the conditions of their bonds.
</p><p>The lawyer also disputed the police's claim that the activists had issued a call asking people to assemble at the protest site. He further alleged that a separate complaint relating to Connaught Place had been used in the present matter.
</p><p>The incident took place amid changes to the designated venues for protests in Delhi.
</p><p>On October 11, Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar issued an order identifying Ramlila Maidan, Burari Ground and CBD Ground as designated venues for protests and demonstrations. Jantar Mantar was removed from the list of approved protest sites.
</p><p>The police subsequently detained the CJP members after they allegedly crossed barricades and entered the area.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/salil"><![CDATA[Salil]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[“Power To Empower”: PM Modi Pitches Digital Public Infrastructure, Legal Reforms And Trust At Bloomberg New Economy Forum]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[PM Modi said at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum that technology and data are the new global power, and that India’s digital infrastructure, legal reforms and emphasis on trust show how that power can be used to empower others.]]></description>
<tags>PM Modi,Bloomberg New Economy Forum,Insolvency Law,GST,Digital Public Infrastructure</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/power-to-empower-pm-modi-pitches-digital-public-infrastructure-legal-reforms-and-trust-at-bloomberg-new-economy-forum-1641478</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/power-to-empower-pm-modi-pitches-digital-public-infrastructure-legal-reforms-and-trust-at-bloomberg-new-economy-forum-1641478</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 13:57:00 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[PM Modi Lists GST, Insolvency Law and Labour Codes as “Reforms of Conviction” at Bloomberg Forum]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288917-pm-modi-bloomberg-forumjpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Prime Minister Narendra Modi</b> has said that technology, data and knowledge are the new sources of global power, but the real question is how that power is used, as he outlined a <b><i>“Power to Empower”</i></b> vision at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in New Delhi.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Addressing global business leaders and policymakers at the forum, which is being held in India for the first time, PM Modi asked: <b><i>“Will technology advance only a few people? Or will it create new opportunities for millions?”</i></b> He said power must go beyond control, towards enabling others.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The digital thread ran through much of his speech. PM Modi said affordable mobile data had allowed a student in a small town to access digital learning and a village shopkeeper to find new customers. He also pointed to India’s digital payments ecosystem, saying a street vendor and a large car showroom use the same system, which he described as <b><i>“the strength of inclusive technology.”
</i></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">India, he said, is also sharing its digital public infrastructure with other countries so they can build systems suited to their needs. He recalled that the CoWIN platform created during the COVID-19 pandemic was open source, adding that the country’s capability <b><i>“should empower humanity.”
</i></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">On governance, PM Modi said a government has authority, but its objective should not be to make citizens dependent on the system. He cited the JAM Trinity and Direct Benefit Transfer, under which aid is sent straight to beneficiaries’ bank accounts, claiming it had reduced corruption and created <b><i>“a direct connection”</i></b> between the government and citizens.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">His speech also carried a legal and regulatory pitch to investors. Listing reforms, he said India had transformed<b><i> “a complex web of taxes into a national market”</i></b> through GST, created an insolvency law, consolidated 29 labour laws into four codes and decriminalised hundreds of minor business-related errors. <b><i>“Reforms are not a compulsion. Reforms are our conviction,”</i></b> he said.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">PM Modi also warned that things which once connected the world <b><i>“are today becoming weapons.”</i></b> Supply chains, energy, minerals, payments and technology, he said, can become <b><i>“a means of pressure and dominance.” </i></b>With artificial intelligence changing the way of working in every sector, he said the major question before the world is one of trust: that supplies will continue, that promises will be kept and that partners will stand by each other in a crisis.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He referred to the AI Impact Summit held in India a few months ago, noting that it discussed not only the use of AI for humanity but also how animals could benefit from the technology. PM Modi listed the <b><i>“responsible use of emerging technologies” </i></b>alongside climate change, water governance and public health as areas where the world needs solutions.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On the economy, PM Modi said India’s startups have grown from a few hundred before 2014 to over 250,000, with nearly half from small cities and towns and over 45 per cent having at least one woman director or partner. He said growth stood at 7.8 per cent in the April-June quarter, the current account deficit had fallen to 0.61 per cent of GDP and foreign exchange reserves exceeded 700 billion dollars.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Concluding with a Vedic verse urging people to walk and speak together, he said dialogue builds understanding. Pointing to the International Solar Alliance, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and the Global Biofuels Alliance, he said India’s platforms are meant to <b><i>“benefit everyone.”</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA["Resign Now" Posts Against CJI Surya Kant: PIL In Supreme Court Seeks Ban On Political Protests In Court Complexes]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Four advocates asked the Supreme Court to bar political processions, sloganeering and party flags inside judicial complexes, to declare that no leader could petition the Chief Justice on the administrative side in a pending case, and to examine whether the conduct of opposition leaders on October 12 amounted to criminal contempt]]></description>
<tags>Contempt of Courts Act,INDIA bloc,Rahul Gandhi,Mahua Moitra,Supreme Court Registry,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/resign-now-posts-against-cji-surya-kant-pil-in-supreme-court-seeks-ban-on-political-protests-in-court-complexes-1641473</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/resign-now-posts-against-cji-surya-kant-pil-in-supreme-court-seeks-ban-on-political-protests-in-court-complexes-1641473</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 13:53:23 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[A PIL filed in the Supreme Court seeks a party-neutral framework against political processions and pressure tactics at constitutional courts, after opposition leaders marched towards the Court and posts demanding the Chief Justice of India's resignation appeared on X]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288891-supreme-court-of-india-opposition-march-to-sc-2026jpg.webp' /><p>Four advocates practising before the Supreme Court have moved the Supreme Court seeking a party-neutral framework to keep political processions, protests and sloganeering away from constitutional courts, and have asked it to consider initiating suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against several opposition leaders over the events of Monday, October 12, when an opposition march headed towards the Court and posts demanding the resignation of <b>Chief Justice of India Surya Kant </b>appeared on X.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The public interest litigation, filed on Tuesday by Advocates&nbsp;<b>Digant Mishra, Divyansh Bisht, Ashish Gopal Garg </b>and <b>Shweta Garg </b>through <b>Advocate-on-Record (AoR) Utkarsh Jaiswal,</b> arrays <b>Rahul Gandhi, Mallikarjun Kharge, Akhilesh Yadav, Mahua Moitra</b>, the <b>Indian National Congress and the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee </b>as respondents, alongside the Union of India, the Delhi Police Commissioner and the Supreme Court through its Secretary General as a proforma respondent.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners framed the question before the Court as "whether the precincts of the Supreme Court of India, the apex judicial institution and constitutional guardian of fundamental rights, can be permitted to become a venue for organised political mobilisation, public demonstrations or activities carrying the potential to exert pressure upon the administration of justice."</p>

<p dir="ltr">They stated on oath that the petition "is not filed on behalf of, at the instance of, or for the benefit of any political party or political affiliation", and that they "express no view whatsoever on the merits of any matter pending before this Hon'ble Court, including the matters relating to the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls and the decisions of the Election Commission of India."</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Background: CJI declines meeting on subjudice SIR and CEC issues </b></p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the petition, the Leaders of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha wrote to the Chief Justice on October 10 seeking an appointment on October 12 to submit a memorandum. Its publicly announced demands, the petition says, included a halt to the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, whose decisions are under challenge before the Court.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The Chief Justice <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/cji-surya-kant-refuses-to-meet-rahul-gandhi-says-electoral-issues-must-be-raised-on-judicial-side-1640763">declined</a> the meeting by a letter dated October 11. The petition quotes the letter as recording that the issues "are already sub judice before the Supreme Court of India" and that "convening a meeting to discuss pending cases would wholly contravene the principle of Separation of Powers, an intrinsic facet of the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution of India, and would be incompatible with the established ethics and judicial propriety". The letter added that "it would thus be more appropriate on your part to invoke the judicial powers of the Supreme Court of India, instead of submitting a memorandum." The petitioners described the letter as "a model of constitutional restraint".</p>

<p dir="ltr">Despite the letter, the petition says, a march to the Supreme Court was announced for October 12. As reported, the Delhi Police halted the procession at a barricade on Bhagwan Dass Road, and the Court's administration permitted a delegation to enter the premises and file a writ petition at the filing counter. The petition states that <b>Rahul Gandhi, Mallikarjun Kharge, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra </b>and<b> Akhilesh Yadav </b>were reported to be among the leaders who entered the premises.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners clarified that they "do not question the filing of a writ petition by any citizen, including any political leader". Their concern, they said, is "the conversion of the act of approaching this Hon'ble Court into a political procession, with crowds, slogans and a public spectacle directed at the Court, in respect of matters already pending before it."</p><p dir="ltr"><b>"Resign Now" and "So we will": Posts against CJI </b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition places on record two posts made on X on October 12, after the Chief Justice was reported to have told reporters that the protests in Delhi were "law and order ka mudda" and "mera vishay nahin hai".</p>

<p dir="ltr">At 4:48 PM, the petition says, the official handle of the Kerala unit of the Congress posted, <i>"Dear Surya Kant,
If law and order is not your domain, resign now. We will find your replacement who can handle it."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">At 6:35 PM, Trinamool Congress MP Mahua Moitra<a href="https://x.com/MahuaMoitra/status/2109631543161631202?s=20"> posted</a>, in the petition's words "in apparent reference to Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India": <i>"Surya clearly Can't. So we will."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners submitted that the first post "addressed the Chief Justice of India by name, without the courtesy of his title", "struck at the dignity of the office of the Chief Justice of India and implied that the highest judicial office in the land is a matter of political choice." They added: "It is indeed shocking that the post of @INCKerala could issue from the official handle of a unit of a national party at all."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition also records that the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association condemned the resignation calls, and that the post was later deleted, with the party's national leadership publicly disagreeing with it.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Relying on Article 124(4), under which a Supreme Court judge can be removed only by an order of the President after an address by both Houses of Parliament on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, the petitioners argued that the Constitution provides "an exclusive mechanism for the removal of a Judge."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Citing <em>C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee</em>, where the Court held that Bar association pressure to coerce a judge to resign was impermissible, the petition contends: "If an association of officers of the court cannot coerce a Judge to resign, a fortiori a political party cannot."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The plea further says that the demand <i>"carried the unmistakable message that a Judge who declines political overtures may face a political campaign for his removal. Such a message, if left unchecked, has an obvious tendency to interfere with the administration of justice."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners stressed that the conduct complained of was directed at matters "not merely pending, but listed for hearing on the very next day, 13.10.2026." Three things together, they argued, raise "serious concern" that the events had a tendency to prejudice the pending proceedings: the march in support of the memorandum's demands, the resignation demand against the Chief Justice presiding over the Bench seized of related matters, and the public description of the march as a test of whether the Court would act as guardian of the Constitution.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition relies on <em>State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi</em>, (1997) 8 SCC 386, which held that "A trial by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law", and on <em>In re P.C. Sen</em>, (1969) 2 SCR 649, where the Court held that comments on pending proceedings "emanating from the parties or their lawyers, are generally a more serious contempt than those coming from independent sources". The petitioners pointed out that several leaders who led the march filed a writ petition the same evening and "are thus themselves litigants before this Hon'ble Court."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Quoting <em>E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar</em>, the petition reminds the Court that judges "cannot take their cue from sentiments of politicians", and, quoting <em>In re Prashant Bhushan</em>, that "An attempt to shake the very foundation of constitutional democracy has to be dealt with an iron hand."</p>

<p dir="ltr">On the right to protest, the petitioners accepted that dissent is "an important feature of democracy", but argued that it "cannot be understood as conferring an unrestricted entitlement to enter restricted or operational court areas, obstruct access to court buildings, assemble in a manner that disrupts judicial work, intimidate persons involved in adjudication, or seek a favourable judicial outcome through collective pressure."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Article 19(2), the petition notes, expressly allows reasonable restrictions "in relation to contempt of court". Relying on <em>Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police</em>, (2020) 10 SCC 439, that "demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in designated places alone", the petitioners contend that "The precincts of a constitutional court are, by their very nature, not a designated place for political protest."</p>

<p dir="ltr">They also invoke <em>Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India</em>, (2003) 2 SCC 45, under which even lawyers may protest only "outside and away from court premises", and argue that "political parties, who have no role in the administration of justice, cannot claim a higher right to take political processions to the gates of this Hon'ble Court or into its precincts."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition further cites US federal law prohibiting picketing near courts and <em>Cox v. Louisiana</em>, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), where the US Supreme Court said "mob law is the very antithesis of due process", for persuasive value.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Arguing for equal treatment inside court complexes, the petitioners submitted that "Article 14 does not admit of a separate procedure for political leaders." Political leaders, "however high their office, can claim no special access to the Chief Justice or to the Judges, no entourage, no right to sloganeering and no platform for political messaging within the judicial campus."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Citing the 1997 "Restatement of Values of Judicial Life", the petition argues that political actors "must not seek to draw Judges into such engagement, whether through private meetings, memoranda on the administrative side, or public spectacle."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners contend that there is currently no "uniform, neutral and enforceable framework" that regulates processions near the Supreme Court and High Courts, prohibits political protests within judicial complexes, prevents organised pressure in sub judice matters, or prescribes the decorum expected of political parties inside court campuses. Prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, they say, are "temporary and area-specific, and are not designed with the particular requirements of the judicial process in view."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Relying on <em>Vishaka</em>, <em>Vineet Narain</em>, <em>Prakash Singh</em> and <em>Kodungallur Film Society</em>, the petitioners ask the Court to lay down guidelines that would operate as law until Parliament or the appropriate authority acts.</p></div><p><b>Case Title: Digant Mishra and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.&nbsp;</b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Supreme Court of India (hearing expected)&nbsp;</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA['Festive Season Business Being Jeopardized Due To Protests': Traders Tell Delhi HC; Protest Pleas Adjourned To Friday]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The traders allege that ongoing protests have jeopardized business worth around ₹2,000 crore; High Court seeks pleadings filed before the Supreme Court to examine whether the issues overlap with pending proceedings]]></description>
<tags>Standard Operating Procedure (SOP),Protests,Delhi High Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/festive-season-business-being-jeopardized-due-to-protests-traders-tell-delhi-hc-protest-pleas-adjourned-to-friday-1641427</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/festive-season-business-being-jeopardized-due-to-protests-traders-tell-delhi-hc-protest-pleas-adjourned-to-friday-1641427</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 13:05:45 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption/>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288791-delhi-hc.webp' /><p><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">The Delhi High Court on Tuesday adjourned petitions concerning the ongoing protests in Delhi to Friday, after asking the parties to place on record the pleadings in related proceedings before the Supreme Court to determine whether the issues raised before it overlap with those pending before the apex court.</span></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div>A Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Justice Sanjay Sharma was hearing a plea by traders seeking the implementation of guidelines and a standard operating procedure (SOP) to regulate protests, as well as a separate petition seeking an investigation into alleged violence against protesters on October 10.</div><div>During the hearing of the traders’ plea, Senior Advocate Sachin Puri submitted that business in Delhi was being severely affected by the ongoing protests, particularly during the festive season.</div><div>" ₹2,000 crores business has vanished. These are festival seasons. We get the business only during this period, which annuals for our benefit for the entire period. October till February is the best time for business in Delhi and that is being jeopardized " Puri submitted.</div><div>He argued that the issue of designated protest areas and the implementation of the mechanism governing demonstrations had repeatedly come before the courts.</div><div>Referring to the Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, Puri submitted that the apex court had directed the authorities to devise a mechanism for the limited use of Jantar Mantar for peaceful protests and demonstrations.</div><div>He also referred to the Supreme Court’s observations on repeated prohibitory orders under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in areas around Parliament. The judgment had cautioned against such orders creating a situation of perpetuity that effectively amounted to a ban on public meetings and demonstrations.</div><div>The High Court asked what steps the Central Government had taken to implement the directions in the Supreme Court’s judgment.</div><div>The Bench observed that if the grievance concerned non-implementation of the judgment, the parties should establish what action had been taken by the authorities and whether further steps were required.</div><div>Puri submitted that the issues raised in the traders’ plea were not before the Supreme Court. The Bench, however, said it did not want to address an issue that was already sub judice before the apex court.</div><div>The Court directed the parties to place copies of the pleadings in the Supreme Court proceedings on record and adjourned the matter to Friday.</div><div>The order records that the petitioners sought the adjournment to enable them to produce the relevant pleadings, so the Court could examine “whether the claim put forth in the present petition covers or also overlaps with the issue which is sought to be canvassed before the Apex Court”.</div><div>The Court also directed the respondents to take instructions in the matter.</div><div>NSUI, Anshika Tripathi Seek SIT Probe Into Alleged Violence</div><div>Separately, the High Court heard a petition filed by the National Students’ Union of India (NSUI) and Anshika Tripathi seeking an investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) into alleged violence against protesters on October 10.</div><div>Advocate Meghan Ahmad, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that unidentified persons who were not part of the protest had allegedly entered the protest site and assaulted demonstrators with sticks.</div><div><div>Ahmad told the Court that 18 video recordings had been filed and that several other videos showing the alleged incidents were circulating on social media.</div><div>Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition under the Delhi High Court Public Interest Litigation Rules, 2010.</div><div>Referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, Sharma submitted that the Delhi High Court’s PIL Rules prescribe specific requirements for petitions filed in the public interest, including disclosures about the petitioner’s identity, background and organisational affiliations, where applicable.</div><div>He argued that the petitioner had not complied with the requirements under Rules 9(E), 9(F) and 9(G).</div><div>Ahmad submitted that the prayer was limited to seeking action against those allegedly responsible for the violence and urged the Court to consider the sensitive nature of the allegations.</div><div>The ASG questioned how the petitioner could argue the merits of the case before the preliminary objection to maintainability had been addressed.</div><div>The Bench permitted the ASG to place his preliminary objection on record by way of an affidavit.</div><div>During the hearing, counsel also sought preservation of CCTV footage from the protest site so that potentially relevant evidence would not be lost. Another counsel sought clarification from the authorities about alleged house arrests, including the number of persons detained, the legal provisions invoked and the orders under which such action was taken.</div><div> The proceedings were adjourned as the Court sought to examine the overlap, if any, with the matters pending before the Supreme Court.</div><div>The petitions will be taken up on Friday.</div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/author-info/1073/lawbeat-news-desk"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[IYC Drops Plea For Jantar Mantar Protest, Delhi HC Issues Notice On Challenge To Alleged ‘Arbitrary’ Permission Denial]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Delhi High Court issued notice on IYC’s challenge to the alleged 'arbitrary' denial of permission for a Jantar Mantar protest against CEC Gyanesh Kumar. The IYC had moved an application on September 25.]]></description>
<tags>Delhi High Court,Indian Youth Congress (IYC),IYC Chief Uday Bhanu Chib,Gyanesh Kumar,Chief Election Commissioner,Jantar Mantar Protest</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/iyc-drops-plea-for-jantar-mantar-protest-delhi-hc-issues-notice-on-challenge-to-alleged-arbitrary-permission-denial-1641407</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/iyc-drops-plea-for-jantar-mantar-protest-delhi-hc-issues-notice-on-challenge-to-alleged-arbitrary-permission-denial-1641407</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salil]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 12:40:39 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption/>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288079-dhc-gyanesh-kumar.webp' /><p>The Delhi High Court on Tuesday, in the petition filed by the Indian Youth Congress (IYC) challenging the Delhi Police’s decision to deny permission for a protest at<a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/jantar-mantar-protest" target="_blank"> Jantar Mantar</a> against Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/gyanesh-kumar" target="_blank">Gyanesh Kumar</a>,&nbsp;issued notice on limited prayers challenging the manner of the permission denial.</p><p>When the matter came up before the bench of Justice Amit Mahajan, Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma, appearing for the respondents, submitted that the plea had become infructuous in view of the <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/jantar-mantar-de-notified-as-protest-site-delhi-police-order-challenged-in-sc-over-shift-to-ramlila-burari-cbd-grounds-1641188" target="_blank">denotification </a>of Jantar Mantar as a protest site.</p><p>However, Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra, appearing for IYC President Uday Bhanu Chib, submitted that he would amend the prayers in the writ petition to reflect the changed circumstances. </p><p>He argued that the challenge was not limited to the denial of permission to protest but also concerned the alleged curbing of the petitioner's rights and the arbitrary manner in which permission had been denied.</p><p>To this, ASG Sharma said that the remaining prayers stemmed from the principal prayer seeking permission to hold the protest. He argued that since the main prayer could no longer be pressed, the petition could not be sustained.</p><p>However, Senior Advocate Luthra clarified that he was no longer pressing prayers (a) and (b) of the writ petition, which concerned permission to protest at Jantar Mantar. However, he sought to pursue the remaining prayers challenging the manner in which permission had been denied.</p><p>Court issued notice on prayers (c), (d) and (f) and posted the matter for further hearing on November 17.</p><p>Through prayers (c), (d) and (f), Chib has challenged the imposition of blanket restrictions on peaceful protests without individual assessment, sought a fresh and reasoned reconsideration of IYC’s request after examining whether concerns regarding security, traffic and public order could be addressed through reasonable conditions, and contested the treatment of the 10-day advance notice requirement as an absolute bar to considering applications filed within a shorter period.</p><p>The proposed protest sought to demand Kumar’s resignation over alleged irregularities in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The allegations form part of a wider political dispute over the revision exercise and its implications for voters’ names on electoral rolls.</p><p><b>Why Was Permission Denied?
</b></p><p>IYC had sought permission to hold a peaceful demonstration involving approximately 100 to 150 people between October 1 and October 25.
</p><p>On October 1, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (New Delhi) rejected the request, citing law-and-order concerns in the New Delhi district and traffic considerations.
</p><p>The police communication reportedly also referred to guidelines restricting dharnas or demonstrations at Jantar Mantar and the Central Vista area to one continuous day. It cited intelligence inputs about possible mass gatherings and the potential impact on security and traffic management.
</p><p><b>What Has IYC Argued?
</b></p><p>IYC president Uday Bhanu Chib has challenged the rejection, arguing that the police cannot use their power to regulate peaceful assemblies to effectively prohibit them.
</p><p>The petition contends that the decision was taken without an individualised and proportionate assessment of the proposed gathering. It invokes Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, concerning equality before the law, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to assemble peacefully without arms.
</p><p>The organisation has also stated that it is willing to comply with lawful conditions relating to security, traffic management, discipline and public order.
</p><p><b>Previous Proceedings
</b></p><p>The high court had declined to grant an urgent hearing on the plea on October 9, listing it for October 12. The matter was subsequently taken up on Monday, when the lawyers sought an early hearing but the court directed that it be heard on Tuesday.
</p><p><b><i>Case Title: Uday Bhanu Chib vs UOI and Others
</i></b></p><p><b><i>Hearing Date: October 13, 2026
</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justice Amit Mahajan</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/salil"><![CDATA[Salil]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[2003 Haren Pandya Murder Case: Supreme Court Refuses Convict's Remission Plea]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Court refuses to consider plea by a convict in the murder case of then Gujarat Home Minister Haren Pandya.]]></description>
<tags>Remission,Murder Case,Supreme Court of India,Premature Release,Gujarat High Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/2003-haren-pandya-murder-case-supreme-court-refuses-convicts-remission-plea-1641375</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/2003-haren-pandya-murder-case-supreme-court-refuses-convicts-remission-plea-1641375</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 11:54:14 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Court notes the State had rejected the convict's remission plea and he was at liberty to challenge it before the High Court.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288659-supreme-court-haren-pandya-murder-casejpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has refused to entertain a premature release filed by a convict names Mohammed Asgar Ali, who is serving a life sentence for the murder of former Gujarat Home Minister Haren Pandya.</p><p>A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Aparesh Kumar Singh passed the order after Swati Ghildiyal, Advocate-onRecord appearing for the respondent-State of Gujarat placed before the Court a copy of the order dated7th October, 2026, passed by the competent authority, rejecting the petitioner’s application for remission/pre-mature release.&nbsp;</p><p><i>"In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to continue with these matter(s) any further. The Special Leave Petition(s), accordingly, stand dismissed. It would, however, be open for the petitioner, if so advised, to assail the correctness of the order dated 07.10.2026, rejecting the application for remission/pre-mature release, before the jurisdictional High Court.&nbsp; It would also be open to the petitioner to seek such interim relief as may be permissible in law before the High Court," </i>the bench ordered.</p><p>In 2024, supreme court had refused to consider the plea by <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-refuses-remission-plea-convict-haren-pandya-murder-case" target="_blank">another convict </a>in the murder case seeking a direction to the state government to decide his plea for remission.</p><p>"The applicant is a convict under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). It is true that he is undergoing sentence past 14 years. The main petition is pending before the High Court of Gujarat in the form of Special Criminal Application," the bench had noted in its order.</p><p>Then Gujarat home minister Haren Pandya was shot dead outside Law Garden in Ahmedabad on March 26, 2003. The CBI had investigated the case and said that Pandya was allegedly killed to avenge the 2002 Gujarat riots. In July, 2019, the Supreme Court had set aside the Gujarat High Court's 2011 judgement that had acquitted nine out of 12 convicts, undergoing life term, in the case of sensational killing of Pandya on March 26, 2003 in Ahmedabad. </p><p>The apex court had then restored the trial court's judgement of June 25, 2007 which awarded life imprisonment to nine persons and handed out sentences ranging from five to seven years to the other three under various provisions of the IPC, Arms Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002.
</p><p><b><i>Case Title: MOHAMMED ASGARALI MOHAMMAD VAJIRALI VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT &amp; ORS.</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Defers Protest Pleas To October 15 Due To Justice Mohana’s Health]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The pleas challenging police and paramilitary actions against protesters in Delhi was to be heard today, deferred on account of Justice Mohana's health.]]></description>
<tags>Protests,Supreme Court of India,Illegal Detention,Metro Station shutdown,Internet shutdown,Gyanesh Kumar,Special Intensive Revision (SIR)</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-defers-protest-pleas-to-october-15-due-to-justice-mohanas-health-1641363</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-defers-protest-pleas-to-october-15-due-to-justice-mohanas-health-1641363</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 11:32:40 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court to take up all protest related pleas’ on October 15 at a fixed time.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288629-supreme-court-delhi-protests-sirjpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has scheduled all pleas concerning protests for hearing on October 15, citing the health condition of Justice Mohana.</p><p>The matters, which were originally to be listed for consideration before the Court today, will now be taken up on the rescheduled date.&nbsp;</p><p>The pleas relate to protests in Delhi against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar and the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. They also concern restrictions imposed on public transport ahead of the October 10 demonstrations, including the closure of metro stations and disruptions to train services.</p><p>The Court is also expected to consider pleas concerning alleged assaults on protesters and women journalists covering the demonstrations.</p><p>Today, the court also opined that it cannot ask Solicitor General Tushar Mehta to put in counters to every issue relating to the October 10 protests. Justice Bagchi said, <i>"There are multiple matters, we cannot ask the SG to file counter in every case..there are overlapping issues.."</i></p><p>We would have heard it today if Justice Mohana was well, the CJI said.</p><p>"Your lordship must rest," SG Mehta told the bench in response.</p><p>Adding to the concern, Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan said, <i>"We have known your lordship from the Bar..her commitment is unparalled..".</i></p><p>Supreme Court will also be hearing the issue <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-tomorrow-lawyers-pleas-against-detention-1641044" target="_blank">concerning detention of lawyers </a>who took part in the protests concerning the SIR row on October 10, 2026.</p><p>Also, a <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/contempt-plea-before-supreme-court-over-57-delhi-metro-station-shutdown-1640268" target="_blank">contempt petition </a>will be heard by Supreme Court alleging that the Central government has violated the court’s order to lift restrictions on metro and train services. The plea has named Union home secretary Govind Mohan, Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar, and Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) chairperson D Thara as contemnors.&nbsp;</p><p><b><i>Bench: CJI Kant, Justice Bagchi and Justice Mohana</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[Social Media Ban For Children Under 13? Indore School Moves Supreme Court For Age Verification And Parental Consent Rules]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[An Indore school and its director of academics asked the Supreme Court to direct the Centre to frame an enforceable child-safety regime for social media, and argued that platforms had escaped the age checks that already applied to OTT content and online games]]></description>
<tags>Social Media,Social Media Regulation,DPDP Act,NCPCR,OTT platform regulation,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/social-media-ban-for-children-under-13-indore-school-moves-supreme-court-for-age-verification-and-parental-consent-rules-1641345</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/social-media-ban-for-children-under-13-indore-school-moves-supreme-court-for-age-verification-and-parental-consent-rules-1641345</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 10:25:41 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Emerald Heights International School, Indore, and its director of academics, Siddharth Singh Girnar, have filed a public interest petition under Article 32 in the Supreme Court seeking a regulatory framework for children's access to social media platforms]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288513-supreme-court-of-india-social-media-paltforms-regulation-2026jpg.webp' /><p>A PIL has been filed by an Indore School in the Supreme Court seeking directions to the Centre to put in place a binding child-safety framework for social media.. <i>"Children in India are signing up for social media platforms that verify nothing beyond a self-declared date of birth, while the same children cannot buy liquor, tobacco or acid and cannot watch adult content on an OTT platform without an age check,"</i> the plea states.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p dir="ltr">The petition has been filed under Article 32 by Emerald Heights International School, a co-educational day-cum-boarding school in Indore affiliated to the CBSE, and its director of academics, Siddharth Singh Girnar. The school states it has about 4,115 students and stands "in the position of a guardian (in loco parentis)" to them. </p><p dir="ltr">The petition has been drawn by <b>Advocates Khusbhu Jain, Mayank Singh Rawat and Zaid Ahmed</b>, and filed through <b>Advocate-on-Record (AoR) Vaibhav Choudhary.</b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners point out that the minimum age adopted by platforms is "at best, a self-imposed threshold of 13 years, generally based on self-declared age." They contend that this threshold "bears no correspondence to the protection accorded to children under Indian law", since the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 treats every person below 18 as a child.</p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the petition, children "including those well below 18 years are routinely exposed to social-media platforms that are not designed or operated as child-safe environments." The platforms, it says, "are structured to maximize attention, prolong engagement and monetize user behavior".</p>

<p dir="ltr">The school says its concern comes from what it has seen in its own classrooms and hostels: children below the stated age "holding and operating social-media accounts", children "being contacted by strangers", and children "coming to school sleep-deprived, distracted and unable to concentrate". It adds, <i>"there is hardly a parent-teacher meeting in which parents do not express their anxiety over the hold which social media has come to have over their children."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition's Article 14 argument rests on a comparison with other regulated activities. It notes that under the IT Rules, 2021, OTT platforms must verify a viewer's age before showing adult content, and that online games are subject to age verification. </p><p dir="ltr">It submits,<i> "A child cannot lawfully buy liquor, tobacco or acid, however, the same child can open a social media account without any verification and access similar or worse content, and can be contacted by any stranger. There is no rational basis for exempting social media platforms from age verification mechanism."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners also argue that the absence of a central law has produced unequal protection, as Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Goa have announced their own measures with different age limits. A child in Karnataka, the petition says, "may be subject to one rule, a child in Andhra Pradesh to another with a different age limit, and a child in Madhya Pradesh to none at all, although all of them use the same platforms." It relies on Entry 31 of List I and Article<a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf"> 253</a> to argue that the subject belongs to the Union.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition places primary fault on the intermediaries. Relying on a 2021 study by the<a href="https://ncpcr.gov.in/public/"> National Commission for Protection of Child Rights </a>(NCPCR), it states that "37.8% of 10-year-old children surveyed had Facebook accounts", and alleges that the intermediaries "are aware of this and have chosen not to act, because more users mean more revenue for them."</p>

<p dir="ltr">It contends that features such as endless scrolling, autoplay, "streaks", "likes" and constant notifications act "with particular force on children", and that the resulting harm "is therefore not an accident but a consequence of how the product is designed." Where an algorithm pushes harmful content to a child who never searched for it, the petition argues, the intermediary "is not a mere passive carrier of third-party content but an active participant in the harm."</p>

<p dir="ltr">On safe harbour, the petitioners submit that an intermediary "that knowingly allows underage users, makes children's profiles visible to strangers and allows unknown adults to contact them cannot be said to have observed due diligence" under Section <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf">79</a> of the IT Act and Rule <a href="https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf">3(1)(b)</a> of the IT Rules. They further argue that, since an agreement with a minor is void under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, the platforms are collecting children's data "without any valid legal basis."</p><p dir="ltr">The petition lists several gaps in the IT Rules, 2021. It points out that neither the IT Act nor the Rules prescribe a minimum age for opening a social media account or require parental consent. The expression "harmful to child" in Rule 3(1)(b) "is nowhere defined", and the duty under Rule 4(4) to use technology to detect child sexual abuse material "is only an 'endeavour' and is not mandatory."</p>

<p dir="ltr">It adds that the Centre has amended the Rules in 2022, 2023 and 2026 to deal with online gaming, false information and AI-generated content, but "on no occasion has it made any provision for the protection of children on social media". The petitioners say that this failure to use a statutory power coupled with a duty "is arbitrary and amenable to a writ of mandamus."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition contends that Section <a href="https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf">9</a> of the DPDP Act, which requires verifiable parental consent and bars tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising directed at children, "is yet to be brought into force, and no mechanism exists to ascertain whether a user is a child. The protection therefore remains on paper."</p>

<p dir="ltr">It points out that the Act received assent on August 11, 2023, the Rules were notified on November 13, 2025, and the child-related provisions come into force only in May 2027. The protection enacted by Parliament "will thus have remained inoperative for almost four years". Relying on <em>Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India</em>, the petitioners argue that the Centre "cannot, by inaction, defeat the will of Parliament", and that Section 9 can be brought into force earlier for social media and online gaming platforms.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition also flags a structural flaw: the obligation under Section 9 "arises only if the user discloses that he or she is a child. A child who enters a false date of birth is treated as an adult", so the provision "depends upon the truthfulness of the very person it seeks to protect". It accept that children have a right to access the internet and say no relief is sought that would prevent a child from using it for education, health or communication with family. They argue, however, that this right "is not the same as a right to unrestricted access to every commercial service offered on the internet."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition also proposes a graded model as a reasonable and proportionate measure: children below 13 would not hold accounts, children between 13 and 16 would have access only with "the verifiable consent and supervision of the parent or guardian and with child-safe settings", and those between 16 and 18 would have access subject to data protection and safeguards against harmful content. This, it says, is "far less intrusive than a complete prohibition" and satisfies the proportionality test in <em>Modern Dental College</em> and <em>Puttaswamy</em>.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners rely on foreign developments, including Australia's minimum age of 16, in force from December 10, 2025, under which access to about 4.7 million accounts of children below 16 was "reported to have been restricted" within about five weeks. They also refer to measures adopted or announced in France, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, Brazil and the European Union.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners anticipate the objection that the issue is one of policy. They distinguish <em>Zep Foundation v. Union of India</em> (2025), in which the Supreme Court declined to impose a ban itself but directed that a representation be considered within eight weeks. The petition notes that "more than seventeen months have since passed without any framework being put in place."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The present petition, it says, "does not ask this Hon'ble Court to frame the policy", but seeks enforcement of existing laws, a direction to the Government to take a decision on child protection on social media, and interim safeguards in the meantime. It submits that "the Policy of the State cannot be a policy of indefinite inaction", and relies on <em>Vishaka</em>, <em>Prakash Singh</em> and <em>Lakshmi</em> to argue that the Court can lay down guidelines to fill a legal vacuum.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners also cite the Union's own Economic Survey 2025–26 and a statement of the Union Minister dated February 17, 2026 that "age-based regulation has to be there", and argue that "inaction after acknowledging the danger is arbitrary". They say their representation of March 9, 2026 to the authorities has gone unanswered. The petition notes that the Supreme Court has already <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-gives-centre-two-weeks-to-file-report-on-csam-seeks-details-of-steps-against-social-media-intermediaries-1634749">issued notice</a> on a similar issue in <em><a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-gives-centre-two-weeks-to-file-report-on-csam-seeks-details-of-steps-against-social-media-intermediaries-1634749">Just Rights for Children Alliance v. Union of India</a></em>.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Reliefs Sought in the Petition</b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners have asked the Supreme Court to:</p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">1. declare that the Respondents' continuing failure to protect children from grooming, sexual exploitation, cyberbullying, harmful content, behavioural profiling and "compulsive-use design" is "arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf">14, 15(3), 21</a> and <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf">21A</a>";</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">2. direct the Centre, by a writ of mandamus, to "frame, notify and operationalize a dedicated, comprehensive and enforceable regulatory framework" for protecting children on social media; or</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">3. direct the Centre to "prohibit the use of social media platforms by children below such age as may be prescribed", and to regulate their use by children above that age; or</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">4. direct the Centre to frame and enforce age-based restrictions on the creation and use of accounts by children on designated social media platforms.</span></p></div><p><b>Case Title: The Emerald Heights International School and Anothers v. Union of India and Others.</b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Supreme Court of India (hearing expected)&nbsp;</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Prolonged Deprivation of Wages Can Warrant Monetary Compensation as Public-Law Remedy: Supreme Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court directed Bihar and Jharkhand to pay 6% interest on delayed wages, 12% on EPF dues and ₹1 lakh compensation to daily-wage workers of five state-owned corporations.]]></description>
<tags>Supreme Court of India,Provident Fund,Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952,Daily Wage Worker,Compensation</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/prolonged-deprivation-of-wages-can-warrant-monetary-compensation-as-public-law-remedy-supreme-court-1641306</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/prolonged-deprivation-of-wages-can-warrant-monetary-compensation-as-public-law-remedy-supreme-court-1641306</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Judgments]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:19:01 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[SC orders compensation for long-delayed workers' dues.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288471-supreme-court-compensation-daily-wage-workers-bihar-jharkhandjpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has held that where circumstances disclose a prolonged and unconstitutional deprivation of the <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/fundamental-rights" target="_blank">fundamental right</a> to dignified wages, the court may, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, award quantified monetary compensation as a public-law remedy.</p><p>A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta made the observation while directing the States of Bihar and Jharkhand to compensate employees and workmen whose salary, wages, <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/provident-fund" target="_blank">provident fund </a>and other monetary dues remained unpaid for prolonged periods.</p><p><b>Why did the Supreme Court award compensation to the daily-wage employees?</b></p><p>Court was dealing with an appeal filed by Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karmchari Maha Sangh and others concerning the long-pending payment of dues following the reorganisation of the State of Bihar under the Bihar Reorganisation <a href="https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/BH_Act2000_1.pdf" target="_blank">Act</a>, 2000.</p><p>The reorganisation of Bihar and the creation of Jharkhand gave rise to questions concerning the apportionment and discharge of liabilities, dues and service-related claims of employees and workmen of State-owned inter-State corporations.</p><p>Court noted that the controversy, which had its roots in the statutory reorganisation, had traversed a "long and chequered course", necessitating successive rounds of judicial intervention and administrative consideration.</p><p>The dispute concerned employees and workmen of five State-owned inter-State corporations which were Bihar State Construction Corporation Ltd; Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd; Bihar State Electronic Development Corporation Ltd; Bihar State Forest Development Corporation Ltd; and Bihar State Panchayati Raj Financial Corporation Ltd.</p><p>Court accepted a report submitted by a Committee headed by Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, former judge of the Supreme Court.</p><p>The Bench noted that the daily-wage employees/workmen had been engaged by the concerned corporations and had rendered services in discharge of the functions entrusted to them.</p><p>"While their status as daily-wage workmen cannot, by itself, confer upon them the same rights and entitlements as regular employees, but at the same time, such status cannot be treated as a reason for disregarding the services rendered by them or denying the entitlements lawfully accruing from such engagement," the Bench said.</p><p><b>What did the Supreme Court say about delayed provident fund dues?</b></p><p>Considering the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions <a href="https://apps.labour.gov.in/cgit/sites/default/files/EPFAct1952.pdf" target="_blank">Act</a>, 1952, Court held that entitlement to interest on delayed provident fund dues must be considered having regard to the statutory character of provident fund as a measure of social security.</p><p>"The amount standing to the credit of an employee by way of provident fund constitutes a statutory benefit accrued during the course of employment and is intended to provide financial security to the employee upon cessation of service. Such amount, therefore, cannot be treated as an ordinary monetary claim capable of being withheld without the consequences prescribed by law," the Bench said.</p><p>Court pointed out that liability to pay interest follows by operation of law upon delayed payment of amounts due under the provident fund scheme. Such liability, it said, cannot be defeated merely because the underlying dues were subsequently discharged.</p><p>Court therefore directed payment of 12% interest on delayed provident fund dues as mandated under the Act.</p><p>"Interest, in its ordinary legal sense, represents compensation for the deprivation of the use of money to which a person is otherwise lawfully entitled. The concept of interest is not confined to a return upon money borrowed or advanced, but extends to compensation for the unjust deprivation occasioned by the withholding of money beyond the time when it becomes due and payable," the Bench said.</p><p>Court further explained that the rationale behind awarding interest lies in compensating a person for being deprived of the use of money lawfully due to them.</p><p>"Where a monetary entitlement has crystallized and payment thereof is delayed beyond the time when it became due and payable, the person entitled thereto is, for the intervening period, deprived of the use and benefit of the amount to which he is lawfully entitled. Interest, in such circumstances, serves as recompense for such deprivation and seeks to compensate, to the extent capable of monetary assessment, for the loss occasioned by the delay," the Bench said.</p><p><b>What compensation did the Supreme Court order Bihar and Jharkhand to pay?</b></p><p>Court directed the States of Bihar and Jharkhand to ensure payment of simple interest at 6% per annum on salary/wage arrears and other monetary dues, excluding EPF dues governed by Section 7-Q of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act.</p><p>The interest is to be calculated from the date on which the respective amounts became due and payable until the date of actual payment, Court ordered.</p><p>For delayed EPF dues, Court directed the States to pay simple interest at 12% per annum for the corresponding period.</p><p>In addition, Court directed Bihar and Jharkhand to pay a one-time sum of Rs 1 lakh to each of the concerned daily-wage employees/workmen who were engaged during the relevant period.</p><p>"The States of Bihar and Jharkhand shall ensure payment of simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the delayed EPF dues, and at the rate of 6% per annum on the delayed salary, wages and other monetary entitlements, for the period commencing from the date on which the respective amounts became due and payable until the date of their actual payment," the Bench said.</p><p><b><i>Case Title: Bihar State Ardh Sarkari Arajpati Karmchari Maha Sangh &amp; Ors Vs State of Bihar And Others</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta&nbsp;</i></b></p><p><b><i>Date of Judgment: September 28, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/lawbeat-news-desk-sc"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[MP CM Mohan Yadav Consults Solicitor General, Advocate General After High Court Strikes Down 27% OBC Quota]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Mohan Yadav met Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Advocate General Prashant Singh in New Delhi to discuss the High Court verdict striking down the 27% OBC quota and the State’s legal strategy.]]></description>
<tags>MP High Court,OBC Reservation,Solicitor General Tushar Mehta,CM Mohan Yadav,Reservation Policy</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/mp-cm-mohan-yadav-consults-solicitor-general-advocate-general-after-high-court-strikes-down-27-obc-quota-1641298</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/mp-cm-mohan-yadav-consults-solicitor-general-advocate-general-after-high-court-strikes-down-27-obc-quota-1641298</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:08:07 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[MP Government Weighs Next Legal Step On 27% OBC Reservation, CM Holds Talks With SG Tushar Mehta]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288449-mp-cm-sg-mehtajpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Mohan Yadav</b> has said he held detailed consultations with the country’s top law officers on the High Court <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/madhya-pradesh-hc-strikes-down-27-obc-reservation-restores-14-quota-1640154" target="_blank">ruling</a> that struck down the State’s decision to raise OBC reservation from 14% to 27%, indicating that the government is now charting its next legal move.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In a post on X, the Chief Minister said he met <b>Solicitor General Tushar Mehta</b> and <b>Advocate General Prashant Singh</b> in New Delhi. According to the post, the discussion covered <b><i>“the legal aspects connected to the Hon’ble High Court’s decision on OBC reservation”</i></b> and the strategy for forthcoming legal proceedings.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The post did not spell out what course the State will take, including whether it intends to approach the Supreme Court. Its reference to forthcoming legal proceedings, however, suggests the government is weighing further steps after the setback in the High Court.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The meeting follows the October 9 <a href="https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/madhya-pradesh-hc-strikes-down-27-obc-reservation-restores-14-quota-1640154" target="_blank">judgment</a> of a Division Bench of <b>Justice Anand Pathak</b> and <b>Justice Vinay Saraf</b>, which held that the enhanced quota was not supported by the circumstances and data placed before the Court. The Advocate General had appeared for the State during the hearing.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Background
</b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The dispute dates back to March 8, 2019, when Madhya Pradesh issued Ordinance No. 2 of 2019 increasing OBC reservation in public employment and higher education from 14% to 27%. The State later enacted the <b><i>Madhya Pradesh Lok Seva (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes Reservation) Amendment Act, 2019</i></b>, to give effect to the change.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The lead petition, <b><i>Ashita Dubey and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others</i></b>, arose from medical admissions. The petitioners, who belonged to the general category and had appeared for NEET-PG 2019, challenged the change shortly before counselling was due to begin. Similar petitions followed on recruitment and admissions.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Petitioners argued that the higher quota pushed total reservation beyond the 50% limit and violated the constitutional guarantee of equality and equal opportunity in public employment. They were represented by senior advocates including Aman Lekhi, Gopal Shankarnarayanan, Pradeep Sancheti, Ankur Chibbar and Aparajita Singh.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The High Court agreed. It stressed that the question was not whether OBCs deserve reservation but whether the State had justified increasing their existing share. <b><i>“This case is not about grant of reservation but extent of reservation,” </i></b>the Bench observed, adding that OBCs were entitled to 14% reservation, but the case did not justify raising it to 27%.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Examining data on higher education and public services, the Court found OBCs adequately represented for the purpose of Article <a href="https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-16-equality-of-opportunity-in-matters-of-public-employment/" target="_blank">16(4)</a> of the Constitution. It saw no extraordinary conditions or emergent situation warranting a departure from the 50% ceiling recognised in<b><i> Indra Sawhney v. Union of India</i></b> and reiterated in <b><i>Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister</i></b>. The Bench also pointed to shortcomings in the legislative process and drafting, observing that the measure appeared to have been prepared in undue haste. Declaring the ordinance and the 2019 Amendment Act unconstitutional, it struck them down.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The ruling also deals with appointments already made. OBC appointments made under the enhanced quota up to September 29, 2022, the date on which the General Administration Department clarified the position on interim relief, were protected. Those appointees will not be removed, and the additional posts will be adjusted in the next three recruitment drives.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appointments made after that date beyond the 14% OBC quota, however, were held liable to be treated as null and void to the extent of the excess. Recruiting agencies, including the Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission and the Employees’ Selection Board, were directed to declare results accordingly and fill the affected 13% posts from the unreserved category.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Petitions challenging the 2019 amendment were allowed, while connected petitions seeking additional OBC or Economically Weaker Sections reservation, and those raising horizontal reservation issues, were treated as dismissed in view of the decision. The ruling restores the earlier 14% position for OBC reservation in public services and higher education.
</p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Case Title: Ashita Dubey and Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others with connected matters
</b></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Judgment Date: October 9, 2026
</b></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Bench: Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Vinay Saraf</b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Rahul Gandhi, INDIA Bloc Seek ECI's Internal SIR Files, Retired-Judge Audit Of Voter Deletions In SC: What The Petition Says]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Article 32 petition by INDIA Bloc leaders sought production of the Election Commission's files and objections on the Special Intensive Revision, an independent audit of the ECINET and ERONET databases by a committee headed by a retired Supreme Court judge, and an interim suspension of the SIR across the States]]></description>
<tags>Rahul Gandhi,INDIA bloc,Special Intensive Revision (SIR),Election Commission of India (ECI),Gyanesh Kumar,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhi-india-bloc-seek-ecis-internal-sir-files-retired-judge-audit-of-voter-deletions-in-sc-what-the-petition-says-1641296</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhi-india-bloc-seek-ecis-internal-sir-files-retired-judge-audit-of-voter-deletions-in-sc-what-the-petition-says-1641296</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Leaders of Opposition Rahul Gandhi and Mallikarjun Kharge have asked the Supreme Court to direct the Election Commission of India to produce its internal records on the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288417-supreme-court-of-india-rahul-gandhi-india-bloc-leaders-2026jpg.webp' /><p>Opposition leaders led by <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhis-sir-plea-supreme-court-registry-flags-14-defects-rs-200-fee-shortfall-1641181">Rahul Gandhi </a>through a petition have <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhi-kharge-akhilesh-yadav-move-supreme-court-against-election-commission-over-sir-irregularities-1640989">told </a>the Supreme Court that the Chief Election Commissioner allegedly exercised the "collective powers" of the Election Commission of India on his own during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, and have asked the Court to call for the Commission's files, minutes and notings to test whether its decisions were lawfully taken.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div tabindex="-1" role="region" aria-labelledby="_r_ckg_"><div tabindex="-1"><div tabindex="-1">

<p dir="ltr">The writ petition, filed under Article <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf">32 </a>of the Constitution by Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and <b>Mallikarjun Kharge</b>, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, along with other party leaders and Members of Parliament, also questions the modification of the statutory Form 6, the design and operation of the ECINET and ERONET electoral-roll databases, and the <i>"large-scale exclusion of electors without adequate notice, hearing or an effective mechanism for restoration."</i></p><p dir="ltr">The petition was filed through <b>Advocate-on-Record (AoR) Prasanna S.</b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition was filed pursuant to a written communication of the Chief Justice of India dated October 11, 2026, in reply to a representation by Gandhi and Kharge dated October 10. The Chief Justice is quoted in the petition as having replied: <i>"Incidentally, some matters highlighting similar issues are scheduled for hearing on Tuesday, 13.10.2026. If so advised, you may submit your petition on Monday … You have my assurance that any such petition shall be heard at the earliest possible opportunity, in accordance with law."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners state that they have approached the Court "in discharge of their public duties", adding that "the right to vote belongs to every eligible citizen irrespective of political affiliation, and its protection is a constitutional imperative that transcends party politics."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners acknowledge the Supreme Court's judgment of May 27, 2026 in <em>Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India</em>, which upheld the validity of the SIR. </p><p dir="ltr">They state expressly that they are not seeking to revisit that ruling, <i>"The present Petition does not seek to reopen the question of the validity of the SIR as such. Its concern is narrower and distinct: whether the safeguards recognised by this Hon'ble Court, and the requirement that the Election Commission act as a collective constitutional institution, have actually been complied with in the implementation of the exercise."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">As per the petition, <i>"The validity of the SIR does not dispense with the requirement that each decision taken in its implementation must conform to the Constitution, the governing statutes and the applicable Rules."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition relies on a report published by <em>The Indian Express</em> on September 23, 2026, which stated that the two Election Commissioners had recorded objections "on at least fourteen occasions over a period of ten months" on decisions concerning voter registration, deletion and restoration of names, and access to electoral-roll data. The objections reportedly indicated that decisions and communications were being issued in the Commission's name without their knowledge or approval.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners note the Commission's response that the reports present only one part of the picture, that differences of opinion are normal in deliberative processes, and that its decisions were unanimous. They state that they do "not seek to prejudge these competing positions", and frame the question as "whether the decisions in question were taken in accordance with the Constitution, the governings statute and the law declared by this Hon'ble Court."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in <em>T.N. Seshan v. Union of India</em>, the petition states that the Chief Election Commissioner "does not enjoy a superior status over the other Election Commissioners, who are not mere advisers but members of the Commission with a say in its decisions." It adds that Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 gives statutory expression to this principle by requiring the Commission's business to be transacted unanimously as far as possible, and otherwise by majority.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners also submit that the issue "is not merely one of internal administrative procedure. It concerns the lawful exercise of constitutional authority by the institution entrusted with safeguarding the integrity of elections." They add that free and fair elections "form part of the basic structure of the Constitution."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition cites the Commission's own replies under the Right to Information Act, 2005. An RTI application dated July 28, 2025 sought the files and notings by which the Commission decided to undertake the SIR across the country. On August 27, 2025, the Central Public Information Officer supplied only the published order dated June 24, 2025 and stated that no other information was available.</p>

<p dir="ltr">In the first appeal, according to the petition, the First Appellate Authority "recorded that the Commission had, until then, not taken any decision to initiate a nationwide SIR in 2025."</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners say this "appears irreconcilable" with paragraph 10 of the June 24, 2025 order, which declares that the Commission had decided to begin the SIR throughout the country, and with the Commission's press note of September 26, 2026, which states that the order had the unanimous approval of the Commission. They seek production of the complete file recording the June 24, 2025 decision, "if such a file exists".</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition challenges the modification of the online Form 6 on ECINET in July 2026, which added a declaration concerning whether the applicant or their relatives appeared in an earlier SIR electoral roll. Form 6 is the form prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, framed under Section 28 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, for inclusion in the electoral roll.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners allege that the form was changed without amending the Rules, "notwithstanding reported objections raised by the Election Commissioners themselves." They point out that on October 5, 2026, the Supreme Court clarified orally in the pending SIR proceedings that it had not approved the modified Form 6.</p>

<p dir="ltr">According to the plea, "<i>The addition of an unauthorised condition to a statutory form may impose an unlawful burden upon eligible citizens seeking registration, particularly first-time voters, and may result in the exclusion of persons otherwise entitled to be enrolled."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">On the ECINET and ERONET databases, the petition refers to reported internal concerns about the absence of an audit of persons who could access and modify the voter database. It states that the review committee set up by the Commission is headed by its own Senior Deputy Election Commissioner and includes an outside technical expert, and submits that "an internal review cannot substitute an independent audit". The petition also refers to reports of eligible electors who could not be restored to the roll because the software allegedly lacked a rollback facility.</p>

<p dir="ltr">It argues that Section 13B of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 vests the preparation and revision of electoral rolls in the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO), whose discretion "cannot be curtailed by technical fiat or a manner of implementation of software." </p><p dir="ltr">The petition reads, <i>"The centralised and opaque design, implementation and configuration of ECINet, restriction of ERO access, and denial of rollback facilities by the DG(IT) lack statutory sanction. Article 324, read with Section 18 of the 2023 Act, vests superintendence in the Commission acting collectively, not its IT division. Such centralisation is ultra vires and subverts the decentralised architecture safeguarding free and fair elections."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition refers to <em>Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India</em>, which alleges that approximately thirteen crore names were deleted from electoral rolls across all States and Union Territories during the SIR. It records the Commission's stand that the figure represents electors marked as absent, shifted, dead or duplicate at the draft stage and does not represent final deletions.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners say that, nevertheless, "the scale of electors marked for removal, and the possibility of eligible voters being wrongly excluded, warrant an effective and transparent verification mechanism." They also raise concerns about bulk filing of Form 7 objections, "the alleged use of forged names and targeting of specific communities and women", the denial of effective notice and hearing, and inadequate enforcement against false declarations.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Invoking Articles <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf">14, 21 </a>and <a href="https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s380537a945c7aaa788ccfcdf1b99b5d8f/uploads/2024/07/20240716890312078.pdf">326</a> of the Constitution and Sections 21 to 23 of the 1950 Act, the petition submits that "the deletion of an elector already on the electoral roll must be accompanied by the safeguards of notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing recognised by this Hon'ble Court in <em>Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer</em>."</p>

<p dir="ltr">To show urgency, the petition points to Punjab, where the draft electoral roll published on August 13, 2026 reportedly reflected a reduction of approximately 20.66 lakh names from an electorate of about 2.14 crore recorded in June 2026. A further 12.80 lakh electors reportedly could not be mapped to the rolls prepared after the 2003 revision and were required to produce documents within a month to remain on the roll. The final roll was scheduled for publication on October 12, 2026.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition warns that "in the absence of effective safeguards and a functioning mechanism to correct errors and restore eligible voters, persons entitled to participate in the forthcoming electoral process may be left off the final roll without an effective remedy before the elections." It adds that "the same concerns arise in other States going to the polls."</p>

<p dir="ltr">Separately, the petitioners seek an independent review of "the decisions, policies, procedures, protocols, technical designs and architecture governing the use and deployment of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), in comparison with global best practices".</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Reliefs Sought in the Petition</b></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petition seeks consideration along with connected matters already pending before the Court, including <em>Rakesh Kumar Singh v. Union of India</em>, W.P. (C) No. 1246/2026, and <em>Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India</em>, in which notice was issued on October 5, 2026.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The prayers include directions to:</p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-the Election Commission of India (Respondent No. 1) to place on record the complete files, agendas, minutes, notings and objections recorded by the Election Commissioners on each disputed SIR decision, the ECINET and ERONET access logs, and the complete file recording the June 24, 2025 decision to begin the nationwide SIR;</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-examine whether the disputed decisions complied with Article 324, Section 18 of the 2023 Act and </span><em style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">T.N. Seshan</em><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">, and to quash any decision found to have been taken without lawful authority;</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-the competent authorities to act against persons responsible for any breach of the provisions governing electoral rolls, "including under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, wherever warranted";</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-the Commission to ensure, pending adjudication, that every SIR decision "is taken and duly minuted in accordance with Section 18 of the 2023 Act";</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-the Commission to ensure that the online Form 6 conforms to the form prescribed under the 1960 Rules unless the Rules are lawfully amended;</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-constitute an independent committee "headed by a retired Judge of this Hon'ble Court and assisted by technical experts and other citizens of eminence" to audit, within a fixed time, deletions and modifications made during the SIR and access to and alterations in ECINET and ERONET, and to review the use and deployment of EVMs;</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-Respondent No. 2 to publish booth-wise the names of all electors deleted during the SIR, with reasons and a breakdown by gender and age, and to provide a functional mechanism for restoring eligible electors;</span></p><p dir="ltr"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">-the Respondents to ensure that no elector is deleted without notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and that eligible persons in Punjab and other poll-bound States may seek inclusion "until the last date permitted by law".</span></p>

<p dir="ltr">The petitioners have also sought<i> "an interim direction suspending the ongoing Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls across the States of the Union, pending consideration and adjudication of the issues raised in the present Petition".</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">Conclusively, the plea states that it has been instituted <i>"in the larger public interest of safeguarding the constitutional right of every eligible citizen to vote, maintaining the institutional independence and collective functioning of the Election Commission of India, and ensuring that the preparation and revision of electoral rolls are carried out transparently, lawfully and in a manner that inspires public confidence in the democratic process."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr"><b style="">Case Title: Rahul Gandhi vs Election Commission of India</b></p><p dir="ltr"><em><b>Bench: Supreme Court of India (hearing expected)</b></em></p></div></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA['Protests Must Not Disrupt Business': Traders Move Delhi HC For SOP Implementation, Claim ₹2,000 Crore Loss]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The petitioners told the Delhi High Court that ongoing protest activities have disrupted traders' businesses and made surrounding areas inaccessible, urging implementation of an existing standard operating procedure (SOP) to regulate protests]]></description>
<tags>Standard Operating Procedure (SOP),Protests,Delhi High Court</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/protests-must-not-disrupt-business-traders-move-delhi-hc-for-sop-implementation-claim-2000-crore-loss-1641284</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/protests-must-not-disrupt-business-traders-move-delhi-hc-for-sop-implementation-claim-2000-crore-loss-1641284</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 08:48:44 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[The Delhi High Court has agreed to hear a plea which seeks an SOP to regulate protests, as the petitioner claims that traders have lost about ₹2,000 crore.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288442-delhi-high-court-protest-sop-traders-plea-2026jpg.webp' /><p><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">The Delhi High Court on Tuesday agreed to hear a plea seeking implementation of a standard operating procedure (SOP) to regulate protests, with the petitioner alleging that traders in the surrounding areas had suffered losses of around ₹2,000 crore due to ongoing protest activities.</span></p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div>A Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Justice Sanjay Sharma agreed to take up the matter later in the day after noting that related issues were also before the Supreme Court.</div><div>Appearing for the petitioner, counsel argued that protests should not be allowed to disrupt the functioning of businesses and that the SOP already put in place to regulate such activities should be implemented.</div><div>"Protests must not disrupt the work of traders; people can't treat their areas as if they have become completely unapproachable. We want the SOP to regulate how protests take place to be implemented" counsel submitted.</div><div>The petitioner claimed that traders had suffered losses of approximately ₹2,000 crore because of the ongoing protest activities.</div><div>" All we are saying is to implement what has already been put in place " counsel said, adding, "All we are asking for is basic implementation of our rights."</div><div><b>Delhi High Court Notes Related Proceedings Before Supreme Court</b></div><div>During the hearing, the High Court asked whether the matter was also before the Supreme Court.</div><div>Counsel for the petitioner confirmed that the issue was being considered by the apex court. The High Court indicated that it would hear the matter later in the day, by which time an order from the Supreme Court might be available to help it appreciate the contentions raised.</div><div>Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma, appearing in the matter, also pointed out that the issue was directly before the Supreme Court.</div><div>"In more ways than one, this issue is before the SC directly. If one reads the prayers and the contentions, the same is precisely within the same broad parameters" he submitted.</div><div>The High Court agreed to hear the plea at the end of the board.</div><div>It may, however, be noted that the Supreme Court today deferred to Thursday (October 15, 2026) the hearing on pleas related to protests, closure of metro stations and disruptions in train services ahead of the October 10 agitations against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar due to the unavailability of Justice V. Mohana on the bench.</div><div><b>Traders Seek Implementation Of SOP To Regulate Protests</b></div><div>The plea seeks implementation of an SOP intended to regulate protests, with the petitioner contending that demonstrations should not prevent traders from carrying on their business or make the affected areas inaccessible.</div><div>The petitioner's counsel emphasised that the plea was not seeking to prevent protests altogether but to ensure that the existing framework governing them was implemented.</div><div>The alleged loss of ₹2,000 crore was cited by the petitioner to underline the claimed economic impact of the ongoing protest activities.</div><div>Meanwhile, a petition has been moved before the Supreme Court <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/jantar-mantar-de-notified-as-protest-site-delhi-police-order-challenged-in-sc-over-shift-to-ramlila-burari-cbd-grounds-1641188">challenging</a> the Delhi Police's decision to strip Jantar Mantar of its status as a designated protest site.</div><div>The challenge is to a standing order issued on October 11, 2026 by Delhi Commissioner of Police Anurag Kumar, which de-notified the site and named Ramlila Ground, Burari Ground and CBD Ground in East Delhi as the venues for protests and demonstrations in the national capital.</div><div>The challenge has been brought through an application filed in a petition already pending before the Supreme Court, which concerns issues arising from the protests in Delhi and the Delhi Police's response to them.</div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/author-info/1073/lawbeat-news-desk"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA['Shoorveer' Song Removed From 'Mirzapur: The Movie' : Delhi High Court Informed; Court Contemplates Costs On Makers]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Delhi High Court was informed that the song 'Shoorveer', used as background music in the film’s climax, had been voluntarily removed with effect from September 17, 2026.]]></description>
<tags>Delhi High Court,Mirzapur: The Movie</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/shoorveer-song-removed-from-mirzapur-the-movie-delhi-hc-informed-court-contemplates-costs-on-makers-1641275</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/shoorveer-song-removed-from-mirzapur-the-movie-delhi-hc-informed-court-contemplates-costs-on-makers-1641275</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Salil]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 08:36:27 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[The song Shoorveer, associated with the valour of Maharana Pratap, removed from the climax scene of Mirzapur: The Movie following a PIL which challenged its use in the film.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288424-delhi-high-court-shoorveer-songjpg.webp' /><p>The Delhi High Court was informed on Thursday that the song Shoorveer, associated with the valour of Maharana Pratap, had been voluntarily removed from the climax scene of Mirzapur: The Movie following a public interest litigation (PIL) challenging its use in the film.</p><p>A Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Justice Sanjay Sharma accepted the submission made on behalf of the film’s producer that the song had already been removed and was no longer being played in the movie.
</p><p>The Court observed that had the song not been removed voluntarily, it would have directed its removal.
</p><p>"If the song had not been removed voluntarily, we would have directed that it be removed" the Court remarked.
</p><p>During the hearing, the Acting Chief Justice also asked whether costs should be imposed on the filmmakers and asked counsel to make a submission on whether they would voluntarily pay some costs.
</p><p><i>" You volunteer and pay some costs and contribute to the social purpose; otherwise, we'll say that you have misused it all these days. Your act has to be coupled with some social responsibility,"</i> ACJ Sambre orally reamrked.
</p><p>The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) and the petitioner did not dispute the submission that the song had been removed.
</p><p>The Court recorded the producer’s submission and disposed of the PIL, observing that no further orders were required in view of the voluntary removal. However, the Court said it won’t sign the order unless costs are imposed.
</p><p><b>What Was the PIL About?
</b></p><p>The petition, filed by Prashant Kumar Singh, challenged the use of Shoorveer as background music in the climax of Mirzapur: The Movie. The musical composition is associated with the heroic conduct of Maharana Pratap and his followers.
</p><p>The petitioner alleged that using the song during a violent sequence involving the film’s characters created an undesirable association between the historical ruler’s ideals and the violence depicted in the movie.
</p><p>The plea sought directions to the concerned respondents to remove the musical composition from the climax scene.
</p><p>During an earlier hearing on September 17, the High Court had questioned the use of the song in a violent fight sequence, observing that its use was prima facie “not in good taste” and that society had reached a point where it was “revering violence”.
</p><p>The filmmakers had submitted that the song was used only as background music to embellish the climax, which depicts a fight between two factions. They had also argued that the film did not compare any of its characters with a historical figure.
</p><p>The CBFC had informed the Court during the earlier proceedings that the producer had independently approached it with a proposal to modify the scene and that it would take a decision on the proposal.
</p><p>The Court had observed that if the filmmakers themselves were modifying the background music, the purpose of the petition would be achieved.
</p><p><b>Producer Confirms Voluntary Removal
</b></p><p>During today’s hearing, counsel appearing for the producer submitted, on instructions, that the song had already been removed from the film and was no longer being played. The removal had taken effect on September 17, 2026, the Court was told.
</p><p>A certificate reflecting the voluntary deletion was also placed on record.
</p><p>The petitioner’s counsel did not dispute the factual submission. The Court accordingly accepted the producer’s statement and disposed of the PIL, holding that no further orders were required.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/salil"><![CDATA[Salil]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Seeks Intelligence Bureau Report On Jagtar Singh Hawara’s Jail Transfer Plea]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Delhi government has raised concerns over Hawara’s proposed transfer to a Punjab jail]]></description>
<tags>Jagtar Singh Hawara,CM Beant Singh assassination,Supreme Court of India,Tihar Jail,Punjab Jails,Transfer Petition,Justice MM Sundresh</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-seeks-intelligence-bureau-report-on-jagtar-singh-hawaras-jail-transfer-plea-1641253</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-seeks-intelligence-bureau-report-on-jagtar-singh-hawaras-jail-transfer-plea-1641253</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:57:53 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court heard Jagtar Singh Hawara’s plea seeking transfer from Tihar Jail to a Punjab prison]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/09/17/2267685-supreme-court-of-india-jagtar-singh-hawala-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has sought a report from the Intelligence Bureau on a plea filed by Beant Singh assassination case convict Jagtar Singh Hawara, seeking his transfer from Tihar Jail in Delhi to a prison in Punjab.</p><p>Noting that the situation concerning Hawara is very volatile, Justice MM Sundresh led bench ordered today, <i>"We will request the Delhi government to get instructions..we will consider issues..we are not the competent persons to decide issues like security..we can get an input from the IB...we are not in a position to go against the Delhi and Punjab government..we don't want to get involved in it.."</i></p><p>Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati told the bench today that the Punjab government had said law and order in Punjab will be affected if Hawara is transferred to a jail there.</p><p><i>"He was found in jailbreak..his death penalty was converted to life imprisonment..he killed the former Chief Minister of Punjab..,</i>" ASG further told court today.</p><p>Last month, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta had<a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/jagtar-singh-hawaras-jail-transfer-plea-sg-tushar-mehta-raises-security-concerns-supreme-court-adjourns-hearing-1632412" target="_blank"> cited concerns</a> regarding Hawara’s proposed transfer to a Punjab jail.</p><p>“This is a matter where the person convicted for killing the former Chief Minister of Punjab wants to go back to Punjab jail,” the Solicitor General submitted. Mehta further told the Court that the State would have difficulty with Hawara being sent back to a Punjab jail, pointing out that he had previously escaped from a jail in the region. The State, he submitted, would prefer that Hawara continue to remain lodged in Tihar Jail.
</p><p><b>Background </b></p><p>Hawara has approached the Supreme Court seeking his transfer from Tihar Jail to a prison in Punjab. He has contended that his continued incarceration in Delhi was unjustified, particularly since the case for which he is serving his sentence arose in Punjab and no criminal case against him was pending in Delhi. He had also relied on his conduct in prison and his family circumstances in seeking the transfer.
</p><p>The Supreme Court had issued notice on Hawara’s plea to the Centre, the Chandigarh Administration, and the governments of Delhi and Punjab. The matter was subsequently listed on several occasions. On March 11, 2026, the Court again listed the matter for April 28.</p><p>Hawara was convicted in connection with the August 31, 1995 assassination of former Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh and the deaths of 16 others in a blast outside the Civil Secretariat in Chandigarh. He was initially sentenced to death, but the Punjab and Haryana High Court commuted the sentence to imprisonment for life for the remainder of his natural life in 2010. Appeals arising from that judgment remain pending before the Supreme Court.</p><p>Hawara had earlier escaped from Burail Jail in Chandigarh in January 2004 after allegedly using a tunnel and was subsequently arrested. A previous plea seeking his transfer from Tihar to Punjab had also been dismissed by the Delhi High Court in 2018. </p><p><b><i>Case Title: Jagtar Singh Hawara v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi </i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justice MM Sundresh and PB Varale </i></b></p><p><b><i>Hearing Date: October 13, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[SARFAESI Act| No Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Matters Within DRT, DRAT's Powers: Supreme Court]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court held that challenges to SARFAESI actions must go before the DRT or DRAT, with Section 34 barring civil court jurisdiction and Section 35 overriding inconsistent laws.]]></description>
<tags>Supreme Court of India,SARFAESI Act,Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT),Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT)</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/sarfaesi-act-no-civil-court-jurisdiction-over-matters-within-drt-drat-powers-supreme-court-1641208</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/sarfaesi-act-no-civil-court-jurisdiction-over-matters-within-drt-drat-powers-supreme-court-1641208</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Judgments]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:19:54 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court bars civil court interference in SARFAESI matters.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288224-sarfaesi-civil-court-jurisdiction-supreme-court-rulingjpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has held that civil courts have no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding concerning matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) is empowered to determine under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (<a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/sarfaesi-act" target="_blank">SARFAESI Act</a>).</p><p>A Bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih said that any challenge to actions taken in exercise of powers conferred under the SARFAESI Act, must be adjudicated by the designated tribunals, as the jurisdiction of civil courts is expressly barred.</p><p>Court made the observation while allowing an appeal filed by International Asset Reconstruction Co Pvt Ltd and holding that the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore erred in granting liberty to the respondent to pursue civil and criminal remedies against actions taken under the SARFAESI Act.</p><p><b>Why can civil courts not interfere in SARFAESI proceedings?</b></p><p>Court relied on Sections 32, 34 and 35 of the SARFAESI <a href="https://ibclaw.in/securitisation-and-reconstruction-of-financial-assets-and-enforcement-of-security-interest-act-2002-sarfaesi-act-2002-bare-act/" target="_blank">Act </a>to hold that challenges to actions taken under the Act must be raised before the DRT or the DRAT, and not before a civil court.</p><p>Section 34 expressly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of matters which the DRT or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Court also noted that Section 35 gives the SARFAESI Act an overriding effect over any other law that is inconsistent with its provisions.</p><p>The Bench further underscored that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding would lie against a secured creditor or its officers for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith under the Act.</p><p>"Proceedings seeking damages for actions taken under the Act are untenable if the actions were protected by the good faith provision," the Bench said.</p><p>Court stressed that this protection extends to actions taken in good faith under the SARFAESI Act and protects such actions from civil or criminal litigation.</p><p><b>The dispute</b></p><p>Certain credit facilities had been extended to respondent No.1 by respondent No.2-bank. As security for the facilities, charges and encumbrances in the nature of mortgage and hypothecation were created over the movable and immovable properties of respondent No.1 in favour of the bank.</p><p>Following non-payment of the dues, the account of respondent No.1 was classified as a Non-Performing Asset.</p><p>In 1996, the bank filed a suit before the Bombay High Court, which was subsequently transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Mumbai.</p><p>On October 17, 2005, the DRT allowed the application and directed respondent No.1 to pay the bank a sum of Rs 28,28,56,282.49, along with future interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Pursuant to the order, a recovery certificate was issued on December 5, 2005, and recovery proceedings were initiated against respondent No.1.</p><p>Thereafter, the bank entered into a deed of assignment with International Assets Reconstruction Co Pvt Ltd, under which the debts, assets and liabilities of respondent No.1 were transferred to the appellant.</p><p>The appellant subsequently initiated recovery proceedings. A notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued to respondent No.1 on January 16, 2009, following which the appellant took possession of the secured property under Section 13(4) of the Act.</p><p>On June 21, 2023, an offer of Rs 189 lakh was received from Apexter Corporation. The offer was subsequently enhanced to Rs 284 lakh and was accepted by the appellant. The sale was confirmed in favour of Apexter Corporation through an acceptance letter dated July 11, 2023.</p><p>The possession of the hypothecated property, comprising plants and machinery, was thereafter handed over to the successful purchaser and a sale certificate was issued.</p><p><b>What did the high court hold?</b></p><p>Aggrieved by the sale, respondent No.1 approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore, seeking, among other reliefs, setting aside of the sale on the ground that it was null and void, arbitrary and fraudulent.</p><p>The high court dismissed the writ petition on February 9, 2024, observing that the sale proceedings had already been completed and the entire movable property of respondent No.1 had been sold.</p><p>It further observed that any objection regarding irregularities in the procedure followed under the SARFAESI Act by the appellant could be raised by availing the alternative remedy before the DRT and the DRAT.</p><p>Respondent No.1 thereafter filed a review petition.</p><p>On May 8, 2024, the high court allowed the review petition and modified its earlier order by granting liberty to respondent No.1 to avail the alternative remedy or pursue appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.</p><p>The appellant challenged this order before the Supreme Court.</p><p><b>High court could not permit civil and criminal proceedings</b></p><p>The Supreme Court held that the high court was not justified in granting liberty to respondent No.1 to file a suit seeking damages or to pursue criminal proceedings in relation to actions taken under the SARFAESI Act.</p><p>"We find that the high court was not right in reserving liberty to respondent No.1 herein to seek remedies by filing a suit for claiming damages etc or for pursuing criminal proceedings while allowing review petition and by modification of its earlier order," the Bench said.</p><p>Court noted that its February 9, 2024 order had already disposed of the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to challenge the actions allegedly taken by the appellant under the SARFAESI Act.</p><p>"In the review petition, the high court instead of reiterating the said order, has granted further liberty to respondent No.1 herein which in our view is not right. We say so for the reason that the high court has not taken into consideration Sections 32 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act," the Bench said.</p><p>Court pointed out that any action taken under the SARFAESI Act in good faith, as well as any omission under the Act, is protected.</p><p>"Similarly, a challenge to an action taken under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act can be assailed only under the provisions of the said Act and the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect thereof," the Bench said.</p><p>Court further noted that under Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, its provisions have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of such law.</p><p>It held that if respondent No.1 sought damages for the actions initiated by the appellant under the SARFAESI Act, there first had to be a finding that those actions were wrongly initiated so as to make respondent No.1 entitled to damages.</p><p>Such a finding, the Court said, could only be made by the DRT and not by a civil court, in view of the express bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.</p><p>The Bench further observed that criminal proceedings in respect of actions taken or omitted to be taken under the SARFAESI Act would also be protected where such actions were undertaken in good faith under the Act.</p><p>"We do not find that the high court was right in enlarging the scope of the alternative remedy available to respondent No.1 herein," the Court said.</p><p>The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the order passed by the high court in the review petition and restored its original order dated February 9, 2024.</p><p>Allowing the appeal, Court clarified that its order would not prevent respondent No.1 from pursuing an appropriate remedy against the appellant under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.</p><p>All contentions of both sides were left open to be raised before the DRT, Court further clarified.</p><p><b><i>Case Title: International Asset Reconstruction Co Pvt Ltd Vs Jayant Vitamins Ltd &amp; Anr</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justices B V Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih&nbsp;</i></b></p><p><b><i>Date of Judgment: September 17, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/lawbeat-news-desk-sc"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[PIL In Delhi HC Alleges DDA Land Allotted For Daman, Diu & Lakshadweep Bhavans Used For Commercial 'Ginger' Hotel]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Petitioner before the Delhi High Court has alleged that land allotted at a concessional rate for a public purpose in Chanakyapuri was developed into a commercial hotel; DDA assures copy of allotment deed within a fortnight]]></description>
<tags>Delhi High Court,DDA</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/pil-in-delhi-hc-alleges-dda-land-allotted-for-daman-diu-lakshadweep-bhavans-used-for-commercial-ginger-hotel-1641198</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/pil-in-delhi-hc-alleges-dda-land-allotted-for-daman-diu-lakshadweep-bhavans-used-for-commercial-ginger-hotel-1641198</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:08:06 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[A PIL before the Delhi High Court has alleged that land the DDA allotted for the Lakshadweep Bhawan in Chanakyapuri is being run commercially as a Ginger hotel. The DDA has said it will provide the original allotment deed within a fortnight.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288204-lakshadweep-bhawan-ginger-hotel-delhi-high-court-piljpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;">A public interest litigation (PIL) before the <b>Delhi High Court </b>has alleged that land allotted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for the Dadra and Nagar Haveli Daman and Diu and Lakshadweep Bhawan in Delhi's Chanakyapuri area was instead developed into a commercial hotel operated under the Ginger Hotels brand.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">During the hearing, the petitioner sought the original allotment deed to substantiate the allegation that the property had been put to commercial use contrary to the purpose for which it was allotted.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Responding to the Court's query, the petitioner's counsel stated that the petitioner would approach the DDA within three days to obtain a copy of the document.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Counsel appearing for the DDA assured the Court that the request would be dealt with expeditiously and that a copy of the allotment deed would be provided within a fortnight of receiving the request.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner has alleged that the commercial development of the property was contrary to the original allotment, under which land was provided at a concessional rate for a public purpose.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The matter was heard by a division bench of <b>Acting Chief Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre</b> and<b> Justice Sanjay Sharma</b>.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>PIL Questions Commercial Use Of Land Allotted For Lakshadweep Bhavan<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner submitted that, under the Central Government's policy, the DDA allotted land to States and Union Territories for the construction of their respective Bhavans in Delhi.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was contended that Daman and Diu and Lakshadweep, both Union Territories, were allotted land in the Chanakyapuri area, where a State Bhavan had earlier been operational.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to the petitioner, the respondent authorities subsequently developed the property through a private entrepreneur and established a hotel and cafeteria operating under the name Ginger Hotels.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner argued that land allotted at a concessional rate for a public purpose could not be used in a manner that resulted in unjust enrichment through a private commercial enterprise. It was submitted that the property ought to have been utilised for the benefit of the public and in accordance with the purpose underlying the original allotment.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner contended that the alleged commercial use violated the terms of the allotment and ran contrary to the objectives of the Directive Principles of State Policy.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Petitioner Highlights Accommodation Needs Of Lakshadweep Residents<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner also highlighted the difficulties faced by residents of Lakshadweep who travel to Delhi for education, healthcare and other medical purposes.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">It was submitted that Lakshadweep is predominantly inhabited by tribal communities and that a designated Bhavan in the national capital would serve as an important source of accommodation for residents visiting Delhi.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to the petitioner, State Bhavans are intended to cater to the needs of people from their respective regions, including those who travel to Delhi for essential purposes and may find it difficult to arrange accommodation.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner further alleged that Ginger Hotels operated the property by charging dynamic room rates, which, according to the submission, were not less than ₹7,000 on a given day.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioner argued that such commercial use was inconsistent with the public purpose for which the land had allegedly been allotted.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>DDA To Provide Allotment Deed Within A Fortnight<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">During the hearing, the Court asked the petitioner's counsel about obtaining the original allotment deed.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Counsel responded that the petitioner would approach the DDA within three days with a request for a copy of the document.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The DDA's counsel, appearing on advance notice, stated that the request would be attended to expeditiously and that the allotment deed would be made available within a fortnight.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In view of the proposed request and the DDA's assurance, the Court permitted the petitioner to amend the PIL to incorporate appropriate pleadings in support of the allegations. The amended petition is to be placed on record within four weeks, and the matter has been directed to be listed after six weeks.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The original allotment deed is expected to provide the petitioner with the document sought to support the contention that the property's present use is inconsistent with the terms and purpose of its allotment.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The allegations concerning the diversion of the property remain the petitioner's contentions and have not been established as findings of the Court.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Section 91 CrPC: Supreme Court Says Accused Entitled To Seek Prosecution Records To Shape Up Defence]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court held that accused persons may seek unrelied documents under Section 91 CrPC/Section 94 BNSS from prosecution, but voluminous records may first be inspected before specific documents are produced during trial.]]></description>
<tags>Supreme Court of India,Section 91 CrPC,Section 94 BNSS,Framing of Charges,CBI</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/section-91-crpc-supreme-court-says-accused-entitled-to-seek-prosecution-records-to-shape-up-defence-1641192</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/section-91-crpc-supreme-court-says-accused-entitled-to-seek-prosecution-records-to-shape-up-defence-1641192</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Judgments]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 07:00:11 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court balances defence rights with trial efficiency.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288143-supreme-court-section-91-crpc-unrelied-prosecution-documents-charge-framing-stagejpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court has held that while an accused is entitled to seek documents in the possession of the prosecution to shape their defence, the stage at which such documents can be sought must be balanced against the nature and volume of the records.</p><p>A Bench of Justices J B Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran said that an accused may seek production of documents from the investigating agency under Section <a href="https://devgan.in/crpc/chapter_07.php#s91" target="_blank">91 </a>of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) [now Section 94 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023]. However, where the documents sought are voluminous, the prosecution may permit the accused to inspect them first.</p><p>The accused can thereafter seek production of specific documents required for their defence at the appropriate stage of the trial, including during the examination of witnesses, instead of seeking all such documents indiscriminately at the stage of framing of charges, the Bench said.</p><p><b>Section 91 of CrPC</b> empowers a court or an officer-in-charge of a police station to summon or order the production of any document or thing necessary or desirable for an investigation, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding.</p><p>Court was hearing a plea filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (<a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/cbi" target="_blank">CBI</a>) against orders directing it to produce certain documents, specifically "unrelied" documents, at the stage of framing of charges.</p><p>The accused, Anil Dixit, had filed an application under Section 91 CrPC seeking certain documents. The application was allowed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, on September 21, 2019.</p><p>The <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/central-bureau-of-investigation" target="_blank">CBI </a>subsequently filed a compliance report, producing some of the documents while resisting the production of others and stating that certain documents were not in its possession.</p><p>A further application filed by Dixit resulted in an order dated July 18, 2022, which was affirmed by the impugned order and subsequently challenged by the CBI before the Supreme Court.</p><p>Before the Court, Dixit filed an affidavit stating that he was not seeking the source of information received by the CBI or the case diaries.</p><p>Court proceeded on the premise that an accused is entitled to documents available with the prosecuting agency for the purpose of shaping their defence. However, it said the question of at what stage such documents can be sought had to be examined with reference to the specific documents being requested.</p><p>The Bench noted that the documents sought included registers maintained by the CBI and source information, which could not be divulged. Dixit had also withdrawn his request for those documents.</p><p>As regards the request for photocopies of all documents seized by the investigating officer but not relied upon in the chargesheet, Court noted that the CBI had permitted inspection of the documents considering their voluminous nature.</p><p>"The accused could examine such documents and seek for production of the specific document required at the appropriate time, when the appropriate witness is being examined either by the prosecution or the defence, for which purpose the CBI shall keep the files ready at the time of trial," the Bench said.</p><p>Alternatively, Court said, the CBI could permit the accused or their authorised representative to identify the particular documents required during inspection.</p><p>Such documents could then be specified in writing and signed by both sides. The same would also be produced before the trial court without delay, and only the documents so identified would need to be kept available before the court at the time of trial, the Supreme Court ordered.</p><p>In view of these directions, Court directed the trial court to proceed with the case and set aside the impugned orders, with a view to facilitating an expeditious trial.</p><p>In the present case, the FIR was registered on October 31, 2014, against several accused persons. It alleged that between 2010 and 2014, the accused, acting in criminal conspiracy with each other, awarded consultancy work for preparation of the master plan and comprehensive architectural, building, designing and engineering designs for the permanent campus of the Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi.</p><p>The prosecution alleged that the work was awarded on the basis of fake documents and that fraudulent payments were made to the concerned firms, causing a wrongful loss of Rs 1,92,08,774.</p><p><b><i>Case Title: Central Bureau of Investigation Vs Anil Dixit</i></b></p><p><b><i>Bench: Justices J B Pardiwala and K Vinod Chandran</i></b></p><p><b><i>Date of Judgment: September 25, 2026</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/lawbeat-news-desk-sc"><![CDATA[Lawbeat News Desk -SC]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Jantar Mantar De-Notified As Protest Site: Delhi Police Order Challenged In SC Over Shift To Ramlila, Burari & CBD Grounds]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[An application filed in the Supreme Court in a pending matter on the Delhi protests contended that the Court had earlier recognised Jantar Mantar as a designated protest site and found Ramlila Maidan unsuitable, and questioned whether the new venues, some allegedly near the city's landfills, could host public gatherings]]></description>
<tags>Jantar Mantar,Protest Site,Ramlila Ground,Right to protest,Delhi Police,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/jantar-mantar-de-notified-as-protest-site-delhi-police-order-challenged-in-sc-over-shift-to-ramlila-burari-cbd-grounds-1641188</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/jantar-mantar-de-notified-as-protest-site-delhi-police-order-challenged-in-sc-over-shift-to-ramlila-burari-cbd-grounds-1641188</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:56:56 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[An application before the Supreme Court has challenged the Delhi Police Commissioner's standing order of October 11, 2026, which de-notified Jantar Mantar as a protest site and designated Ramlila Ground, Burari Ground and CBD Ground in East Delhi as the new venues for demonstrations]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288176-supreme-court-of-india-jantar-mantar-protest-site-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Delhi Police's decision to strip Jantar Mantar of its status as a designated protest site has been challenged before the Supreme Court. The challenge is to a standing order issued on October 11, 2026 by Delhi Commissioner of Police Anurag Kumar, which de-notified the site and named Ramlila Ground, Burari Ground and CBD Ground in East Delhi as the venues for protests and demonstrations in the national capital.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The challenge has been brought through an application filed in a petition already pending before the Supreme Court, which concerns issues arising from the protests in Delhi and the Delhi Police's response to them.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta</b>, a former judge of the Delhi High Court, is expected to appear for the applicant.</p>

<p dir="ltr">By the standing order of October 11, the Commissioner of Police de-notified Jantar Mantar as a protest venue. In its place, the order designated three locations: Ramlila Ground, Burari Ground and CBD Ground in East Delhi. The order states that a detailed and revised Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for protests at the three venues will be issued separately.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The order came amid protests in the capital against the Election Commission of India and <a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/chief-election-commissioner">Chief Election Commissioner</a> (CEC)&nbsp;<a href="https://lawbeat.in/tags/gyanesh-kumar">Gyanesh Kumar</a>, and police action against those protests.</p>

<p dir="ltr">The application relies on an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court. It points out that the Court had previously recognised Jantar Mantar as a designated site for protests and had rejected Ramlila Maidan as an unsuitable alternative.</p>

<p dir="ltr">On that basis, the application as per reports, questions the rationale behind the restrictions now imposed by the Delhi Police and the choice of the alternative locations. The application also raises concerns about the three venues themselves. It alleges that some of them are situated near Delhi's landfill sites, and questions whether they are suitable for hosting public gatherings.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Furthermore, the application raises concerns over the availability and suitability of designated protest venues in the national capital following the de-notification of Jantar Mantar.</p></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Rahul Gandhi's SIR Plea: Supreme Court Registry Flags 14 Defects, Rs 200 Fee Shortfall]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Missing documents, Rs 220 fee shortfall, incomplete papers among the 14 defects flagged by the Registry in Rahul Gandhi’s Supreme Court petition against Election Commission of India.]]></description>
<tags>Rahul Gandhi,Gyanesh Kumar,Chief Election Commissioner,Special Intensive Revision (SIR),Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhis-sir-plea-supreme-court-registry-flags-14-defects-rs-200-fee-shortfall-1641181</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhis-sir-plea-supreme-court-registry-flags-14-defects-rs-200-fee-shortfall-1641181</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:50:32 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court against the Election Commission of India on October 12, 2026, alleging irregularities in the SIR process]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/12/2287733-supreme-court-of-india-rahulgandhi-opposition-leader-2026jpg.webp' /><p>Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, who has filed a joint petition before the Supreme Court along with several opposition leaders on October 12, challenging alleged electoral irregularities and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has run into 14 procedural defects, the Supreme Court Registry flagged.&nbsp;</p><p>The objections include missing authorisation documents, an illegible identity card of Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge and a shortfall of Rs 220 in court fees. The registry has also raised questions about the documents submitted with the petition and the naming of individual Election Commissioners as respondents.</p><p>Five Opposition leaders, led by Gandhi, <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/rahul-gandhi-kharge-akhilesh-yadav-move-supreme-court-against-election-commission-over-sir-irregularities-1640989" target="_blank">approached </a>the Supreme Court on Monday, October 12, 2026, with a writ petition against the Election Commission of India, alleging irregularities in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process. The petition was lodged through Advocate-on-Record S Prasanna shortly before the Court's filing counter was due to close for the day.
</p><p>Apart from Gandhi, the petition has been filed by Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge, Trinamool Congress MP Saugata Roy, Samajwadi Party chief Akhilesh Yadav, Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Tejashwi Prasad Yadav and others. The matter has been titled "Rahul Gandhi vs Election Commission of India".
</p><p>The petition invokes the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and is directed against the Election Commission of India, the constitutional body responsible for the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections. Its central grievance is that the SIR process has been marred by irregularities.
</p><p>The contents of the petition have not yet been made public. Details of the grounds urged, the prayers made and the specific relief sought by the petitioners are awaited. It is not known when the matter will be listed before a Bench. </p><p>Ahead of the filing, the Supreme Court permitted a delegation of 10 to 15 Congress leaders to enter the filing counter within the Court premises. According to reports, the delegation was to submit the petition against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar and alleged vote theft. The reports added that the delegation would remain outside the high-security zone of the Court complex.</p><p>The filing coincided with the INDIA bloc's planned "Chalo Dilli" march, which Gandhi led from Connaught Place to the Supreme Court in protest against the functioning of the Election Commission.
</p><p><b>CJI Surya Kant declined request to meet opposition MPs </b></p><p>The Opposition went ahead with the march although Chief Justice of India Surya Kant had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/discussing-pending-cases-against-ethics-judicial-propriety-cji-surya-kant-on-refusing-to-meet-rahul-gandhi-mallikarjun-kharge-1640973" target="_blank">declined</a> a request for a meeting with Opposition MPs on the issue.
</p><p>Notably, on October 11, the CJI had refused to meet with Rahul Gandhi, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge and other opposition leaders and discuss their allegations concerning electoral irregularities.
</p><p>On October 10, the leaders had requested an appointment on Monday, 12the October, 2026, between 4 PM and 5 PM, to submit a memorandum concerning: <br>(a) the Chief Election Commissioner / Election Commission of India; <br>(b) the arbitrary arrest of several students; <br>(c} the closure of metro stations; and <br>(d) the cancellation of trains, among other issues.
</p><p>In a letter, the CJI had said, "At the very outset, it may be noted that the issues referred to hereinabove are already sub judice before the Supreme Court of India. Therefore, convening a meeting to discuss pending cases would wholly contravene the principle of Separation of Powers, an intrinsic facet of the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution of India, and would be incompatible with the established ethics and judicial propriety." </p><p>CJI Kant also reminded Gandhi and other that within our constitutional framework, the Supreme Court of India is not endowed with any administrative powers to deal with the issues highlighted by them. </p><p>"It would thus be more appropriate on your part to invoke the judicial powers of the Supreme Court of India, instead of submitting a memorandum on the administrative side. Incidentally, some matters highlighting similar issues are scheduled for hearing on Tuesday, 13.10.2026. If so advised, you may submit your petition on Monday, either physically at the Supreme Court of India, between 10:30 A.M. and 04:30 P.M., or alternatively, by utilising the e-filing option, which permits filing at any time and on any day. You have my assurance that any such petition shall be heard at the earliest possible opportunity, in accordance with the law," the letter added.
</p><p>This development came ahead of a planned Opposition march to the Supreme Court today under the banner “Chalo Delhi – March for Democracy”, announced by Gandhi amid the continuing political controversy over electoral rolls and demands for the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Gandhi and Kharge had written to the CJI requesting an opportunity to hand over a memorandum setting out their concerns.
</p><p><b><i>Case Title: Rahul Gandhi and Ors. v. Election Commission of India</i></b></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Madras High Court Upholds TN Speaker's Decision To Accept Resignations Of AIADMK MLAs Who Later Joined TVK]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[The Madras High Court has upheld the Speaker’s acceptance of six AIADMK MLA resignations, ruling that disqualification proceedings against them will continue.]]></description>
<tags>Madras HC,AIADMK,Tamil Nadu,JCD Prabhakar</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/madras-high-court-upholds-tn-speakers-decision-to-accept-resignations-of-aiadmk-mlas-who-later-joined-tvk-1641175</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/madras-high-court-upholds-tn-speakers-decision-to-accept-resignations-of-aiadmk-mlas-who-later-joined-tvk-1641175</guid>
<category><![CDATA[News updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:46:29 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[The Madras High Court has upheld Speaker JCD Prabhakar’s acceptance of the resignations of six AIADMK MLAs who joined TVK, and directed that their disqualification proceedings be completed within two months.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288148-madras-high-court-aiadmk-mlas-resignation-tvk-disqualificationjpg.webp' /><p style="text-align: justify;">The Madras High Court on Tuesday upheld Tamil Nadu Assembly Speaker JCD Prabhakar’s decision to accept the resignations of AIADMK legislators who quit the Assembly after the state elections and subsequently joined Chief Minister Joseph Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK).<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">A Division Bench of <b>Chief Justice SA Dharmadhikari</b> and<b> Justice G Arul Murugan</b> held that the resignations were genuine and that the Speaker was not expected to conduct a detailed inquiry into the reasons behind the legislators’ decision to resign.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">However, the Court clarified that acceptance of the resignations would not bring the pending disqualification proceedings against the legislators to an end. It directed the Speaker to complete those proceedings within two months.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Court partly allowed a petition filed by AIADMK whip Agri Krishnamurthy challenging the Speaker’s decision to accept the resignations.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The dispute arose from allegations that certain AIADMK legislators had defied the party whip by voting in favour of the TVK government during a confidence motion before subsequently resigning and joining the ruling party.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitions concerned six legislators: Maragatham Kumaravel, P Sathyabhama, Isakki Subbaiah, Jayakumar, MR Vijayabhaskar and C Vijayabhaskar.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>AIADMK Challenged Acceptance Of Resignations<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">AIADMK whip Agri Krishnamurthy and National People’s Power Party leader Ravi approached the High Court challenging the orders accepting the legislators’ resignations.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioners questioned the manner in which the resignations had been accepted, contending that the Speaker had not conducted a meaningful inquiry into whether they were voluntary. They also referred to allegations of horse-trading and argued that the circumstances surrounding the resignations warranted closer scrutiny.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to the petitioners, the legislators tendered their resignations on May 25, 2026, and the Speaker accepted them on the same day. A Gazette notification was subsequently issued, and the legislators joined the TVK.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The AIADMK argued that the speed with which the resignations were accepted, followed by the legislators’ move to the rival party, raised questions about whether the constitutional procedure had been followed in substance.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Relying on Article 190 of the Constitution, the petitioners submitted that the Speaker was required to satisfy himself that the resignations were voluntary and genuine. They contended that the procedure adopted in the present case amounted to little more than formal compliance and that the party should have been given an opportunity to raise its objections.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The petitioners also referred to a complaint submitted to the Governor alleging horse-trading.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Speaker Says Resignations Were Voluntary<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Opposing the challenge, the Speaker maintained that he had personally interacted with the legislators before accepting their resignations and was satisfied that they had acted voluntarily.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Assembly Secretary argued that the petitions were based on an incorrect understanding of the legal consequences of resignation. It was submitted that a legislator’s resignation did not erase the consequences of conduct that could attract disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, accepting a resignation could not, by itself, extinguish or render infructuous disqualification proceedings arising from alleged defection.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Speaker argued that Article 190(3)(b) required the Speaker to examine the genuineness of a resignation rather than investigate the political motives behind it.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">He submitted that there was no allegation that the resignation letters had been written by anyone other than the legislators themselves. According to the Speaker’s side, the resignations had been accepted after verifying that they reflected the members’ own free will and were not the result of coercion or undue influence.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The legislators who resigned, argued that a member’s decision to vacate an Assembly seat should not automatically be treated as evidence of wrongdoing.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">She submitted that resigning from the legislature before joining another political party was an exercise of democratic choice and dissent, and that the legislators’ actions could not, merely on that account, be presumed to involve corruption or malpractice.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The legislators maintained that they were entitled to leave their seats and join another political party.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><b>Background: AIADMK MLAs Backed TVK Government<br></b></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The dispute followed the Tamil Nadu Assembly election results declared on May 4, 2026, in which the TVK emerged as the party with the highest number of votes but fell short of the majority required to form the government on its own.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The TVK, led by Vijay, subsequently secured support from other parties and formed the government. A confidence motion was held in the Assembly on May 13, with the government securing 144 votes in its favour.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to the AIADMK, the party had issued a whip on May 11 directing its legislators to oppose the confidence motion. However, 25 MLAs allegedly voted in favour of the TVK government, contrary to the party’s direction, prompting disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule on May 14.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">Some proceedings against legislators were later dropped after they apologised for their conduct, according to the material placed before the Court.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">The legislators whose resignations are at issue subsequently tendered their resignations on May 25 and joined the TVK.<br></p><p style="text-align: justify;">By-elections were also held in Maduranthakam and Dharapuram after Maragatham Kumaravel and P Sathyabhama resigned and joined the TVK. Both contested on TVK tickets and retained their seats.<br></p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/himanshi-hans-53811"><![CDATA[Himanshi Hans]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Supreme Court Stays Defamation Case Against Rahul Gandhi Over "Choro Ke Sardar" Remark On PM Modi]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Supreme Court issued notice on Rahul Gandhi's plea to quash the criminal complaint and stayed further proceedings before the trial court, after Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi argued that the issues were identical to another matter in which a stay had already been granted]]></description>
<tags>Rahul Gandhi,Prime Minister Narendra Modi,Criminal Defamation Case,Bombay High Court,Supreme Court of India</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-stays-defamation-case-against-rahul-gandhi-over-choro-ke-sardar-remark-on-pm-modi-1641153</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-stays-defamation-case-against-rahul-gandhi-over-choro-ke-sardar-remark-on-pm-modi-1641153</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Top Stories,Supreme Court Updates]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 05:50:04 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Supreme Court stayed further trial court proceedings in a criminal defamation case against Rahul Gandhi over his alleged "Choro ke Sardar" and "Commander-in-Chief" remarks about Prime Minister Narendra Modi]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/13/2288085-supreme-court-of-india-rahul-gandhi-defamation-case-2026jpg.webp' /><p>The Supreme Court on Tuesday stayed further proceedings in a criminal defamation case against Congress leader and Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha <b>Rahul Gandhi</b>, which arises from his alleged references to Prime Minister Narendra Modi as "Choro ke Sardar" and "Commander-in-Chief". The Court issued notice on Gandhi's petition seeking to quash the case.</p><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper">

<p dir="ltr">The matter was heard by the bench of<b> Justices Vikram Nath </b>and<b> Aparesh Kumar Singh</b>. </p><p dir="ltr"><b>Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi</b> appeared for Gandhi.</p>

<p dir="ltr">Singhvi told the Bench that the case raised questions already before the Court in another proceeding. <i>"These are identical issues. Pls see page…,"</i> Singhvi said. He added, <i>"There is also a third matter involving Shashi Tharoor pending."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">After a brief exchange, the Bench passed the following order:<i> "Issue notice, in the meanwhile further proceedings before the trial court shall remain stayed."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">During the hearing, Justice Nath put a question to the senior counsel in Hindi.</p>

<p dir="ltr"><i>"Akhbaar mei naam chapega ya nahi chapega?"</i> Justice Nath asked, which translates to <i>"Will the name get printed in the newspaper or not?"</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">Singhvi, smiling, replied, <i>"My lords, I said nothing. I am only placing my case."</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">Justice Nath then asked, <i>"Nobody is opposing you here?"</i></p>

<p dir="ltr">In response, Singhvi referred to the earlier proceeding in which the Court had granted him interim relief despite resistance from the other side.</p>

<p dir="ltr"><i>"In another case, where your lordships gave me a stay, Mahesh Jethmalani heavily opposed me on a caveat. That order is there,"</i> he submitted.</p><p dir="ltr">Conclusively, the proceedings before the trial court have been stayed.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>Background</b></p></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><p>On September 8, the Bombay High Court had <a href="https://lawbeat.in/amp/news-updates/bombay-hc-refuses-to-quash-defamation-case-against-rahul-gandhi-over-commander-in-thief-remark-on-pm-modi-1629710">refused</a> to quash criminal defamation proceedings against Rahul Gandhi over his 2018 remarks against Prime Minister Narendra Modi, including the reference to PM as "commander-in-thief" and "Choron Ke Sardar".</p><p>Justice N.R. Borkar had dismissed Gandhi’s petition challenging the Girgaon Magistrate’s order that had issued process against him, holding that there was no manifest illegality or perversity warranting interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).</p><p>The Court had however, granted Gandhi six weeks’ relief from appearing before the magistrate, enabling him to approach the Supreme Court against the High Court’s decision. The direction deferring proceedings before the magistrate, which had been issued earlier, was continued for the six-week period.</p><p><b>Complaint over remarks against PM Modi</b></p><p>The case arose from a complaint filed by BJP member Mahesh Shrishrimal before the Girgaon Magistrate Court. According to the complaint, Gandhi allegedly made defamatory statements about Modi during a public rally in Rajasthan in September 2018, in the context of the Rafale fighter jet controversy.</p><p>Shrishrimal also relied upon a video posted by Gandhi on his social media account in which the "commander-in-thief" reference was allegedly repeated. The complainant claimed that the remarks caused reputational harm to Modi and also affected persons associated with him and the BJP. The magistrate, after considering the material placed before the court, issued process against Gandhi on August 28, 2019.</p><p>Gandhi subsequently approached the Bombay High Court after receiving the summons in 2021, seeking quashing of the proceedings. It was his case that the complaint was legally unsustainable and amounted to a politically motivated prosecution. A central argument was that Shrishrimal could not maintain the defamation complaint because he was not the person directly targeted by Gandhi's remarks.</p><p>Gandhi also relied upon Section <a href="https://devgan.in/crpc/chapter_14.php#s199" target="_blank">199 </a>of the CrPC, which states about who can initiate criminal defamation proceedings. It was argued that the complaint could not be maintained in the manner adopted by Shrishrimal. It was further contended that the alleged remarks were directed at the Prime Minister and did not identify the BJP or a sufficiently definite group of persons so as to give an individual party member a cause of action for defamation.</p><p>The state opposed his plea, contending that material before the magistrate disclosed a prima facie offence and that the High Court's inherent jurisdiction could not be used to conduct an appreciation of evidence at this stage. It was also argued that the complainant could qualify as an aggrieved person where the allegedly defamatory imputation was capable of extending to an identifiable group connected with the Prime Minister and the BJP.</p><p>Complainant Shrishrimal's counsel also opposed Gandhi's plea, maintaining that the complainant had personally supported the allegations and produced material before the magistrate. He argued that the magistrate had independently examined the material before issuing process and that there was sufficient basis at the preliminary stage for the proceedings to continue.</p><p><b>What did the High Court observe?</b></p><p>The High Court ultimately declined to conclusively determine whether Gandhi's statements were confined to Modi or also extended to members and functionaries of the BJP.</p><p>Justice Borkar observed that the question of how far the alleged imputations extended, and whether they affected identifiable members of the party, would depend upon an assessment of the evidence and the context in which the statements were made. The Court held that such an assessment was better left to the trial stage rather than being conclusively determined while exercising the limited jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.</p><p>Justice Borkar found no sufficient basis to exercise the High Court's inherent jurisdiction against the magistrate's order. The Court further concluded that, considering the overall facts and circumstances, there was no infirmity in the magistrate's decision to issue process.</p></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><b>Case Title: Rahul Gandhi v. State of Maharashtra</b></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><b><i>Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Aparesh Kumar Singh</i></b></div><div class="pasted-from-word-wrapper"><div><b><i>Hearing Date: October 13, 2026</i></b></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/sukriti-mishra"><![CDATA[Sukriti Mishra]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Trilegal Advised Runwal Enterprises on INR 5,000 million IPO]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Trilegal advised Runwal Enterprises Limited (REL) on its initial public offering]]></description>
<tags>Trilegal,IPO,Initial Public Offering</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-runwal-enterprises-on-inr-5000-million-ipo-1641095</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-runwal-enterprises-on-inr-5000-million-ipo-1641095</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Deal Beat]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[aishwarya iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 15:33:51 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Trilegal advised on IPO aggregating INR 5,000 million which comprised a fresh issue of 16,398,962 equity shares of face value INR 2 each.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/12/2288010-trilegal-dealsjpg.webp' /><p>Trilegal advised Runwal Enterprises Limited (REL) on its initial public offering (IPO) aggregating to ~INR 5,000 million. The issue comprised a fresh issue of 16,398,962 equity shares of face value INR 2 each. 
</p><p>REL, through itself, it’s subsidiaries, joint ventures and associate (REL Group) is a real estate developer present across the full spectrum of real estate development, specializing in residential projects that cater to affordable, mid-income, and luxury segments, as well as commercial spaces, retail malls and educational buildings.</p><p>REL Group is a recognized brand in the industry and has a strong presence in Mumbai. REL Group is also backed by marquee investors including, HDFC Capital Affordable Real Estate Fund - 3, Nishi-Nippon Railroad Co. Ltd, Genkai Capital Secured Investment Pte. Ltd and Nexus Realty Trust.</p><p>The proceeds from the IPO will be used for repayment / prepayment of full or in part of certain borrowings availed by REL and its subsidiaries.</p><p>The syndicate of book running lead managers comprised ICICI Securities Limited and Jefferies India Private Limited.</p><p>The Trilegal Capital Markets team advising on the matter was led by Partners, Richa Choudhary and Maitreya Rajurkar, and comprised Senior Associate, Pooja Tada and Associates, Yug Gambhir, Siddhant Mishra, Samruddhi Varma, Shreyansh Gupta, and Arnab Goswami.</p><p>Trilegal’s Partner, Sai Krishna Bharathan, provided strategic inputs on the transaction.</p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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<title><![CDATA[Trilegal Advised CPPIB On INR 30 billion Equity Investment In Prestige Hospitality Ventures]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[Trilegal advised the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board on its proposed direct investment of INR 30 billion in Prestige Hospitality Ventures.]]></description>
<tags>Trilegal</tags>
<link>https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-cppib-on-inr-30-billion-equity-investment-in-prestige-hospitality-ventures-1641092</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://lawbeat.in/deal-beat/trilegal-advised-cppib-on-inr-30-billion-equity-investment-in-prestige-hospitality-ventures-1641092</guid>
<category><![CDATA[Deal Beat]]></category>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[aishwarya iyer]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 15:12:49 GMT</pubDate>
<imagecaption><![CDATA[Trilegal advised CPPIB on the transaction and on corporate, operational and real estate due diligence, CCI filing, and drafting and negotiation of the transaction documents.]]></imagecaption>

<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img src='https://lawbeat.in/h-upload/2026/10/12/2288006-trilegal-dealbeatjpg.webp' /><p>Trilegal advised the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board on its proposed direct investment of INR 30 billion (c. C$441 million) in Prestige Hospitality Ventures, the hospitality arm of the Prestige Group. Subject to receipt of regulatory approvals and upon consummation of the investment, CPPIB will acquire a stake of ~27% and the investment marks CPPIB’s first direct investment in India’s hospitality sector.
</p><p>Trilegal advised CPPIB on the transaction and on corporate, operational and real estate due diligence, CCI filing, and drafting and negotiation of the transaction documents. The closing of the transaction is subject to completion of CPs, including receipt of regulatory approvals.</p><p>Prestige Hospitality Ventures owns luxury and premium hotels in key gateway cities across India, with a development pipeline spanning Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi, Goa, Hyderabad and Mumbai.</p><p>The Trilegal Transaction Team advising on the matter was led by Partner: Sai Krishna Bharathan; and comprised Senior Associate: Raina Mitra; Associates: Archi Jain and Annika Bohra.</p><p>Diligence Teams:</p><p>The Trilegal Real Estate Team advising on the matter was led by Partners: Monika Bhonsale, Mridul Kumbalath, Sadaf Shaikh, and Arnav Nagalia; and comprised Counsels: Dilnaz Bapasola, Sohni Kherada and Mohammed Sayed; Senior Consultant: Yunus Nawab; Consultant: Ganesh Memane; Senior Associates: Mythri Jonnala and Roshini Bansal; Associates: Siddhartha Fondekar, Shashank D Bharadwaj, Rajat Deepak Kalal, Suhaschandra BS, Aakanksha Dalal, Akanksha Shah, and Parth.</p><p>The Trilegal Corporate Team advising on the matter was led by Partner: Apeksha Mattoo; and comprised Counsel: Namesha Singh; Senior Associates: Maitreya Sharma, Raina Mitra; Associates: Vrinda Bhola, Vaishnavi Bansal, Sanchit Thapliyal, Rohan Singhal, Rehaan Engineer, Harsh Bhatti, Anjali AR, Arshan Kazi, Archi Jain and Annika Bohra.</p><p>The Trilegal Operational Team advising on the matter was led by Partners: Apeksha Mattoo, Kunal Gupta, Thomas J. Vallianeth; and supported by Counsel: Shrishma Dandekar; Senior Consultant: Chandan Dhand; Consultants: Shashwat Shrivastava, Vaishnavi, Pranvi Manglick; Senior Associates: Anshul Sharma, Sidharth Ray, Maitreya Sharma, Raina Mitra; Associates: Akshobhya Nitin Pol, Anjali AR, Annika Bohra, Archi Jain.</p><p>The Trilegal Competition Team advising on the matter was led by Partner: Gauri Chhabra; and supported by Senior Associate: Eesha Sheth; Associate: Shobhit Shukla.</p><p>The Trilegal SEBI Regulatory Team advising on the matter was led by Partner: Pranav Atit; and supported by Senior Associate: Janeesha Singh; Associates: Tanvi Godiwala and Ashlesha Pandey</p>]]></content:encoded>
<source url="https://lawbeat.in/aishwarya-iyer"><![CDATA[Aishwarya Iyer]]></source>
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